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THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Dissertation Abstract 
Community Members’ Perspectives on the Thurgood Marshall Academic High School 
Riot: A Case Study of the Effects of Embedded Law Enforcement in High School 
Despite studies by legal and social-justice organizations pointing to connections 
between school-based police referrals and arrests that lead youth (particularly of color) 
into the juvenile-justice courts and criminal courts and are funneling students of color 
into the school-to-prison pipeline, schools increasing use school resource officers (SROs) 
in programs on K–12 campuses. Much of the academic literature about SROs in schools 
highlight the rationale for placing programs in urban schools from the perspectives of 
policymakers, legislators, members of the juvenile- and criminal-justice systems, and 
school district officials. Limited scholarly work documents the voices of impacted 
members of school communities (educators, students, and families) bearing the 
ramifications of SROs and school-based policing programs placed on their campuses. 
The San Francisco Unified School District’s Thurgood Marshall Academic High 
School (TMAHS) “October 11, 2002 Police Riot” holds a place in U.S. public school 
history. It is the second largest law-enforcement response (126 officers) to a K–12 
facility, for a “nonweapon” school fight, escalated to a riot by the increase in SROs on 
the campus. 
A narrative, qualitative research approach was used for this study that involved 10 
one-on-one interviews with former members (students, educators, and parents) of the 
TMAHS Community. Research findings revealed that participants recognized the 
TMAHS era in three distinct phases: (a) Pre-10/11, (b) 10/11, and (c) Post 10/11, and 
then (d) the overall impact that TMAHS and the 10/11 riot had on their lives. Factors that 
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motivated participants to become deeply invested in TMAHS were the school’s clear 
collaborative education philosophy and the notion that if students of color were given the 
right tools, success was more than possible but wholly probable. Reflections pointed to 
factors that shifted the school’s philosophy under new school leadership that 
implemented harsh zero-tolerance policies and tripled the number of SROs on campus. 
This research yielded recommendations for professional practice and key 
questions that should be asked of and discerned from a broad spectrum of potentially 
impacted school community members before placing SROs or embedding armed law-
enforcement officers on a school’s campus. Additional recommendations were to reassess 
zero-tolerance policies, removing school-based law-enforcement personnel from the 
student disciplinary process, and implementing a restorative-justice-and-practices model 
for community-harm accountability, reconciliation, and reduction for school community 
members. Finally, developing an ongoing system of accountability measures and data 
monitoring would ensure that racialized behaviors and bias tensions are eliminated from 
interactions between law-enforcement officers and school community members. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In September of 2002, the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) alerted 
the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) that a gun fight was ensuing between rival 
students at Washington High School (see Map 1, #1) on the northwest side of San 
Francisco. The police department responded to the incident with one squad car. 
Washington High School had 2,390 students enrolled at the time (California Department 
of Education [CDE], 2017), with a predominately Asian and Caucasian student body. A 
week later, another student altercation occurred: a knife fight with students at Lincoln 
High School (see Map 1, #2) with about 2,560 students enrolled (CDE, 2017), also on the 
northwest side of San Francisco and also with predominately Asian and Caucasian 
student body. The SFUSD alerted the SFPD, which responded by sending six officers 
(N’T. Lee, 2004) to the scene. On October 11, 2002, an on-campus SFPD school resource 
officer (SRO), stationed at Thurgood Marshall Academic High School (TMAHS), located 
on the southeast side of San Francisco (see Map 1, #3), alerted SFPD that there was a 
nonweapon school fight between some African American boys (Fuentes, 2013). The 
TMAHS student population had a more even spread of diversity between Asian, African 
American, and Latino students. 
2Map 1 
Locations of George Washington (#1), Abraham Lincoln (#2), and Thurgood Marshall 
Academic High Schools (#3) in San Francisco, CA. 
Note. Washington, Lincoln and Thurgood Marshall high schools in San Francisco, by 
Google.com, 2018, retrieved from https://www.google.com/maps/search/washington 
,+lincoln+and+thurgood+marshall+high+schools+in+San+Francisco,+CA/@37.7575548,
-122.5088421,12z/data=!3m1!4b1 
The response by local law-enforcement agencies to that riot was to send 126 
armed police in special-weapons-and-tactics gear and sheriffs in riot and tactical gear 
with helicopter support. The San Francisco Fire Department was called to the scene as 
well as ambulatory support. These first responders descended on Thurgood’s small high 
school campus with an enrollment of 1,150 (CDE, 2017) and surrounded blocks in the
neighborhood (Office of Citizen’s Complaints [OCC], 2004). Upon their arrival at the 
school, the police immediately took command of the school building and staff, as the 
authority onsite, for what was understood to be a nonweapon school fight (OCC, 2004). 
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Students and their families and teachers, whose comments appeared in a series of 
newspaper articles featured in The San Francisco Chronicle and other local papers, 
attested to their incredible dismay of racial slurs and police brutality experienced by 
Black and Latino students at the hands of the riot police descending on their school 
campus and disrupting what would have been a relatively normal school day, if school 
administrators had been managing a school fight and the students involved (Delgado, 
2002; Delgado, Van Derbeken & Asimov, 2002; Gordon, 2004). The primary concern 
repeated reflected singularly on the following question: How could a nonweapon school 
fight devolve into the SRO-led law-enforcement melee that enveloped the Thurgood 
Marshall community on October 11, 2002? 
Based on the sociopolitical climate of U.S. cities from the 1980s through the 
2000s, renewed declarations of the war on drugs, gangs, and criminal behavior turned its 
gaze toward youth, particularly youth of color, with the dawn of the superpredator 
phenomenon. Zero-tolerance policies and tough-on-crime laws were enacted to support 
harsh penalties for the smallest infractions. All municipalities (rural, suburban, and 
urban) governed through crime, used ordinances embraced by politicians and media 
outlets as a reaction to the fear-mongering. However, urban areas, along with targeted 
Black and Brown youth, became a focal point, bearing the brunt of law enforcement’s 
wrath. These policies became the overarching rationale for school policymakers, 
legislators, and members of juvenile-justice systems to justify the placement of SROs in 
public schools. In urban areas, high concentrations of youth of color were targeted as part 
of the gang and drug element, broadening their criminal reach into schools. 
Much of the literature about SROs and the SRO programs in U.S. schools focused 
on highlighting the rationale for placing SRO programs in urban schools from the 
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perspectives of policymakers, legislators, members of the juvenile- and criminal-justice 
systems, and school-district officials. Several Gun Free and Anti-Gang Initiatives enacted 
at the federal level in throughout the 1990s served as legislative responses to juvenile 
crime. A multitude studies by legal and social-justice organizations (Brown, 2015b; 
Donohue, Schiraldi & Ziedenberg, 1998; Ghandnoosh, 2014, 2015), attempted to 
ascertain and verify the deliberate and definitive cause-and-effect connections that stem 
from school-based police referrals and arrests leading into the juvenile-justice, criminal-
court, and, eventually, prison systems (Goldsmith, 2016; Petteruti, 2011). 
To better understand the City of San Francisco, its School District and Law 
Enforcement, along with TMAHS’s universe at the time of the 10/11 riot and what could 
have led to an event that shocked the city, it becomes necessary to offer some school 
background and describe the nouveau-like renaissance environment of modern day San 
Francisco in the 1990s and 2000s.  
TMAHS was previously Pelton Middle School (San Francisco NAACP, 1983, p. 
22) with a regular maximum student capacity of about 800 students. Over the summer of 
2002, the school had grown to between 993 and 1,150 students, due to the closing of 
neighboring McAteer High School in the spring of 2002 (Fuentes, 2013; N’T. Lee, 2004; 
TMAHS-SARC, 2002). TMAHS used the higher 280 graduation requirement to account 
for remediation-course offerings that many incoming students needed to reach grade 
level. The higher credits also allowed students college-entry readiness with the 
completion of the A-G Course Requirements (University of California, 2017) upon 
graduation from TMAHS, and gave students more opportunities to take advanced-
placement and honors courses by the time many reached their senior year. 
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By the start of the 2002 school year, SFUSD leadership and board of education 
eliminated the higher graduation-credit requirement at TMAHS from a 280-unit 
graduation requirement to the districtwide 230 units and the sophomore class had already 
begun its credit trajectory. Also, over the summer of 2002, the entire senior 
administrative staff had been replaced. The principal and two vice principals were 
completely new to the school, the student body, school staff, and the families of TMAHS 
(N’T. Lee, 2004). The new administrators were not indoctrinated into the unique college-
going culture of the school, nor did they comprehend the deep relationships of many 
families with the staff, regardless of cultural or ethnic background. Their struggle to 
blend, mix, and mingle with students, staff, and community was palpable. TMAHS was a 
multicultural school (CDE, 2017) in a tightly knit community. 
Additionally, during the summer in 2002, hundreds of McAteer students were 
assigned and transferred into TMAHS without attending the traditional Thurgood 
Marshall Way Summer Bridge Program (TMAHS SARC, 1997). Since the school’s 
inception, the staff at TMAHS created a summer bridge program, grade-level specific, to 
help incoming students adapt to the block class schedule, assess remediation needs if any, 
and conform to the widely accepted college-going culture that existed at the school. 
Parents or students’ guardians agreed to support students’ attendance and future 
college career by signing a symbolic pledge as an incoming member of the TMAHS 
Community. The sophomore class of 2002 was the last class of TMAHS students to 
participate in the 2001 Summer Bridge Program. Last, by the start of the school year in 
2002, the school had replaced the well-known and respected SRO with two SROs who 
were new to the school and surrounding community. The former SRO respected the staff, 
students, and families and received their respect in return. However, it was also common 
6 
 
knowledge that the SRO preferred remaining primarily stationed at the nearby Southern 
Police Station in Bayview, which was a brisk 10-minute walk downhill from the school. 
The SRO only came to campus to handle issues that required a police officer’s attention. 
In 2002, the entire TMAHS Community, except any incoming transfer and freshman 
students, knew this SRO’s philosophy and peace-officer interactions with students 
(Fuentes, 2013). 
The newer SROs on campus had no relationships with the staff or students, nor 
did they have an opportunity to “summer bridge” into the school culture. The new SROs 
were also told by school administrators that the school had racial tension between African 
American and Asian students, though those tensions had not existed in the history of the 
school. However, in a meeting that took place just before the school year began, the new 
principal noted to the Parent Teacher Student Association, “the problem being with the 
Black students” (Fuentes, 2013, p. 172). After the riot, in a press conference, Captain 
Puccinelli of Southern Station in Bayview summarized the circumstances as a series of 
fights that began just before school started Friday morning, when one youth was attacked 
by a group of 10 to 15 students outside the school. That attack precipitated a big fight, 
and the two officers in the school were overwhelmed (Delgado et al., 2002). However, 
several teachers and students said police had used their batons, grabbed the hair of 
students involved in the melee, and handcuffed innocent youths. “They were acting as if 
this was a riot, but it was not at the riot stage,” said Hartzog, a teacher at Marshall for 5 
years. “The whole thing could have been resolved calmly, without having officers here in 
force” (Delgado et al., 2002). 
In 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) introduced the Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) in Schools Program (“Police in schools,” 2016; DOJ, 
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2016) to SFUSD through the Police Department and the City and County of San 
Francisco budgeting process by fully funding 26 armed SFPD SROs throughout SFUSD 
secondary schools (Fuentes, 2013). Although California school districts were 
experiencing deep budget cuts for student-support-service needs, such as counselors and 
school nurses, if coupled with the COPS program, schools could receive fiscal allocations 
for the counselors and nurses they had requested, along with an SRO as a part of the 
support-services package (SFUSD, 2003). Law enforcement, when referring to the COPS 
program, have called themselves those much-needed extra pair of hands for school 
counselors or the deemed keepers of the peace for administrators by their presence on 
school campuses (Greer, 2015; Wald & Thurau, 2010). 
Statement of the Problem 
School-community narratives from students, educators, and families about the 
SRO programs and policing activities in urban schools has largely been absent from 
scholarship. Therefore, a deep need exists to explore, through the school community’s 
voice, their impressions of the SRO program and policing activities at one specific high 
school: TMAHS in San Francisco. 
Background and Need for the Study 
The TMAHS riot of October 11, 2002 was a catastrophe waiting to happen. All 
elements of a racially charged police melee were present, contributing to a moment that 
forever changed the life course of hundreds of TMAHS students, their families, and the 
educators working at the school. Nevertheless, having the elements of the melee present 
did not mean the riot had to happen. 
The need for this study stemmed from decades-long negative interactions between 
K–12 students of color and policing agencies placed in their schools. When the decision 
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place law-enforcement officers in schools by various policymakers, the missing voices of 
the impacted community (particularly students of color, their families, and teachers) 
rarely has been deeply considered. The following background illustrates the volatile 
result of education and municipal leadership’s combining (a) the driven implementation 
of zero=tolerance school and community policies, with (b) a sanctioned and enabled 
police force on campus, and then (c) turning an intentional deaf ear to the school 
community’s concerns regarding the detrimental effects of the aforementioned on 
students’ academic and emotional well-being. 
Some of San Francisco’s most noteworthy civic bureaucracies have been deeply 
intertwined for several decades. Each entity’s actions impacted the others’ over the years 
with significant implications and ramifications. Evidence of this could not have been 
made clearer than in the early part of the 21st century through a recapitulation of the 
sociopolitical climate of and relationship between the City of San Francisco, the SFPD, 
and the SFUSD. Adding to the overall climate of San Francisco’s early 21st-century 
existence is the history of TMAHS, connecting the school’s origins to the 1983 U.S. 
Northern District Court’s Consent Decree from the national landmark case of the San 
Francisco Chapter of the NAACP versus the SFUSD and the Post-911 training mandates 
for law enforcement in municipalities across the United States. 
In 2002, San Francisco had 3 African Americans in the most prominent positions 
of leadership in the jurisdiction of city and county. The Mayor, Willie L. Brown, 
reelected in 1999, was nearing the end of his second term and had recently appointed the 
Chief of Police, Prentice Earl Sanders. Arlene Ackerman, hired in 2000 by a vote of the 
Board of Education of the SFUSD, was Superintendent of Schools. 
9 
 
Mayor Willie Brown 
Mayor Willie Lewis Brown, was elected Mayor of San Francisco in a run-off 
election on December 12, 1995, beating incumbent and 1-term Mayor Frank Jordan. 
Brown had closed out a successful, yet tumultuous 31 years in the California State 
Assembly. He resigned his post as Speaker of the Assembly to become what he 
proclaimed as the pinnacle of his political career, requesting to no longer be Mr. Speaker 
but rather Mr. Mayor to all who knew him (Richardson, 1996). 
Throughout his mayoral campaign, Brown combatted many foes he had acquired 
in his time in the state assembly: politicians ready to repay Brown for hard-fought battles 
and losses, business entities that did not get a coveted contract, and investigative 
journalist who could not make allegations stick to him. However, Candidate Brown 
continued working in Sacramento, laying the ground for younger Democrats, in case he 
won in San Francisco, so his legacy and work could carry the party forward, including 
awarding lucrative government contracts. Brown had out-campaigned his opponent by 
working the neighborhoods of San Francisco and phone banking with friends from 
Sacramento and family members from across the United States. He gained endorsements 
from candidates eliminated in the November election, which led to his victory in the 
December 1995 run-off. In the press, Brown avoided incendiary topics like the 
concluding O. J. Simpson trial and the Million Man March in Washington D.C., while 
carefully ensuring not to offend the LGBT community or other San Francisco power 
brokers from the Asian, Jewish, arts, and downtown-business communities (Richardson, 
1996). 
By December 12th, Brown had built a relationship with San Francisco’s citizens, 
and the media referred to Brown as “Da Mayor,” acknowledging his new national 
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platform as “an instant spokesman for urban America” (Richardson, 1996, p. 391). On 
December 13, 1995, Brown said “I enjoy everything I do, and I do it with glee. I’m not 
into doom and gloom. I’m into happiness. I hope San Francisco takes on my style and my 
attitude” (Richardson, 1996, p. 389). The local press responded, as The San Francisco 
Examiner’s inauguration request titled 
Sunrise over a Stylish New S.F. … Please do not change a bit in office, Willie. 
Keep those beautiful women on your arms. Keep going to the Academy Awards. 
Keep wearing that yellow silk tuxedo. We’ve had enough “citizen mayor” 
baloney. We want a real mayor, a slick politician who is funny and fearless, who 
charms us and who makes us proud when he goes on “Nightline” or “Letterman.” 
San Francisco is a royalist city without a royal family. You’re it for the next four 
years. (Richardson, 1996, p. 404) 
Brown would remain a towering force, politically and socially, in San Francisco, well 
beyond the end of his second term, which ended in 2004. Brown’s weekly Sunday 
column in The San Francisco Chronicle, the city’s only mainstream media print 
newspaper, continues in 2017, entitled Willie’s World. 
Chief of Police Earl Sanders 
Prentice Earl Sanders moved to San Francisco in the 1950s, working odd jobs 
while attending high school and playing football during the day. After graduation, 
Sanders went into the military and continued working odd jobs until he took the SFPD 
officer’s examination, passing with high marks (Reiterman & Glionna, 2003). However, 
the police force in San Francisco was highly segregated throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
with no Asians or women and only two Latino officers. Also, the force had a preference 
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for White officers in hiring and for nearly all promotional opportunities in the 
department. African Americans in the SFPD formed Officers for Justice in 1968 to 
advocate for better wages, assignments, and a change in the racial composition and hiring 
practices of the department (Williams, 2014). 
In 1971, Robbery Inspector Earl (as he had become known) Sanders became a 
homicide detective, gaining respect after solving several homicide cases, as well as 
working to solve the infamous zebra-killing attacks and murders. The zebra killings were 
a series of racially motivated, yet seemingly random attacks and murders in the early 
1970s that had been terrorizing San Francisco (Reiterman & Glionna, 2003). However, 
because there was little movement by the 1970s in the SFPD in promoting Blacks or 
hiring Latinos, Asians, and Women, the Officers for Justice sued the 
City & County of San Francisco, the San Francisco Police Department, and the 
Civil Service Commission for its failure to recruit and hire minorities. 
Announcement of the suit opened the flood gates and overnight the Officers For 
Justice’s lawsuit was joined by the National Organization of Women, Chinese For 
Affirmative Action, the NAACP and other Latino and Japanese community 
organizations 
achieving class-action status (Williams, 2014, para 6) and won. The SFPD, assigned a 
special monitor by the judge, began to transform hiring and promotion practices. Sanders 
had risen in police ranks to become Assistant Chief of Police to Chief Fred Lau in the 
1990s. In Mayor Brown’s second term, he needed to search for a new Chief of Police to 
replace retiring Chief Lau. Assistant Chief Sanders was next in line and, in the summer of 
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2002, became the first African American Chief of Police in the City and County of San 
Francisco (Reiterman & Glionna, 2003). 
Superintendent Arlene Ackerman 
Arlene Ackerman began her education career by ascending through education 
positions as a classroom teacher, then transitioning to school administration as a middle 
school principal in St. Louis, then to district-administration ranks. She was recruited by 
The Seattle School district recruited her in 1992 to join their district administration and, 
in the late 1990s, she moved to Washington D.C. to eventually become the 
Superintendent of Schools. While Ackerman was building leadership skills, San 
Francisco’s public schools were struggling with school-segregation issues and 
inequitable-education opportunities for African American students, settled by lawsuits 
and an ongoing Consent Decree implementation measures (Orfield et al., 1992). 
In 2000, Ackerman was the first female and African American Superintendent of 
San Francisco’s public schools, after the Board of Education and teacher’s union 
leadership recruited her from her Washington D.C. Superintendent position (Livingston, 
2011). Ackerman immediately noted fiscal discrepancies in contracting and alerted the 
FBI of potential fraud in a whistleblower lawsuit (City Attorney of San Francisco, 2004). 
After a lengthy investigation that garnered national attention, Ackerman had recouped 
more than $50 million in cash and services owed to SFUSD. While SFUSD was 
regaining valuable funds lost from years of fraudulent contracting, Ackerman worked on 
a strategic plan to support the district’s underperforming schools, located primarily in the 
southeast sector, initiating the Students and Teachers Achieving Results (STAR) 
program. Ackerman introduced STAR in 2002, as the Consent Decree was due to reach 
its end date. Superintendent Ackerman requested an extension on the Decree’s ending 
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date, offering the STAR program as justifiable reasoning for further support and district 
monitoring. The court agreed to extend the Decree date to the end of 2005 (Livingston, 
2011). 
The SFUSD Consent Decree Creates TMAHS 
These prominent San Francisco African Americans had all been born in the 
educationally segregated southern United States: Brown (Richardson, 1996) and Sanders 
(Reiterman & Glionna, 2003) in the 1930s in Texas and Ackerman (Martin, 2013) in the 
1940s in Missouri. Additionally, because the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme 
Court case would not occur until 1954 (Biegel, 2008), Mayor Brown, Police Chief 
Sanders, and Superintendent Ackerman, all living as adults in the cosmopolitan 
metropolis of San Francisco in 2002, received part of their primary education in the 
segregated South. The early education backgrounds of all three of San Francisco’s 
prominent African Americans—Brown, Sanders and Ackerman—strikes an important 
note in San Francisco leadership roles. In 1978, the San Francisco Chapter of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), on behalf of 
African American parents who had children enrolled in the San Francisco Public Schools 
sued SFUSD. The suit garnered national attention because of San Francisco’s uniquely 
diverse community (Biegel, 2008), Fagan summarized the suit as follows: 
San Francisco branch of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (“SFNAACP”) and a group of black parents filed a class-action 
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. They 
charged the San Francisco Unified School District, its board members and its 
superintendent, the California State Board of Education and its members, the 
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State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Department of Education 
with engaging in racially discriminatory practices and maintaining a segregated 
school system in San Francisco, in violation of the constitutions and laws of the 
United States and California. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and 
injunctions guaranteeing them equal educational opportunity and fully 
desegregated schools under a court-ordered desegregation plan, as well as an 
award of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Fagan, 2008, p. 1) 
Founded in 1994, TMAHS was “established by the [SFUSD], in agreement with 
the parties to the Consent Decree [of 1983] and the approval of the Court” (TMAHS-
SARC, 1994). Originally named San Francisco Academic High School, TMAHS was to 
model its curriculum after Raoul Wallenberg High School, located on the west side of 
San Francisco, created in 1981 to provide a “small school, family-type atmosphere for the 
college-bound” student (Wallenberg-SARC, 1994, p. 1). Although, TMAHS accepted 
students from across San Francisco, because it was “located in the Bayview-Hunters 
Point neighborhood, it “reserves 40% of enrollment spaces for students from these 
neighborhoods” (TMAHS-SARC, 1995, p. 1), and later opened its “enrollment 
preferences to students residing in zip codes 94124, 94134, and 94110” (TMAHS-SARC, 
1997, p. 1). 
During feasibility studies conducted before the plans for TMAHS were finalized, 
noted successes were experienced by 1994 at Philip and Sala Burton High School 
(Burton), also located south side of San Francisco and created by the Consent Decree (in 
1983). In those schools, multiple students received 4-year academic scholarships to such 
prestigious higher education institutions as Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
15
Chancellors Awards to the University of California at Berkeley (Burton-SARC, 1994, 
p. 1), it was deemed more suitable for Thurgood’s curriculum to be modeled after Burton, 
as the school also served many residents in the 94124, 94134, and 94110 zip-code sectors 
of San Francisco (see Map 2). 
Map 2 
San Francisco Zip Code Used for Consent Decree Area Boundaries for Thurgood 
Marshall High School 
 
Note. From San Francisco, California (CA) Zip Code Map—Locations, Demographics, 
by City-data.com, 2018, retrieved from http://www.city-data.com/zipmaps/San-
Francisco-California.html 
Therefore, with a close association with a nearby successful Consent Decree high school 
(Burton), TMAHS was designed as a 4-year college-preparatory high school with 
mandatory “focus on mathematics, science, and technology” (Orfield et al, 1992; 
TMAHS-SARC, 1994, p. 1). 
16 
 
Later, through continuous improvement strategies, TMAHS implemented the 
following: 
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT: 280 credits are required for graduation. Four 
years of mathematics and science. Orientation and Summer Bridge Program are 
mandatory for all incoming 9th graders. Parents & students are required to sign a 
contract of commitment to “The Thurgood Marshall Way.” (TMAHS-SARC, 
1997, p. 1) 
All students are required to take four years of English, mathematics, and science. 
All students are required to take three years of social science, and world language 
(Chinese, French, Japanese, or Spanish). All students are required to take two 
years of technology which involves computer science and/or computer 
applications. 
 We are on a block schedule to facilitate more in-depth teaching/learning. 
We also have common planning time for teachers to discuss students’ work and 
plan curriculum and standards-based instructional strategies to meet students’ 
needs,” previously implemented then documented in 2002. (TMAHS-SARC, 
2002, p. 5) 
In the 2001–2002 graduating class of TMAHS, Thurgood boasted it had sent just 
as many or more of its graduates to University of California and California State 
University colleges than the nationally renowned Lowell High School, located on the 
northwest side of San Francisco, as well as obtained more than $998,000 in senior-class 
scholarships. The ethnic background of TMAHS students in the inaugural year, 1993 (see 
Table 1) and during the 2002–2003 (see Table 2) showed the school was 14.9% Latino, 
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28% African America, and 45% Asian. The grade level demographics of the TMAHS 
student body was evenly divided by grade (CDE, 2017). The ethnic demographic of 
Thurgood in 2002 was similar to its inaugural year of 1994, and in 2012, still within 
Consent Decree percentages (Zabarte, 2016). 
Local Law Enforcement after 9/11 
After the September 11, 2011 terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the downed Flight 93 in Somerset, PA, 
law-enforcement agencies throughout the United States began creating homeland-security 
centers at local municipal and state levels of government. The California State Threat 
Assessment Center (CAL STAC, 2017a) is a state-level agency created in response to the 
9/11 attacks and deficient national-level information sharing that preceded its creation. 
By September 25, 2001, CAL STAC could assuage and address all types of crimes and 
hazards that threaten Californians and its infrastructure. The California Highway Patrol in 
Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Orange County, and San Diego runs day-to-day 
operations. At the local level, the CAL STAC partner is the California State Threat 
Assessment System (STAS), connecting the county sheriff, a city police department, and 
fire and emergency-management systems (CalStas, 2017) to focus on public safety 
locally. STAS mirrors CAL STAC monitoring of human smugglers, criminal gangs, and 
drug activity, in addition to terror and extremist threats against the lives and assets of 
citizens. 
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In May of 2002, STAS distributed a joint Secret Service and Department of 
Education commissioned report to local law-enforcement agencies, titled Threat 
Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating 
Safe School Climates, as a guide to prepare for all types of K–12 school-site violence that 
might occur in their jurisdiction (Fein et al., 2002). 
The guide includes specific preparations for “Implementing a School Threat 
Assessment Process, Conducting a School Threat Assessment, and Managing a 
Threatening Situation” (Fein et al., 2002, p. 8). The guide’s predecessor and companion 
report, The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the 
Prevention of School Attacks in the United States, by several of the same of authors 
(Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum & Modzeleski, 2002), introduced the School Threat 
Assessment Tool as a promising school-based violence-mitigation device for local law 
enforcement to implement “in tandem with emergency planning with schools and the 
school district” ( Vossekuil et al., 2002, p. 37) as soon as possible. Peripherally 
commenting on foreign terror threats, this report addresses situations similar to Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute or Columbine High School campus threats. 
When reflecting on the Thurgood Marshall police riot, officials from San 
Francisco’s SFPD and Sheriff agencies’ handling the Thurgood Marshall October 11th 
riot blamed the other departments for escalating panic and causing fear in the school’s 
small community (Driver, 2002). SF Sheriff Hennessey indicated that the deputies’ 
tactical unit, in full tactical gear, was in the vicinity, training for a “hypothetical 
Columbine-like event at a school—when they got a call from the Police Department to go 
to the school. We never touched the students. We just did what the cops asked us to do” 
(Reilly, 2002). SFPD’s Assistant Deputy Chief countered with evidence from a videotape 
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of the police riot, taken by a teacher who was falsely arrested, showing baton-swinging 
deputies rushing “in a formation towards the students in full riot gear, while our guys are 
seen standing on the sidelines” (Reilly, 2002).  
Later, the investigation revealed that the police department did not contact the 
sheriff’s department. The sheriff’s department, already rehearsing for a K–12 violent 
school incident nearby, heard the school had an issue and rushed over in their riot gear 
(Driver, 2002). Further research shows that police units have been able to use students as 
test models when testing new tactics; students serve as live experimental subjects (Beger, 
2002, p. 120), forced into cooperating because they are students and tactics testing 
happens during the school day. 
Local policing-agency decisions regarding schools traditionally did not involve 
outreach for guidance from local school families or community members. Law-
enforcement agencies typically communicated new procedures through their 
administrative counterparts, who transmitted the information to the school-district 
leadership and governing body of schools in a memorandum, updated operations manual, 
or consent calendar of items that received blanket approvals in meetings. 
San Francisco Mainstream Media 
Local print and television media reported on the TMAHS 10/11 police riot. Every 
local television station in the San Francisco-Bay Area covered the riot for about a week, 
with print media’s coverage carrying regular in-depth perspectives on the day and actors 
involved. The San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco New Bayview Paper, The San 
Francisco Guardian, The San Francisco Examiner, Sing Tao Daily, and El Tecolote had 
coverage for their various readerships. However, The San Francisco Chronicle’s 
broadsheet (the largest newspaper format available) coverage of the riot was sustained. 
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The Chronicle’s reporting of the TMAHS October 11, 2002 riot was covered by a total of 
seven reporters for nearly a 2-year period. The primary reporters were Delgado (2002) 
and Gordon (2004), augmented intermittently with other reporters. 
This dissertation’s case study included providing a document analysis of The 
Chronicle’s coverage of the TMAHS riot from October 12, 2002 through September 30, 
2004. This dissertation compares the reporting of the Thurgood Marshall riot through a 
series of articles. The aim was to discern if a collection of direct and indirect provocation 
instances would reveal a certain type of influential reporting about the event as well as 
accountability for all people involved in the event. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to provide TMAHS former community members 
(students, educators, and parents) an opportunity to offer their perspectives on the overall 
school climate at TMAHS and how it felt to have permanent placement of armed law-
enforcement officers on their school campus before the October 11, 2002 police riot, 
during, and afterwards. The majority of the sophomore, junior, and senior classes in 2002 
entered the school in their freshman year under the mandatory 280-credit graduation 
requirement expectations (TMAHS-SARC, 1997). All three classes of students and their 
families participated in The Thurgood Marshall Way Summer Bridge program and 
became indoctrinated in the cohesive TMAHS college-going culture. Those students 
were familiarized with the previous principal, vice principals, counselors, and singular 
SRO assigned to the school. In filtering potential student participants, at minimum, the 
2002 sophomore and junior classes had been at TMAHS as freshmen a full year prior to 
the October 11, 2002 riot, had been at school during the October 11, 2002 riot, and stayed 
at TMAHS after the October 11, 2002 riot. 
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This study did not discount students’ families and educators who had an 
opportunity to experience the previous principal, vice principals, counselors, and SRO as 
well as the new principal, vice principals, counselors, and SROs. Their views and 
reflections on the impact of permanently assigned law-enforcement officers or SROs on 
them or the environment of their high school was the focal point of this study. With a 
total of 10 qualitative study participants, reflections were accrued through a series of 
individual narratives from former TMAHS students, teachers, and parents. 
Historical data gathered by the case-study researcher, also a former TMAHS 
Community member, and The San Francisco Chronicle from October 2002 to September 
2004, documenting the TMAHS 10/11 riot, triangulated the study. In this qualitative 
research, the triangulation of multiple data sources provided validity (as suggested by 
Creswell, 2012; Roberts, 2010, Yin 2009). 
Research Questions 
This study was guided by the following research questions: 
1. How did embedded on-campus police presence affect school climate at 
TMAHS? 
2. To what extent did the TMAHS October 11, 2002 police riot impact students, 
teachers, and parents? 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for the dissertation was the theory of deterrence 
(Polinsky & Shavell, 1999; Skiba & Peterson, 1999, Wright, 2010), which posits that, 
regardless of the crime or offense to the whole, the punishment must be much more 
severe than any reasonable consequence to deter any other or further attempts of an 
offense or equal to something similar in the future. Accompanying the theory, its 
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customary companions are zero-tolerance policies and the broken-windows theory. This 
is the rationale associated with the three-strikes laws (Wright, 2010). 
Rooted in the theory of deterrence is broken-windows theory, which hypothesizes 
that by creating fear among community members, policing agencies attempt to regain 
order from the speculated escalation of community disorder and deterioration, based on 
the notion that one original broken window eventually may cause turmoil (Hinkle & 
Weisburd, 2008; Ranasinghe, 2012). Regarding the TMAHS riot, The Chronicle’s press-
conference comments from SFPD Captain Puccinelli about TMAHS students on the 
evening of October 11, 2002 elevated the fear of family and community members. 
Puccinelli noted, “there was a riot going on in that school. If we do nothing, we are 
derelict in our duty, and someone might get killed in there” (Delgado et al., 2002, para 
11). 
At TMAHS, an enabled police force believed that causing fear among 
communities of color, especially with youth, through tactics developed under the guise of 
zero tolerance, resulted in “an overreaction,” recounted by English teacher McKamey. 
“The level of this response was a total disconnect with what was actually happening. Our 
students watching this cannot believe it. … They were being treated like common 
criminals” (Delgado et al., 2002, para 8). 
Viewing the TMAHS 10/11 riot through a critical-race theory (CRT) lens, as a 
support theory, weaves study narratives into research that can identify policing power 
structures, reflections about race, and the intended or unintended implications for 
students of color and their school communities (Bell, 1995; Tate, 1997; Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2012; Yosso, 2005). A crucial component of CRT, in the context of school 
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settings, speaks to valuing the social and cultural capital that students of color brought to 
the TMAHS school setting from their families, homes, and communities (aligned with 
Yosso, 2005). Social and cultural capital in CRT are values and experiences of people of 
color often not recognized or acknowledge by the “dominant ideology and White 
privilege” (Yosso, 2005, p. 74). 
Throughout U.S. history, bureaucracies and educational institutions extolled 
academic objectivity, self-determination, and operationalized equality for all to succeed 
through opportunities, but minimized assets of students of color such as home languages, 
family structures, and community networks based on cultural background. CRT adds 
legitimacy to the historical wisdoms of storytelling or having a voice (Ladson-Billings, 
1998), passed down the generations as equally valuable with other social attributes 
canonized and maintained in U.S. society. Dominant culture sees these cultural-capital 
assets as deficiencies and believes efforts to resist the dominant ideology by students of 
color should be squashed at all costs in dominant-culture schools’ settings (Solórzano & 
Yosso, 2002). An insidiously lurking form of racism, uncovered by the CRT lens, is 
known as dysconscious racism in the CRT racism structure. In 1992, King noted that 
people of color revealed a type of acceptance of life’s conditions that clearly could trace 
back to unjust racial discrimination. King called this internalized racism dysconscious 
racism. Dysconsciousness is inadequate and distorted thinking about cultural inequity and 
diversity, subtly and unconsciously justifying the normalcy of White dominant norms and 
privilege (King, 1991; Vinh, 2009). 
Another concept bringing these theories together was Freire’s concepts that 
undergird CRT structure and support combating systematic oppression to help youth of 
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color’s intransitive consciousness. A mind that has succumbed to oppression without 
resistance in educational settings challenges the dominant ideology (D. E. Collins, 1998). 
The difficult work to unravel the tightly bound intransitive consciousness can be found in 
Freire’s critical-consciousness studies and practiced as conscientiousness between 
progressive educators and students. 
Traditionally indoctrinated “educators most often assume that schools work and 
that students, parents and community need to change to conform to this already effective 
and equitable system” in the eyes of the existing power structures (Yosso, 2005, p. 75), 
regardless of what CRT considers a social asset. This deficit model of thinking in schools 
that predominantly educate students of color presupposes students enter the education 
universe with less than their White peers. Furthermore, it supposes their families do not 
care about supporting academic excellence, as evidenced by achievement gaps made of 
their own doing that have existed for decades (Bell, 1995; Yosso, 2005). These theories 
and practices are necessary to understand the systems of oppression that permeate 
bureaucratic systems such as public schools, particularly those with a majority population 
of youth of color, sent to learn within their walls. 
Limitations of the Study 
Limitations for this case study and research that impacted the studies’ results were 
in multiple areas. A limitation was identifying the varied study participants who still 
reside in the nine northern California San Francisco-Bay Area counties. An additional 
source of participants was one or two crucial participants in southern California and 
Arizona who are senior citizens and were noted to be infirm. 
The elderly and infirm TMAHS Community members who were ultimately 
unavailable for participant interviews are unknown to the researcher. Other potential 
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participants who did not come forward may have had family and caregiver obligations, 
work issues, or physical challenges that may have prevented their participation. 
Conducting the research without those participants did not prevent the research from 
moving forward. 
A timing limitation for the research occurred through various miscommunications 
with the University of San Francisco Institution Review Board (IRB), resulting in final 
approval to conduct research well after the anticipated start of May 2017. Understanding 
that many of the potential participants’ availability during the summer months was more 
flexible than at other times of the year made the summer an optimal period to conduct 
this research. With IRB approval occurring in September of 2017, the researcher and 
various TMAHS Community members who were educators or former students (now 
parents), made negotiating school and work schedules more challenging. Overall, this 
timing may have limited snowball sampling in accessing and acquiring participants. 
Delimitations of the Study 
This case-study research had more than a few delimitations. It was imperative to 
narrow the scope and to focus the breadth of research toward the research questions on 
the case-study topic. Further, issues regarding the police action at TMAHS on October 
11th did raise emotional wounds that were long dormant in a few study participants. 
However, when asked, participants noted that the disturbances from the past did not 
affect their overall well-being. Careful and ethical considerations were taken to inform 
participants about the anticipated conversation. The researcher recalled this period in 
their history with each participant, well before the study interview began. Participants had 
some time to consider and reconsider participating in the study and how it would affect 
their thoughts about police and SROs, particularly if they were currently in the education 
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profession at a school site and had to interact with police. The researcher was an integral 
TMAHS Community member from the 2001 academic school year and remained 
involved with the school until December 2014. The researcher did not select certain 
members of the TMAHS Community for the study due to the following circumstances: 
(a) past experiences of contention between the researcher and member, (b) the member 
was still employed by SFUSD and may not have been able to speak honestly, (c) the 
member had been more directly involved in the 10/11 riot and appeared at that time to be 
deeply traumatized, or (4) the member was targeted after the riot in an ongoing retaliatory 
manner by the SFPD or SFUSD. 
Additional delimitations considered were those in the overall TMAHS 
Community itself and their abilities to decipher their own feelings and behaviors during 
their time at TMAHS and the effects of that time on their lives. These are parameters of 
the question timeline. During the study, various TMAHS Community members 
disassociated themselves fully from the researcher, utterly stopping all communication 
until the research had concluded. 
Educational Significance 
This research contributes to the gaps in scholarly work that failed to address 
insights from impacted school community members (e.g., students, teachers, 
administrators, and families). This study elicited reflections involving law-enforcement 
officers and SROs placed in their schools as a form of security measure. The research 
brought to light those voices often not heard or entreated to participate in decisions about 
the placement and funding of embedded police or SROs in schools at the district and 
municipal levels, with little regard for the effect on the school’s culture and impacted 
community. This research also revealed that the layered decisions to continuously embed 
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police, consistently increase their numbers in public schools, and enforce zero-tolerance 
policies are not accidental manifestations of targeted youth of color, their families, and 
their teachers. Scholarly research rarely highlights those impacted voices of students, 
educators, and parents regarding the community-decimating structures and practices 
setup in tightly-knit education communities that are meant to serve disenfranchised 
students of color. 
This study provides background and research to school districts’ governing 
bodies, city legislators, and policymakers. This research study may assist public 
advocates, grappling with the long-term effects of police-embedded school environments 
and arrests on campus. A need persists to hear from and understand problems 
experienced by impacted school students, teachers, and parents who are present on a 
school’s campus along with the SROs or police. Policymakers can and should draw on 
this study’s research to support their decision-making process, analyzing the various 
elements, leaving no reason to solely rely on police-union lobbyists, siloed one-note 
conversations, and unrefuted law-enforcement statistics that support the referral of SROs 
to a permanent on-campus assignment (Dudnick, 2014). Present in this research was an 
opportunity to assist decision makers to consider selecting a different model of restorative 
discipline or model of police interaction with students, educators, and community 
members who are part of school communities. 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms were operationalized for this study: 
A-G Requirements. Widely used and accepted for University of California (UCs) 
and California State Universities as well as private colleges and universities, the A–G 
course requirements, also known as A–G course sequence is a list of subject requirements 
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created in the high school course schedule from freshmen through senior year. Its purpose 
is to ensure students obtain a general body of knowledge that will provide breadth and 
perspective to new, more advanced study. The list of courses in the sequence are 
history/social science (“a”), English (“b”), mathematics (“c”), laboratory science (“d”), 
language other than English (“e”), visual and performing arts (“f”), and a college-
preparatory elective (“g”). “These courses are to be academically challenging, involving 
substantial reading, writing, problem solving, and laboratory work (as appropriate), and 
show serious attention to analytical thinking, factual content, and developing students’ 
oral and listening skills (University of California Office of the President, 2017). 
Block schedule. “A system for scheduling the middle- or high-school day, 
typically by replacing a more traditional schedule of six or seven 40 to 50-minute daily 
periods with longer class periods” (e.g., 90 to 120 minutes) that meet on an every-other-
day schedule throughout the week. One bonus of block scheduling is that student become 
accustomed to this schedule, which mirrors college-campus schedules for classes, making 
the transition to a college campus seamless (Glossary of Education Reform, 2017). 
Board of education/Governing education body. A body of people/board 
controlling an educational system or a unit of it; especially, a board of citizens controlling 
especially elementary and secondary public-school education in a state, county, city, or 
town (San Francisco NAACP, et al, 1983). 
Broken-windows theory. Social scientists Wilson and Kelling (1982) posited that 
if a broken window on a building remained unrepaired in a neighborhood for an extended 
period, no matter the socioeconomic level of the neighborhood’s demographics, other 
windows in the building would be broken by any number of residents or passing strangers 
because the population had concluded no one cared. 
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Case study. Creswell defined case study as “a methodology: a type of design in 
qualitative research that may be an object of study, as well as a product of inquiry” (2002, 
p. 97). Further, case studies have bounded systems, are detailed, and use multiple sources 
of information. 
Classroom management. The wide variety of skills and techniques teachers use to 
keep students organized, orderly, focused, attentive, on task, and academically productive 
during a class (Glossary of Education Reform, 2017). 
Conscientization. The process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social 
reality through reflection and action. Action is fundamental because it is the process of 
changing reality. Freire said that all people acquire social myths that have a dominant 
tendency, so learning is a critical process that depends on uncovering real problems and 
actual needs (Freire Institute, 2017). 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), Secure our Schools Initiative. 
COPS Secure Our Schools grants provide funding to state, local, or tribal governments 
working in partnership with public schools to improve school safety. Successful 
programs build on a comprehensive safety assessment that identifies the school’s 
individual needs, and law-enforcement agencies receiving funding collaborate with 
school administrators, teachers, students, and parents to implement solutions to school 
safety challenges (DOJ, 2016). 
Critical consciousness (in education). A level of consciousness characterized by 
depth in the interpretation of problems, by testing one’s own findings while being open to 
revision, attempting to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and preconceived 
notions when analyzing them … affirming the mutual and coequal roles of teachers and 
learners (Heaney, 1995). 
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Critical race theory (in education). A set of basic insights, methods, perspectives, 
and pedagogy that seeks to analyze, identify, and transform those cultural and structural 
aspects of education that maintain dominant and subordinate racial positions inside and 
outside the classroom. The theory in education challenges biological- and cultural-deficit 
stories by using a variety of efforts such as “counterstories, historiographies, corridos, 
oral traditions, films, and poetry (McNee, 2015, p. 12). 
Discipline. The practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behavior, 
using punishment to correct disobedience (N’T. Lee, 2004). 
Enabled police force. A police force unhindered by legal scrutiny and empowered 
by deregulation in a deliberate attempt to preserve the racially disparate criminal-justice 
system (Goldsmith, 2016). 
Generative themes. Generative themes are codifications of complex experiences 
charged with political significance and likely to generate considerable discussion and 
analysis. They derive from a study of the specific history and circumstances of the 
learners (Heaney, 1995). 
Impact. Measure of the tangible and intangible effects (consequences) of one 
thing’s or entity’s action or influence on another (OCC, 2004a). 
Intransitive consciousness. The state of those whose sphere of perception is 
limited, whose interests center almost totally on matters of survival, and who are 
impermeable to challenges situated outside the demands of biological necessity (D. E. 
Collins, 1998). 
Lockdown in a school setting. An emergency measure or condition in which 
school-site staff and students are temporarily prevented from entering or leaving a 
restricted area or the whole building during a threat of danger (OCC, 2004). 
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Off-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law-enforcement officer). 
An SRO patrols perimeters of a physical school location or site, along with the 
surrounding neighborhoods (N’T. Lee, 2004) 
On-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law-enforcement officer). 
An SRO patrols and may have designated space in the physical-school location or site 
(OCC, 2004). 
Police/Law-enforcement officer. A person whose job is in keep the peace, handle 
routine calls for service, respond to emergency calls or in progress crimes, enforce 
criminal, traffic, health and safety code violations; assist during major emergencies and 
natural disasters with evacuations and perimeter security; arrest and book prisoners and 
transport, file crime and incident reports, conduct basic investigations, evaluate and 
secure crime scenes, render first aid in appropriate situations, make death notifications; 
locate and interview witnesses, serve arrest, traffic and search warrants, patrol assigned 
beat or arena in a car, on foot, on a bicycle or horse; a member of the police force (Police 
Test Guide, 2018). 
Prison–industrial complex. Considering the corporate economic and dividend 
structures being attributed to the prison industry, closely reflecting that of the U.S. 
military, the profitability of privatized business–government linkages with corrections 
and public punishment, the exponential expansion of the penal system can now be 
characterized as a prison–industrial complex (Davis, 1998). 
Restorative justice. A social science process that studies a harm-causing offense 
and uses methods involving primary stakeholders in determining how best to repair the 
harm done by that offense. The three primary stakeholders in restorative justice are 
victims, offenders, and their communities of care, whose needs are, respectively, 
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obtaining reparations, taking responsibility, and achieving reconciliation. The degree to 
which all three engage in meaningful emotional exchange and decision making is the 
degree to which any form of social discipline approaches being fully restorative 
(Wachtel, 2013). 
Restorative practices. A practiced social-science process that negotiates how to 
build social capital and achieve social discipline through participatory learning and 
decision making. The use of restorative practices helps reduce crime, violence, and 
bullying; improve human behavior; and strengthen civil society (Wachtel, 2013). 
School campus. The physical location of the school site in the school-district 
jurisdiction (OCC, 2004). 
School community. A school community consists of people associated with the 
school on a regular or integral basis. These members consist of, for example, students, 
teachers, onsite administrators (principal and vice/assistant principal), janitors, cafeteria 
workers, counselors, deans, parents of students attending the school, school-district 
officials assigned to oversee the school, neighboring residents, nearby merchants, and 
nonprofit organizations near the school location that provide services to the school’s 
population (N’T. Lee, 2004). 
School resource officers (SROs). By federal definition, a career law-enforcement 
officer with sworn authority, who is deployed by an employing police department or 
agency in a community-oriented policing assignment to work in collaboration with one or 
more schools (Canady, James, & Nease, 2012; McNicholas, 2008). 
Social justice. Goldfarb and Grinberg defined social justice “as the exercise of 
altering these [institutional and organizational] arrangements by actively engaging in 
reclaiming, appropriating, sustaining, and advancing inherent human rights of equity, 
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equality, and fairness in social, economic, educational, and personal dimensions” 
(Theoharis, 2007). 
Stop and frisk. A legal practice used in the United States, predominantly by the 
New York City Police Department that originated in London in which a police officer 
may detain, ask questions, and search a person who appeared to be suspicious. Stop-and-
Frisk laws were a direct descendant of zero-tolerance practices and broken-windows 
theory. However, after 10 years of the practice, the majority of people who were stopped 
and frisked by the New York City Police Department were African American and Latino 
men between the ages of 14 and 24 (Devereaux, 2012). 
Structural racism. A system in which public policies, institutional practices, 
cultural representations, and other norms work in various often-reinforcing ways to 
perpetuate racial-group inequity. Structural racism identifies dimensions of history and 
culture that have allowed privilege associated with “Whiteness” and disadvantages 
associated with “color” to endure and adapt over time. Structural racism is a feature of 
the social, economic, and political systems in which we all exist (Lawrence, Sutton, 
Kubisch, Susi, & Fulbright-Anderson, 2004). 
Superpredator. A term used to describe youth deemed as violent and 
unredeemable in the eyes of society. In late 1995, DiIulio, a criminologist and political 
scientist, wrote a magazine article entitled “The Coming of the Super-Predators” (Drum, 
2016, para 2). DiIulio said 
We’re talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and no 
sense of the future. And make no mistake, while the trouble will be greatest in 
black inner-city neighborhoods, other places are also certain to have burgeoning 
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youth-crime problems that will spill over into upscale central-city districts, inner-
ring suburbs, and even the rural heartland.  
Three strikes laws. ‘“Three strikes and you’re out,’ requiring that criminals 
involved in three serious, violent felonies be sentenced to prison for guaranteed terms up 
to life imprisonment” (Meese, 1994, p. 58). The three-strikes laws are also part of U.S. 
tough-on-crime policies and zero-tolerance practices. 
U.S. Department of Education. The mission of the U.S. Department of Education 
(2016) is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by 
fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access. 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The Office of the Attorney General was 
created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, sec. 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93), as a one-person 
part-time position. The Act specified that the Attorney General was to be well versed and 
educated in the law with the duty to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court 
in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon 
questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or when requested 
by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their 
departments. (DOJ, 2016) 
War on drugs. A U.S. term commonly applied to a campaign of prohibition of 
drugs, military aid, and military intervention, with the stated aim to reduce the illegal 
drug trade. The term was popularized by the media shortly after a press conference given 
on June 18, 1971, by U.S. President Nixon, the day after publication of a special message 
from President Nixon to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, during 
which he declared drug abuse and its users as society’s moral enemy (Dufton, 2012). 
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Summary 
This dissertation considers the TMAHS October 11, 2002 police riot and denoted 
two very different responses by SFPD officers when dealing with high school students on 
the northwest side of San Francisco. Much of the literature about law enforcement in 
schools or SRO programs comes from the perspective of legislators, policymakers, and 
city and school district leadership without including the perspectives of the communities 
that are directly impacted by those decisions. The chapter provided an introduction and 
brief history of SRO programs and an explanation of how they transitioned into U.S. 
schools through the multiple versions of the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990 and 
systematized tracking databases, coupled with zero-tolerance policies, and the sanctioned 
aggressive behavior of policing agencies by the U.S. court system. 
The introduction to this dissertation included consideration of the sociopolitical 
climate of San Francisco and its convergence with San Francisco’s most prominent 
African Americans at the time of the TMAHS riot in 2002—Mayor Willie Brown, Police 
Chief Earl Sanders, and School Superintendent Arlene Ackerman—to help readers 
understand the larger context in which such an unprecedented event could occur in the 
renowned liberal city. The connection to San Francisco’s African American leaders’ 
segregated childhood education and a brief history of the SFUSD segregation-eliminating 
Consent Decree, which called for the creation of TMAHS in the southeast sector of the 
city, was a way support the growth of mathematics- and science-education opportunities 
in a largely African American community. 
This dissertation focused, through semistructured interviews and research 
questions, to hear TMAHS Community voices on the police riot. The study sought to 
share the unheard voices of students, teacher, and parents about the riot’s effect on their 
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school’s climate and further, if the riot influenced their lives. Additional research data 
used The San Francisco Chronicle’s coverage of the riot and the dissertation researcher’s 
experiences to offer a historical review of San Francisco, the Unified School District, and 
the TMAHS Community and riot. 
The theory of deterrence led in interpreting participant reflections and helped 
decipher the kinds of tactics set in place before and after the riot, along with what 
systems of racism ideology affect public schools. A CRT lens was used to deconstruct the 
communities of color’s own dysconscious-racism experiences, separating them from 
public perceptions and their own realities. 
This study’s significance fills current gaps in the scholarship, pointing to the 
glaring racial tones and long unheard voices of impacted community members when 
police are permanently stationed on their school campus. Further, this study recounts 
experiences of a traumatic incident involving the police on campus. The final part of the 
chapter listed relevant words, phrases, and mandated defined in context of the discussion. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The review of literature used a claim of interpretation to integrate four claims of 
fact. According to Machi and McAvoy (2016), a claim of interpretation makes use of 
expert testimony, empirical research, statistical studies, and anecdotal case studies to 
synthesize data and to organize several claims of fact. The claims of fact synthesized in 
this literature review include the following: (a) the superpredator phenomenon 
contributes to the SRO program, which embeds law enforcement in schools, (b) the SRO 
program contributes to the profiling and marginalization of youth of color in schools, 
(c) structural racism buoys the school-to-prison pipeline, and (d) the culture of mass-
incarceration traumatizes youth of color. Following the discussion of these facets, a 
conclusion will employ joint reasoning, arguing that embedded school-based law-
enforcement marginalizes and traumatizes youth of color in schools. 
The Theory of Deterrence, Broken Windows Theory, Critical Race Theory, and 
Dysconscious Racism 
The theory of deterrence has long been used in hopes of deterring criminal 
activity (Skiba & Peterson, 1999). The theory of deterrence presumes that “human beings 
are rational actors who consider the consequences of their behavior before deciding to 
commit a crime” (Wright, 2010, p. 2), perpetuating the idea that potential offenders 
weigh their future behavior against the consequences of their possible actions and 
conclude that the risks of punishment is too severe. When applied to school-aged 
children, it has been dubbed zero tolerance and permeates through U.S. schools as a 
formula for prejudging and overpunishing youth (Civil Rights Project, 2000). Zero-
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tolerance policies and practices, strongly associated with the theory of deterrence, have 
been more casually expressed in public schools as interventions. In the general parlance, 
they are more commonly known throughout the country as getting “tough on crime,” 
which then leads to enabling mandatory minimum sentencing for minor criminal offences 
through three-strikes laws (Wright, 2010, p. 1). These have been coupled with the more 
recent stop-and-frisk and stop-and-inspect mandates. Initially, these theories and 
practices were lauded by elected officials and legislators as practical tools for crime 
reduction through strict deterrence measured and practiced by unbiased law enforcement. 
However, actual police practice and documented experiences from communities 
witnessing firsthand law-enforcement behavior condemn these methods, stating that 
crime reduction results were based on fear and increased police brutality on communities 
of color, and particularly men between the ages of 14 and 24 (Meese, 1994). 
The additional layer of fear-mongering strategies imported by policing agencies 
into poorer communities and communities of color that have not been revitalized is 
known as broken-windows theory (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008; Ranasinghe, 2012). 
Broken-windows theory assumes that communities are not capable of order on their own, 
even if the smallest of offenses to the greater citizenry occur on a regular basis. Law-
enforcement personnel proclaim that law and order must exist and be imposed for 
minimal offenses, regardless of the circumstances or what the community understands as 
norms (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008). 
CRT affirms that racism exists and is “ordinary” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012, 
p. 3), that is, ever-present for people of color in the United States. Race categories in the 
national census existed in the United States since the late 1700s, noting Black and White 
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people (S. M. Lee, 1993). Throughout U.S. history, people of European descent 
migrating into the country consistently pushed for inclusion in the White category for 
census purposes. 
If a person was not referenced as White, that person was considered other or in 
another category. For example, Mexicans, after a time, were swapped out of the White 
category in the census (Haney López, 1997) into their own category, along with Blacks. 
In fully embracing CRT as a racism–cultural excavation tool, the “Black/White binary 
limits understandings of the multiple ways in which African Americans, Native 
Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, Chicanas/os, and Latinas/os continue to experience, 
respond to, and resist racism and other forms of oppression” (Yosso, 2005, p. 72). 
Critical work explain how structural racism systematizes “public policies, 
institutional practices, cultural representations, and other norms work in various, often 
reinforcing ways to perpetuate racial group inequity,” allowing dominant cultures 
privilege and nondominant cultures to acclimatize their existence without it (Lawrence et 
al., 2004). Both those who benefit from structural racism, and those who suffer its 
indignities, may experience racism as normal, routine, and familiar (Bell, 1995; Delgado 
& Stefancic, 2012). Freire’s thematic practice in attaining critical consciousness occurs 
in stages against oppression and practices by the oppressor that lead to an oppressed mind 
to understand current circumstances, how the person came to be in oppressed position, 
and how to thwart that ongoing oppression (D. E. Collins, 2000). 
In 1991, King invented a new phrase to describe another form of racism that 
quietly accedes to the U.S. dominant culture (White) norms and advantages. 
Dysconscious Racism King explains 
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it is not the absence of consciousness (that is, not unconsciousness) but an 
impaired consciousness or distorted way of thinking about race as compared to, 
for example, critical consciousness [and] further, demonstrates an uncritical habit 
of mind (including perceptions, attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs) that justifies 
inequity and exploitation by accepting the existing order of things as given. (1991, 
p. 135) 
Youth of color remain particularly vulnerable to dysconscious racism and self-
doubt (Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, & Valentine, 2009). Disproportionately labeled as 
disruptive, youth of color experience school-based disciplined more frequently than other 
students. Under the influence of dysconscious racism, African American and Latino 
children often internalize these labels (Casella, 2003a). 
Freire championed and popularized a concept created by Helder Camara, known 
as conscientization, which combats specific internalized features of intransitive 
consciousness in progressive pedagogy circles (D. E. Collins, 1998). These efforts, when 
put into current practice, may also defeat the oppressive dysconscious racism visited by 
many students of color. 
Superpredator Phenomenon contributes to the School Resource Officer Program 
This subsection describes how literature examined the creation of the term 
superpredator, which became politically synonymous with children who got into any 
kind of trouble on the playground or in school by just being children. What were once 
teachable moments by caring adults explaining the differences between right and wrong 
and peer modeling the differences between appropriate and inappropriate behaviors were 
now exaggerated and highly exposed instances of criminal behaviors. 
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Socially, if law-enforcement agencies and the court systems are society’s general 
answer to crime, then the first logical answer that occurred to address the child criminal 
was to place police in their schools with the hopes of capturing future offenders before 
their life of crime ensued. Thus, a cyclical pattern began: the more insignificant the 
student infraction to the rules, the harsher infliction of school-sanctioned, criminally 
labeled, police-enforced discipline. 
Law-enforcement officers employed databases such as the Gang Reporting, 
Evaluation and Tracking System (GREAT) and the Drug Abuse Warning Network 
(DAWN) to understand gang, drug, and other criminal activities. GREAT tracks youth 
gangs (Langston, 2003). DAWN tracks drug use and monitors drug-trafficking activities. 
Law-enforcement, legislative, and judiciary bodies purposely use exaggerated crime 
statistics from sources like the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). These statistics 
combine disproportionately categorized Latino/a youth as drug dealers and gang 
members. Statistically, they also disproportionately characterized African American 
youth as gang members and crack-cocaine consumers (Fleury-Steiner, Dunn, & Fleury-
Steiner, 2009; Reinerman, & Levine, 1989). By also labeling these youth as “thugs” and 
“gangsters,” these databases target urban youth, threatening outsiders in their own 
communities (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009, p. 7). 
In 1996, Princeton social scientist DiIulio coined the termed superpredator in the 
book titled Body Count: Moral Poverty—And How to Win America’s War Against Crime 
and Drugs, for society’s youth, aged 11–17, at times including younger and older youth 
as well (Bennett, DiIulio, & Walters, 1996). Superpredators would become a growing 
rank of juveniles who were dramatically thoughtless and cruelly pitiless children who had 
no fear of criminal labeling, incarceration, or a hint of morality (Haberman, 2014). 
43 
 
DiIulio’s observations appealed to middle and upper-class faith-based communities 
across America. DiIulio repeatedly pointed out to “moral poverty” of these youth 
“without the benefit of parents, teachers, coaches, and clergy to teach them right and 
wrong and to show them unconditional love” (Elikann, 1999) leaving them nowhere to go 
but to a life riddled with remorselessness mayhem. 
In March of 1996, Floridian psychotherapist and criminologist Heide’s story of a 
teenager who shot a runner because the runner refused to give into being robbed, 
commented “that many juvenile killers are ‘incapable of empathy’” (Elikann, 1999, p. 4) 
Northwestern University Criminologist Fox labeled these teenage superpredators 
“temporary sociopaths—impulsive and immature.” Fox, noted that the 1990s were the 
“calm before the crime storm” (Fox, 1996, p. 1). The criminologist countered conflicting 
evidence that juvenile crime is declining and “so long as we fool ourselves into thinking 
that we’re winning the war against crime, we may be blindsided by the bloodbath of 
teenage violence that is lurking in the future” (Elikann, 1999, p. 4). 
In a report filed with the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, Fox 
(1996) justified vehemently noting increases in juvenile crime because “the data on age 
patterns also reveals that the overall decline in crime committed by people of all age 
obscures the differing trends for youth and adults” (p. 1). As the superpredator phrase 
fueled political rhetoric of the 1990s, children took the blame for an imagined spector of 
the Me-Generation’s excesses and failings. It was far easier to defend fractured 
communities against superpredators, who should be caged or contained, rather than 
defending communities against children who need teaching and nurturing. 
The media’s fascination and fear-mongering use of the superpredator term 
legitimized the creation of the strictest and most punitive policies associated with even 
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the lowest levels of juvenile infractions through compiled political urging for legislation 
to be enacted inside U.S. public schools. Court systems from state to state began 
receiving an influx of arrested juveniles for what would previously have been assessed as 
“rowdy” teenage behavior (Aseltine, 2010, p. 40). By 1997, Florida Congressman 
McCollum legislated a new level of tough-on-juvenile-crime bill targeted toward 
children. This Violent Youth Predator Act, was lobbied as an ongoing deterrent to youth 
gang and drug activities; however, the title was considered excessive and was eventually 
changed to the more subdued Juvenile Crime Control Act (Elikann, 1999, p. 11). At the 
bill’s core were block grants that incentivized state courts to prosecute youth as young as 
12 years of age as adults, and in a few states as young as 10 years old (Gest & Pope, 
1996, p. 28). The block grants not only awarded states for prosecuting younger offenders 
as adults, it also awarded block grants to “impose increasing penalties against repeat 
offenders; [to] establish a tracking system for minors who commit second crimes and 
make their records public, and [to] allow juvenile court judges to issue court orders 
against the parents or guardians of convicted minors who do not properly supervise 
them”(Gray, 1997, para 13). 
Executive Director of the Juvenile Law Center Schwartz, in Philadelphia, and 
Chair of the Juvenile Justice Committee of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, said in 
1996, “It’s a no-brainer,” why politicians are leading the charge in this direction: “Kids 
don’t vote” (Stansky, 1996, p. 62). Consequently, normalizing use of the term 
superpredator for minors was introduced into the juvenile-justice system, eventually 
introduced into the school systems, as that is the location of most children during daytime 
hours (Haberman, 2014). 
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Through partnering successive federal legislation throughout the 1990s, the SRO 
program’s legacy accompanied exponential expansion, tracked backwards to see how it 
would be made inevitable for armed law-enforcement officers to be placed inside U.S. 
schools. Starting with the 1990 Gun Free Schools Zones Act (Giffords Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence, 2017), prohibitive behaviors related to fire arms within 1,000 feet 
of a school: a nationwide practice to thwart the combination of gang and drug crimes on 
the streets and in communities from spilling over into schools. 
New to the White House, in 1993, and holding to stringent crime campaign 
promises, President Clinton continued to answer the public’s outrage about urban youth 
crime affecting middle-class U.S. neighborhoods and schools by signing into law the Gun 
Free Schools Act of 1994. The Gun Free Schools Act was an extension of the Bush-era 
Gun Free Schools Zones Act, designating specific rules and punishments for the 
possession of firearms in schools (Petteruti, 2011). The rules associated with the 1994 
Act, describing these ultrapunitive restrictive practices, were formally understood as 
zero-tolerance policies. Eventually, zero-tolerance policies expanded to include drugs and 
other weapons as a part of the Clinton-era war on juvenile crime and drugs through White 
House proposed changes to the Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act of 1997 (Gray, 1997) 
and were to govern school spaces that were inside as well as outside of schools when 
considering youth offenses. 
The more conventional SRO programs, similar to the school-based law-
enforcement programs that are readily recognized today, were in response to nationally 
publicized cases of school violence that were closely clustered in a span of 6 months 
from late 1997 to early 1998, located in “Pearl, Mississippi; West Paducah, Kentucky; 
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Jonesboro, Arkansas; Edinboro, Pennsylvania and Springfield, Oregon” (Donohue et al, 
1998, p. 2; Elikann, 1999, p. 3), and then later at Columbine High School in Littleton, 
Colorado (Kennedy, 2001). These instances occurred as elected officials were responding 
to community members expressing their affront to unabated gang violence and perceived 
threats of the so-called “super-predators” (Heitzeg, 2009, p. 8) moving from the streets 
and into schools. Congressman McCollum then introduced the Violent Youth Predator 
Act, later changed to Juvenile Crime Control Act on the house floor in the U.S. 
legislature (Elikann, 1999). 
The superpredator phenomenon once thoroughly vetted by political and public 
opinion, provided justification for transitioning police from the streets to the schoolyard. 
The 1990s through to 2008, with statistics showing an increase in police due to a 
federally funded police-in-schools program known as “COPS Safe Schools Initiative 
Program (CIS)” (Haberman, 2014) accurately follows the money. The Columbine High 
School and Sandyhook Elementary School shootings boosted funding, even when 
evidence refuted the need for increased safety measures following the public’s 
cataclysmic panic and fear of the superpredator in previous years (Fine et al., 2003; 
Petteruti, 2011). 
Before the existence of SROs (Mulqueen, 1999), police agencies had traditionally 
provided many kinds of support to schools. The ideal community-based partnership 
between police agencies and schools could be indispensable for creating and maintaining 
supportive and safe schools (Canady et al., 2012). Arguably, through COPS, SROs would 
represent a more interconnected relationship between local police departments and the 
school community in that agency’s jurisdiction. The initial marketing rationale for 
placing these SROs, sworn law-enforcement officers, in schools was to provide (a) safety 
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experts and law enforcers, (b) liaisons to community resources, and (c) participants in a 
school learning environment as informal counselors and educators (Jones, 2000). 
The bonus for police departments that sought to enhance their image and 
relationship with youth (West & Fries, 1995) was that they found a location to do so in 
the more casual contained academic environment. SROs or embedded law enforcement 
presence on K–12 public school campuses affected schools in one way or another 
(Theriot, 2016). Through the CIS initiatives and federally funded programs enacted or 
enhanced on the heels of mass school shootings by juveniles, exactly how many police, 
SROs, or private security guards were currently working in U.S. public schools, paid by 
federal funds, was unknown. The U.S. Department of Education, the DOJ, and even 
state-level police agencies do not have accurate numbers because no mechanism was put 
in place to track the numbers or the federal dollars from every presidential administration 
since the program’s inception. Presidential support came from a combination of President 
Nixon linking the two words war and drugs, then President Reagan championing the 
phrase “War on Drugs” (Dufton, 2012) through to the Obama administration after the 
Sandyhook Elementary School shootings (Aseltine, 2010). 
Evidence accrued that by continuously keeping police in K–12 schools’ settings 
(forming a normative scenario), by increasing the number of police in schools, or by 
strategically galvanizing political and public opinion supporting police in schools, 
reasoning that SROs and police were placed into public schools for safety and learning 
(Lind, 2015; Weiler & Cray, 2011), the program would remain a staple in the educational 
bureaucracy. Beginning in the 21st century, the National Association of School Resource 
Officers and police departments across the country, through a coordinated strategic 
public-relations campaign, marketed themselves to whole school communities (see Table 
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3). Politicians engaged to gain voter support for safe schools (Canady et al., 2012). These 
factors aligned with inferior record keeping and virtually no transparency or 
accountability by the U.S. Department of Education and DOJ, despite millions of dollars 
over decades (Dignity in Schools Campaign, Bay Area Chapter, 2017) being funneled 
into these SRO programs. The police had become deeply embedded in U.S. K–12 schools 
and their cultures (Lind, 2015; Weiler & Cray, 2011) with a free hand to designate their 
on-campus responsibilities. SRO programs, such as CIS, maintain they are integral to the 
school community and as significant as school teachers and school administrators 
(Canady et al., 2012; Theriot & Anfara, 2011). 
Table 3 
Percentage of Sworn Law Enforcement Officers or School Resource Officers 
Permanently Assigned to Public School from 2013–2014 in the United States 
Scholastic level 
% of law 
enforcement 
School districts 99.2 
Schools  99.5 
Elementary schools 
(excluding justice facilities) 
24.0 
High schools (excluding justice facilities) 42.0 
High Schools with higher Latino and Black Populations (excluding Justice facilities) 51.0 
Note. Statistics from 2013–14 Civil Rights Data Collection: A First look: Key Data Highlights on Equity 
and Opportunity Gaps in Our Nation’s Public Schools, by U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil 
Rights 2016, retrieved from https://ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/2013-14-first-look.pdf 
Training programs, such as the one conducted at the respected Johns Hopkins 
University, teach police officers how to make themselves part of a school’s onsite 
administration, attending staff meetings and all official school functions. The National 
Association of School Resource Officers supports police in schools as educators and 
counselors, as well as promotes the ideology that officers are an immediate and 
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imperative bridge between school and a municipalities’ law-enforcement body (Canady 
et al., 2012; Goralczyk, 2004). At schools, many SROs are so completely incorporated in 
the school community that they handle any disciplinary matters; many researchers and 
authors have posited this leads to the criminalization of student behavior, “wherein 
students are arrested and introduced to the juvenile justice system for relatively minor 
behaviors” that previously were handled by school-site principals, grade-specific deans, 
counselors, or teachers (Hirschfield, 2008; Theriot, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the superpredator phenomena deepened its traction through 
mainstream media’s depictions of youth of color as remorseless criminals, regardless of 
actual declining juvenile-crime statistics (Elikann, 1999). Furthermore, without the 
political capitalization on the public’s mass and predictively racism-laced hysteria, law-
enforcement officers and SRO programs may have remained a minor player in the on-site 
education arena. The opposite, however, became the reality in public education. History 
demonstrates that SRO programs became a mainstay of U.S. school systems, with much 
of their focus on schools predominately populated with urban schools and students of 
color (Casella, 2003a). 
The SRO Program contributes to the Profiling and Marginalizing of Youth of Color 
This subsection explained how SROs, once established in public schools, used 
their programmatic mandates to enforce zero-tolerance policies as a part of the academic-
discipline structure on school campuses, which exponentially began contributing to the 
profiling and marginalizing of youth of color. In some cases, school districts applied 
zero-tolerance policies to different types of behaviors exhibited by students who did not 
possess guns. The application of zero-tolerance policies to minor incidents, such as 
pranks, talking on a mobile device in class, or standing in the hallway after the class-
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transition bell rang led to suspensions, expulsions, or, in extreme cases, ticketing, arrests, 
and referrals to juvenile courts (Aseltine, 2010; Petteruti, 2011, Theriot, 2009). To 
enforce zero-tolerance policies, school districts would use surveillance measures in 
schools such as metal detectors, locker checks, security cameras, on-campus SROs, or 
security personnel. Minor infractions such as scuffles, truancies, and cursing, traditionally 
handled by teachers, counselors, deans, and school principals, were being handled 
directly by SROs and criminalizing youth of color (Bernburg, Krohn, & Rivera, 2006; 
Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008). When SROs handled discipline issues in schools (see 
Table 4), they were often strongly supported by administrators and community members, 
especially after “a high profile, racially charged” criminal case, publicized through local 
media reports, allowed a new process of governing through crime (Fleury-Steiner et al., 
2009, p. 5). 
In surveys conducted by Fine et al. (2003) of the 133 youth (ages 16–21), 83% 
who participated in follow-up telephone interviews indicated that they (predominately 
African American and Latino) had regularly experienced microaggressions equating to 
“disrespect or suspicion” (p. 153) from police or security guards in neighborhood stores 
or schools. Students also noted that simply wearing their own stylized “contemporary 
urban attire” (Fine et al., 2003, p. 154) led to increasingly being profiled by school 
authorities, assuming youth to be criminals. 
Rios (2006) discovered that boys of color as young as 8 years were swept up into 
the criminal justice systems and within their school settings were seen, Ferguson’s 
research (2000) uncovered that youth of color in school settings with police present were 
together treated as endangered species, but also as criminals that should be feared, 
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essentially casualties of their own actions and situations (Cann, 2015).  Cann’s research 
supports Ferguson’s summary about media and “popular culture’s representations of 
Black and Brown youth took on significance in schools as Black boys in particularly 
were mistreated, underserved, referred to special education, suspended, and expelled at 
higher rates than their White peers” (p. 292). 
Table 4 
Percentage of Juveniles, Aged16–19, Interactions with Police in the United States 
Type of Interaction % of U.S. population 
All police contact 3.5 
Use of police force 30.1 
Use of police force, initiated by police 80.1 
Note. From If Not Now, When? A Survey of Juvenile Justice Training in America’s Police Academies, by L. 
H. Thurau, P. Buckley, G. Gann, & J. Wald, 2013, retrieved from http://strategiesforyouth.org/sfysite/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/SFYReport_02-2013_rev.pdf 
Executive director of the National Association of School Resource Officers 
Canady, responding to a Los Angeles judge’s comment that SROs might have a difficult 
time differentiating between handling discipline and handling disorderly conduct or 
assault, said “the good officer recognizes the difference between a scuffle and an assault” 
(Sanburn, 2015; Taylor, 2015). However, SROs from across the country are using tasers 
and pepper spray on students spending too much time in the hallways or not moving 
along during class transition. 
Critics of zero-tolerance policies observed that instances of an enabled police 
presence on school campuses, along with the media’s ongoing portrayal of Black and 
Brown youth, particularly young men, has resulted in juveniles of color (Skiba & 
Peterson, 1999; Witt, 2007) being subjected to harshest treatment and punishments for 
minor infractions at much higher rates than other non-youth-of-color students with the 
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same numbers or types of infractions (Aseltine, 2010; Colombi & Osher, 2015; Dignity 
in Schools Campaign Bay Area Chapter [DSC Bay Area], 2017; Theriot, 2009). Youth 
who even experience contact with police on campus, out-of-school suspensions, and 
expulsions are statistically moved closer and closer to the school-to-prison pipeline, when 
not in the classroom learning (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 2013). In 
2006, in Birmingham, Alabama, more than 1,000 students were directly or indirectly 
exposed to police on campus pepper spraying. Elsewhere, one pregnant high school teen 
was pepper sprayed by an SRO in a hallway because she was crying (Klein, 2015) and 
was then hospitalized. 
The continued uptick in instances of brutality toward girls of color by campus 
SROs intimates a police culture from these news headlines: 
• Diabetic High School Girl Beaten by Police Officer and Arrested—For 
Falling Asleep in Class. 
• School Guards Break Child’s Arm and Arrests Her For Dropping Cake. 
• 8-year-old Special Needs Student Handcuffed, Arrested for Tantrum at 
School. 
• Detroit Student Suspended For Rest Of The Year Over Pocketknife Found In 
Purse. 
• SRO arrests 16-yr old in class after flipping her out of her chair and dragging 
student across floor (Crenshaw, Ocen, & Nanda, 2015; Sanburn, 2015) 
SRO programs and embedded in-school law-enforcement officers are often a 
reflection of their police station’s culture and law-enforcement-community culture across 
the country. That community and culture permeates law-enforcement agencies that reside 
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in the culture of the prison–industrial complex (Davis, 1998) and mass incarceration 
historically has targeted people of color. This culture has been the bedrock of mass 
incarceration and tends to destabilize communities of color and unnecessarily traumatizes 
youth from those communities. 
Structural Racism and the School to Prison Pipeline 
Through the CRT lens, racism is a normative condition in society. Structural 
racism endures as it is fixed in and throughout policies, mandates, and laws that govern 
the everyday lives of all citizens (Lawrence et al., 2004). Students of color are educated 
and must exist in a system of structural racism that contains barriers and obstacles 
preventing them from thriving or surviving outside the prison–industrial complex. 
Many social scientists were markedly disturbed by the skyrocketing increase in 
juvenile arrests, incarceration, and activity in the juvenile-justice system and youth court 
cases, as well as the ongoing duration of activity in response to superpredator theory, 
when statistically juvenile crime was dropping by nearly two-thirds from 1994 to 2011 
(Haberman, 2014). Actual figures proved the opposite of the juvenile superpredator 
theory and subsequent hysteria that had swept the country, but school-policing presence 
continued to increase (Bowditch, 1993). 
Most research on law enforcement in schools points to the creation and 
enhancement of the school-to-prison pipeline (Eckholm, 2013; Kilpatrick, 2010) without 
receiving substantive input from affected school-community members. Further research 
needs to better understand the perceptions of high school students, for example, regarding 
the presence of police on campus. Large gaps persist in the body of knowledge of what 
influences embedded police on a public-school campus have when viewed through the 
school community’s various members’ perspectives. 
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In addition, further supportive inquiry needs to be understood from students who 
have experienced trauma from interactions with on-campus police or SROs (Theriot, 
2016; Theriot & Orme, 2014) assigned to enforce zero-tolerance discipline. 
Current research directed at U.S. schools using zero-tolerance policies on K–12 
campuses has paved a direct link into the juvenile- and criminal-justice systems (Brown, 
2015b; Donohue et al., 1998; Ghandnoosh, 2014, 2015; Petteruti, 2011), and students are 
regularly targeted for arrests when the offense warrants discipline in the education arena 
(Thurau et al., 2013). Few comprehensive longitudinal studies in the United States 
focused on links between zero-tolerance policies that lead to more suspensions and 
expulsions that lead to more arrests for youth of color. 
Monahan, VanDerhei, Bechtold, and Cauffman (2014) conducted empirical 
research of 6,636 months of data over a 2-year period from students who were suspended, 
expelled, or truant (n = 1354) as a result of the school’s zero-tolerance policies. The 
study’s participants, aged 14–19 were 41.5% Black or African American descent, 33.5% 
Hispanic or Latin American descent, and 20.2% White, with 86% identifying themselves 
as male (p. 1110). During the study timeframe, all the students were enrolled in school 
while school was in session and revealed in interviews that they were arrested while out 
of school under suspension, expulsion, or truancy. 
Results showed that students who were pushed out of school through an enforced 
theory of deterrence have 2.10 more chance of being arrested when they are suspended 
than students in school. Studies showed that students who were truant from school had a 
2.42 higher chance of being arrested than those students in school (see Table 5, adapted 
from Monahan et al, 2014). Because higher numbers of suspended, expelled, or truant 
students were students of color (Black/African American or Hispanic/Latin American), 
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they were more likely to be arrested than their White peers by not being in school, due to 
zero-tolerance policies. 
Table 5 
Black and Hispanic Students More Likely to be Arrested Than White Students (When All 
Were Suspended or Truant) 
Decent Percentage n = 1,354 
Chance of being arrested 
while suspended 
compared to suspended 
White students 
Chance of being arrested 
while truant compared to 
truant White students 
Black or African American 41.5 562 2.10 2.42 
Hispanic or Latin American 33.5 454 2.10 2.42 
Whites 20.2 274 — — 
Note. Adapted from “School Yard to the Squad Car: School Discipline, Truancy, and Arrest” by K. C. 
Monahan, S. VanDerhei, J. Bechtold, & E. Cauffman, 2014, Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 43, p. 
1116. doi:10.1007/s10964-014-0103-1. Used with permission, see Appendix C. 
Part of the ongoing debate on the widespread devastation and the long-term harm to 
overall learning environments caused to students and their families involve police. This 
remains true when they encounter law-enforcement officers on school campuses, turning 
the school site into disciplinary institutions, with roads leading to the criminal-justice 
system and not to higher learning. 
The Culture of Mass Incarceration Traumatizes Youth of Color 
Alexander explains in the book, The New Jim Crow (2010), that the U.S. 
criminal-justice system uses mass incarceration as a newer form of racism, dubbed 
colorblindness (p. 2). The colorblind lens was used heavily in the Reagan era War on 
Drugs, intentionally criminalizing, prosecuting, and incarcerating people of color at rates 
much higher than White counterparts, particularly more vulnerable youth. The War on 
Drugs gave people of color “what they deserve” because the U.S. was now being “tough 
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on crime” and “not coddling them,” operationalized through expanded budgets for 
criminal-justice systems at the federal, state, and local levels (Alexander, 2010). 
Black and white Americans conflicting evaluations of the criminal justice system 
also extend to their differing explanations for African Americans’ higher rates of 
arrest and incarceration. White Americans more often attribute this disparity to 
higher rates of crime among blacks and to lack of respect for authority among 
black youth; black respondents more often point to a biased police force and 
justice system” (Ghandnoosh, 2014, p. 29). 
The United States has had an ongoing understanding that in criminal-justice 
systems, favor is extended and sometime permanent for imprisonment rather than 
rehabilitation or restorative opportunities for those convicted of crimes, particularly when 
the positive outcomes could serve communities of color (Alexander, 2010). The targeted 
wave of mass incarceration has disrupted many homes and families that were already 
struggling to balance economic and educational disadvantage. Researchers termed this 
disruption that reaches beyond criminal-justice systems and into communities “the 
collateral consequences of mass imprisonment” (Chesney-Lind & Mauer, 2003, p. 1). 
Nellis, with the Sentencing Project, analyzes criminal-justice data and recently 
authored a Sentencing Project Report (2016), that reflects U.S. incarceration rates for 
people of color compared to those of Whites. The report shows that Blacks are being 
jailed five times, and in some states, 10 times more than Whites; Hispanics are jailed at 
least four times more than Whites (Nellis, 2016). In California, for example, Latino and 
Black youth being tried as adults outdistance their White peers at exponentially 
disproportionate incarceration rates. Black and Brown youth are “2.5 times more likely 
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than white kids to be arrested, 6.2 times more likely to be tried in adult court, and 7 times 
more likely to be sent to prison by adult courts” (Males & Macallair, 2000, p. 7) than 
White children. The media’s depictions of jails filled with people of color paints a bleak 
picture for youth of color and their future in the United States. 
As long as CIS and SRO programs have existed, the U.S. Department of Labor 
and DOJ have provided very little documentation, tracking whether CIS Initiatives have 
created more instances of police brutality and police–student interactions, leading to 
increased arrests of youth in public schools. The focus for these agencies had been 
anecdotal evidence and strategic communications that led back to superpredator juveniles 
and the unfortunate instances of mass shootings in public schools, employed to justify 
directing the public’s attention to and calling public schools some of the most unsafe 
places for our children to be in the nation (Kilpatrick, 2010; Taylor, 2015). The American 
Civil Liberties Union has continued to file law suits across the country on behalf of 
students, many with disabilities, who have been taunted, physically abused, and arrested 
at the hands of school police officers using force as discipline for classroom behaviors 
(Brown, 2015a). 
The exponential growth of the racially motivated use of excessive force by police 
noted that Americans have become accustomed and are at ease with a strong-armed 
police force to manage issues with minority citizens that are perceived as problems 
(Goldsmith, 2016). Mainstream media compounded this public perception through their 
representations of youth of color, leading to implications of how students are seen and 
“handled” in their own schools. The use of excessive force, on many occasions, 
accompanied the zero-tolerance ideology and policy enforcement, tracked 
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from a 1989 Supreme Court decision, Graham v. O’Connor. In that case, the court 
misinterpreted the Fourth Amendment and established the modern definition of 
“excessive force,” the legal term that references an enabled police force that 
repeatedly equates to police brutality … couched in conservative theories of 
personal responsibility, for a powerful police force. (Goldsmith, 2016, p. 192) 
In a survey conducted by Weitzer (2000), published in the Law & Society Review 
with 147 African American participants, youth participants noted differences in how 
police treat Whites and Blacks through their lived examples. For example, “When Black 
people walk with our hands in our pockets, we look like we’re up to something. When a 
white man walk with his hands [in his pockets] we know he cold” (p. 138). A female 
participant indicated when asked “Why,” stated, “If you’re Black there’s a presumption 
of guilt, a presumption of wrongdoing if you’re stopped” (Weitzer, 2000, p. 138). 
Another young male participant added an example: 
If they stop a White guy at 3 in the morning, they’ll figure he was working late 
and he’s on his way home to see his wife. You stop a Black person at 3 in the 
morning and figure he was up to no good, or just got through robbing a store, 
shooting somebody or whatever. Always assuming the worst when it’s someone 
of color. (Weitzer, 200, p. 138) 
The evidence and research indicated that police–student interactions on public 
school campuses have long-lasting negative impacts on the lives of public school students 
(DSC Bay Area, 2017; Thurau et al., 2013). Study data indicate that youth believed 
police have undertaken the parental role and that if circumstances denote an arrest, the 
police should explain the reason for the illegal behavior before an arrest happens “to help 
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them navigate the world of peers, parents, and schools” (Thurau et al, 2013, p. 10). Youth 
believe police do not listen to them, their perspectives are disregarded, and law-
enforcement officials assume they are guilty upon initial encounters. The effects of mass 
incarceration have had rippling consequences for youth of color. These range from virtual 
police states in neighborhoods to family caregivers being placed in jail for child abuse, 
based on unsubstantiated accusations from anonymous callers. 
Marginalization and Traumatization of Youth of Color 
Students’ feelings about the treatment of youth/students, due to increased 
numbers of police in their schools or the increased presence of law enforcement in their 
neighborhoods were the focus of several researchers (Fine et al., 2003; Theriot & Anfara, 
2011; Weitzer, 2000). The Fine et al. (2003) surveys noted that students of color had a 
different perspective about police on school campus than their White peers: “in each 
instance the youth were ‘scared’ or ‘shocked’ at the behavior of the police, and report 
feeling as though it would be hard to trust police in the future” (p. 152). Students held 
lasting and negative impressions about their interactions with the police, on-campus and 
off-campus. One Caucasian student noted being targeted through an association with 
“Black kids” (Fine et al., 2003, p. 153) when she was in a car with everyone behaving, 
which left the student with negative impressions of the police. Struggling with their own 
dysconscious racism, multiple African American students indicated that they were 
resigned to the unfair circumstances, simply saying that they were “used to it” (Fine et 
al., 2003, p. 154), and felt unwanted in their schools, neighborhood stores, and their own 
communities. 
Theriot’s (2016) surveys of various students’ feelings about whether on-campus 
police presence hindered their ability to feel connected to their school, hinged on how 
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many interactions students had with the SRO throughout the school year. The author 
concluded that there were more positive attitudes about police for students with increased 
interactions with SROs (2016), and most students surveyed were “predominantly 
Caucasian (n = 1,266; 65%)” (p. 456), as well as “students who have witnessed other 
students be arrested for less serious offenses may feel less connected at school if they 
have recurrent fear or stress about making minor disturbances that may result in their own 
arrest” (Theriot, 2016, p. 461). 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police report acknowledged, in 2012, 
that the police are not exhibiting enough of an understanding of youth vulnerability 
during their interactions and interrogation sessions with youth. This lack of empathy 
about juveniles’ developmental stages during questioning occurs whether the youth is a 
victim, a witness, or a suspect in the given situation (Thurau et al., 2013). Proponents of 
their removal from the education landscape advance that juvenile arrest rates tell the story 
for both sides (Donohue et al., 1998; Petteruti, 2011). Youth of color are losing 
psychologically, emotionally, economically, and educationally. 
However, police are in school communities seeking to change these realities and 
perceptions of law enforcement. For example, with all the turmoil that has occurred in 
Chicago’s streets, specifically the violent interactions between police and youth, the 
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement started a new program in which 
African American police officers go into inner city schools and educate students about 
their work and about how to interact with the police. Much discussion ensues on a 
person’s “civil rights under the law,” explained by the officers to students in an age-
appropriate manner (Brotman, 2015). This example of police working with children of all 
ages is located in their most frequent setting other than home: the classroom. 
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In Richmond, California, the police department offers training to SROs about how 
to interact with youth, noting their developmental abilities and brain structures to 
diminish the opportunities for clashes (Keierleber, 2015). These lessons are spreading 
across the country, as in 2012, with Colorado’s Peace Officer Standards and Training 
Board, which developed specialized coursework for SROs to have minimum 
requirements that must be met before being assigned to an on-campus job. Through 
structured youth-focused trainings and community partnerships that include psychosocial 
and physical aspects of children, police and onsite SROs are finding many ways to 
support positive school environments by fully embracing the whole school community. 
These are instances of the effort of law-enforcement agencies attempting to shift their 
internal cultures. 
Pockets of law-enforcement agencies believe some of their impact on youth of 
color can be harmful. Researchers documented law-enforcement officers’ behaviors 
toward youth of color, supported by government leadership and academic leaders, 
verifying the harm caused. The United States, and by extension, its law-enforcement 
agencies have a culture in which race issues that play out every day detrimentally in 
communities of color and for students of color in the schools, push them into the margins 
of society. 
Summary 
This literature review assembled the four following claims of fact: (a) the 
superpredator phenomenon contributes to the SRO program embedding law-enforcement 
officers in U.S. schools, (b) the SRO program contributes to unwarranted profiling that 
marginalizes youth of color in schools, (c) existence of structural racism and the school-
to-prison pipeline, and (d) the culture of mass incarceration traumatizes youth of color. 
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Inundated by unjustifiable theories of deterrence, along with broken windows 
zero-tolerance policies enforced by embedded law-enforcement officers in their schools 
and neighborhoods, the literature review discloses how Black and Brown students 
encounter overwhelming forces that distress the delicate balance of their tight-knit 
communities. The review also used elements of a CRT lens, such as dysconscious racism, 
to corroborate these claims experienced by youth of color, explaining their intransitive 
consciousness. Dysconscious racism is largely due to inequitable dominant-class 
privilege. 
Each claim of fact taken alone did not lead to a distinct why or illustrate directly 
how police in schools assist in ostracizing students of color from the academic landscape. 
However, when the claims are combined with joint reason (Machi & McAvoy, 2016) as 
one claim of interpretation, the needed logic to justify the conclusion that embedded law-
enforcement officers placed in schools forces youth of color into the margins of their 
academic environment, deeply traumatizing them. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study was to explore the experiences and effects of embedded 
on-campus police presence for members of the TMAHS Community who were present 
on campus on October 11, 2002 during the police riot. Specifically, this study used the 
theory of deterrence and other supportive theories to investigate study participants’ 
understandings of what motivated SRO and law-enforcement behaviors on their campus. 
Additionally, this study discerned how members of TMAHS Community have addressed 
any personal issues propagated by the incident in their lives as students (and now as 
adults), educators, and parents in SFUSD. 
A secondary research component in this dissertation is a document analysis of The 
San Francisco Chronicle’s news reporting articles from October 2002 through September 
2004. The articles recount the events from the riot to the seating of the new San Francisco 
Police Commission and their request for a public hearing and investigation by the OCC 
on the event. The third and fixed research component to triangulate the data is that of the 
experiences of the researcher, a longtime member of the TMAHS Community, 
accompanied by the historical and contextual data presented to frame the TMAHS school 
creation, community, and climate and the October 11, 2002 riot. Additionally, the 
researcher provided context regarding the sociopolitical climate of San Francisco from 
the late 1990s through the early 2000s as a reference of the events that occurred around 
the school. 
Restatement of the Purpose 
This chapter focuses on the methodology of the study to explore the feelings and 
beliefs of TMAHS community members about the actions of law-enforcement officers on 
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their school campus and in their lives before and after the riot. This study sought to 
understand how and in what ways their lives were impacted by permanently assigned 
law-enforcement officers or SROs. Finally, the goal was to discern the impact on them 
and the environment of their high school. 
A Case Study 
Qualitative research, as described by Creswell (2012), is a type of educational 
research in which the researcher relies on the views of participants, asking broad, general 
questions; collects data consisting largely of words (or texts) from participants; and 
describes and analyzes these words seeking themes. The research for this dissertation was 
a case study, inherently qualitative (Creswell, 2012; Yin, 2009) of the TMAHS October 
11th riot. Case-study research, as described by Creswell (2012), was not so much a 
methodology but a use of qualitative research design that was constricted by the time of 
the occurrence in a binary place that investigated a real-world phenomenon, experience, 
or situation with as much depth and detail as possible. 
Other authors have defined case-study research as a strategy of inquiry (Creswell, 
2012; Yin, 2009) that follows a path of deep observation to understand and describe a 
phenomenon that occurred at a noted time and place. Roberts (2010) described the 
important elements of case study as “rather than number, the data are words that describe 
people’s knowledge, opinions, perceptions, and feelings as well as detailed descriptions 
of people’s actions, behaviors, activities, and interpersonal interactions” (p. 143). 
An influencing study factor for this research was the comparative case study 
(CCS) explained by Bartlett and Vavrus in Rethinking Case Study Research (2016). A 
comparative case study contains aspects that were an excellent fit for “social research 
about practice and policy” (p. 1) traditionally associated with groups of people, an 
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individual person, or a type of organization (APA, 2016) for the TMAHS 10/11 riot 
inquiry. In CCS, the practice component considers study participants, their varying 
behaviors and objectives, and their hierarchical positions, as ascribed to the environments 
that regularly interact in the “social and cultural worlds” in which they exist. 
Concurrently, the policy component of CCS is so deeply intertwined with the influential 
political practices of those people, involved in denoting, defining, and directing how they 
manage issues and problems, that it is hard to clearly distinguish each intersecting aspect 
of CCS for its effective and more common use in other types research (Bartlett & Vavrus, 
2016). This was exemplified when the TMAHS Community interacted with the city 
government and SFUSD offices after the riot, on the school’s campus, at school board 
meetings, or at police-commission hearings, explored during the inquiry with 
participants. 
Research for this study used these overlapping circumstances in the case study 
through a historical narrative by the researcher, narrative-producing inquiry, and 
reflections, as well as document analysis that contained the following descriptors: 
1. Researched and verified recollections from this dissertation researcher, 
introducing TMAHS, the TMAHS climate, the TMAHS Community, and the 
TMAHS 10/11 riot. 
2. Conducted face-to-face (or online video when face-to face was not possible) 
interviews with 10 members of the TMAHS Community. 
3. Extracted narrative historical timelines from all research participants, former 
students, teachers, and parents of the TMAHS school community. 
4. Analyzed multiyear documents from The San Francisco Chronicle newspaper 
covering the TMAHS police riot and its aftermath. 
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Through these inquiry processes and analyses, the study sought to gain a deeper 
understanding of how each participant viewed events at TMAHS before the beginning of 
the 2002 academic year, then specifically on October 11, 2002, and afterwards. 
Furthermore, this study discerned how all of their TMAHS experiences impacted their 
lives. 
Research Setting 
Using the snowball-sample technique, the researcher contacted potential TMAHS 
participants, asking them to contact others with whom they maintained relationships over 
the years from their time at TMAHS. The goal was to gain as many potential participants 
as possible. The hope was that the snowball method would gain more participants than 
needed for the study but understanding that time and place constraints eliminated some 
participants from participation in the study. The researcher conducted interviews with as 
many participants as were minimally required as a realistic sample size to be interviewed. 
Once a participant’s contact information was confirmed, the researcher began 
communicating through e-mail and telephone to explain the preinterview and interview 
processes. The preinterview process consisted of the participant receiving a succession of 
e-mail messages, an introductory human-subjects packet that contained (a) a 
memorandum explaining what research was being conducted and why they were 
requested for selection, (b) a review of IRB protocols for individual interview guiding 
questions, and (c) a letter of consent to participate. All participants had to return approved 
consent before further study communication took place with them, other than answering 
questions about the process. The researcher provided participants with the researcher’s 
contact information to elicit any questions, as well as the opportunity to ask any questions 
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before interviews began. Participants again had an opportunity to ask questions about the 
process after their interviews concluded. 
All interviews were audio recorded and, if available with the permission of the 
participant, video recorded. This manner of research allowed the researcher and 
participant to focus on each other directly and casually, eliminating as many distractions 
as possible to capture all the participant said. The researcher took some field notes for 
general information about participants, taking care to observe participants’ body language 
or behaviors throughout interviews. 
All study participants resided in the State of California. More narrowly, the 
research was conducted in the Greater San Francisco Bay Area, because most participants 
lived in the geographic nine counties of the that area: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, 
Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma. Participants had the 
option to take part in a quiet public location convenient for them such as a local library or 
coffee shop. However, most interviews were conducted in participants’ homes, places of 
work, or by video conference at a time and location most convenient to study 
participants. 
Research Population 
This case study included several types of school-environment participants: 
1. Five former TMAHS educators with historical knowledge of the TMAHS 
mission and philosophies over a 4- to 5-year period, which included the 
timeframe of the October 11, 2002; 
2. Three former TMAHS students, who were at TMAHS before the October 11, 
2002 riot, on campus during the riot, and were still enrolled at TMAHS after 
the riot; 
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3. Two parents of former TMAHS students enrolled at TMAHS before the 
October 11, 2002 riot, on campus during the riot, and still enrolled at TMAHS 
after the riot; and 
4. The case-study researcher, noting the integral component played in presenting 
and unearthing historical documents and perspectives important to the study. 
Additionally, a wide net was cast for other participants that included people 
capable of making decisions about TMAHS or in positions of power in SFUSD or San 
Francisco. This outreach included those who had specific influence over the city’s 
southeast sector, the Bayview–Hunters’ Point community (including then Mayor Willie 
L. Brown and Supervisor Sophie Maxwell), where TMAHS is situated in Supervisorial 
District 10 boundaries. District 10, historically, was a base of the African American 
community in San Francisco. 
The thickness (or richness of detail) for this case study was enhanced through 
explanation and clarification by individuals that offered insight to the dynamics of the 
school district and San Francisco politics during the late 1990s through early 2000s, but 
preferred complete anonymity for this dissertation. Thicker detail was created with the 
anonymous commentary combined with participants’ and researcher’s ability to 
remember the Thurgood Marshall campus and surrounding environment before the event, 
during, and afterwards, through differing lenses, consideration of their ages, their status 
in the school, and their relationships to one another in the TMAHS Community (aligned 
with Botelho & Ellis, 2015; Creswell, 2012). 
In preparing for the fieldwork, the researcher conducted preinterviews to test that 
all recording equipment worked well and notations could be made with minimal effort. 
The fieldwork pretest provided guidance about the researcher’s demeanor and ability to 
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ask semistructured interview questions, while gaining insight to participants’ actual 
comments and answers in the allotted time for each interview. Interviews ranged from 20 
minutes to nearly 4 hours in length. 
Questions to Guide Initial Dialogues 
The semistructured interviews and follow-up discussions for clarification and 
corrections are listed below and were presented in an open-ended fashion to each study 
participant: 
1. Describe the school culture of TMAHS when you arrived. 
2. Describe the school culture at TMAHS from 2002 to 2007, as you recall. 
3. What type of interactions did you (as an educator, parent or student) have with 
the SROs at TMAHS before 2002? 
4. Why do you think SROs were stationed at TMAHS? 
5. Since your time at TMAHS, have you been able to turn that riot into a driver 
of positive change in your life? Can you share any examples? 
Reliability 
The researcher conducted interrater reliability (Roberts, 2010) in the prefieldwork 
phase to make certain the questions consistently measured what they were meant to draw 
from participants. The researcher then interpreted the data subjectively, when analysis 
contradicted the software’s analysis. This discovery led to a rechecking of transcribed 
dialogue to verify participant text. Each participant had an opportunity to review their 
transcribed interview to check for completeness, edits, and what would be included in 
dissertation. 
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Data Collection 
The data-collection methodology of the qualitative case-study research in this 
dissertation targeted members of the TMAHS Community (students, educators, and 
parents), newspaper articles from The San Francisco Chronicle (2002–2004), and from 
the dissertation researcher’s historical experiences as a TMAHS Community member. 
Former TMAHS students were (in 2017) between the ages of 29 and 32, assuming they 
were between 14 and 17 years old in the second year of high school. In addition to 
student participants, the researcher used a snowball approach and sought other TMAHS 
educators and parents, to provide their perspectives. The participants, once they had 
responded to a formal or informal request to participate in the study, were sent detailed 
information about the study. After affirming a clear desire to participate, these individuals 
were sent an e-mail containing an IRB consent form with research-process details and 
information denoting their participant rights. Participant dialogues took place either as 
face-to-face discussions or by scheduled video conferencing and ranged from 20 minutes 
to approximately 240 minutes. 
The recorded interview data, once collected from each participant, were 
transcribed and read by the researcher for transcription accuracy. The researcher followed 
up with participants to obtain clarifications. The researcher then asked participants to 
review their interview excerpts for accuracy, edits, and questions for clarification. Once 
completed, many of the approved excerpts appear in the dissertation document. 
Generally, intimate personal information or specific details naming educators or students 
not participating in the study was excised from excerpt consideration or labels were 
substituted for names such as Teacher or Mr. X, with participants’ approval. Participant 
identities were masked by eliminating race and gender and truncating occupation details 
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to provide strict confidentiality. Some participants preferred to only offer guiding 
contextual information and remain completely anonymous in the research. Anonymous 
participants were not counted in study figures and are only referenced when their 
contextual insight was necessary. Subsequently, each participant’s transcribed document 
was entered into a qualitative text-analysis software to help the researcher categorize and 
code the interviews, which eventually led to emerging themes and subthemes. 
Data collection regarding The San Francisco Chronicle articles consisted of a 
keyword research on the newspaper’s website and locating all the articles in the time 
parameters of the riot and its aftermath: October 12, 2002 through to September 24, 2004. 
The San Francisco Chronicle document analysis sought to reveal whether The Chronicle 
lead its readership toward a biased perspective in finding who was at fault or accountable 
for the riot (the TMAHS Community or law-enforcement personnel). The Chronicle 
reported the events that occurred at the High School in the southeast sector of the city. 
The data collected from the researcher’s experiences appear in the introduction (Chapter 
I) of the dissertation, presented to familiarize the reader with TMAHS, its philosophy, 
mission, and student population, aligned with the Consent Decree, the documented 
circumstances leading up to the October 11, 2002 riot, and the sociopolitical history of 
San Francisco as it pertains to TMAHS. 
Data Analysis 
From the semistructured interviews, the researcher unearthed emerging themes 
and used coding to establish relationships for a more thorough understanding of the 
current perspectives of these people today, as they recollected what happened to them, 
their children, and their students 15 years ago. Deductive analysis of the interview themes 
supported a comprehensive inductive analysis to evaluate data from specific and constant 
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codes that emerged from the analysis. To further assist in the process of coding efforts 
and theme production of qualitative and quantitative data, the researcher relied on the 
data-analysis software. 
Historical and detailed document analysis added to the thickness of the case-study 
research, revealing trends in public perceptions of the school with or without police 
presence. The document analysis encompassed reporting of The San Francisco Chronicle 
from the time of the TMAHS October 12, 2002 riot through September 24, 2004, 
following the initial hearing by the San Francisco Police Commission more than 2 years 
after the incident (Yin, 2009). The print media featuring TMAHS served as the prominent 
local news perspectives on occurrences in and around the City and County of San 
Francisco, California. 
In reviewing the series of articles, the researcher noted an emerging “collection of 
instances” or repeated descriptions and metaphors that revealed certain types of reporting 
themes about the event: public perceptions, relationships, and social codes about people 
involved in the event, put forward in the ongoing articles. A pattern arose in the reporting 
that indicated bias toward the students and staff of TMAHS regarding the actual riot 
triggers, posturing the TMAHS Community against law-enforcement officers for this 
catastrophe’s impact on the community (Creswell, 2012). The researcher coded an initial 
analysis of themes, then revisited through matching by the researcher. 
The coding helped sort through the mass of case-study interview data and print 
media data to bring about patterns that retold the story of behaviors and underlying 
actions of participants involvement at the school, as well as behavior patterns of 
policymakers after the riot. The interviews revealed patterns that extended beyond the 
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Thurgood Marshall 10/11 riot, with recollections about what led to the riot and what may 
be learned from it, observed in the ongoing aftermath left in its wake. 
Protection of Human Subjects 
The role and responsibility of the researcher was to fulfill the complete obligation 
to protect the rights of human subjects. The initial step was to finalize and submit the 
application to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at the 
University of San Francisco, which was also charged with the protection of volunteer 
participants in research conduct through various projects. The application required 
considerable explanation of the protection protocols employed by the researcher for the 
protection of human participants in the research conducted. Once the application was 
approved, the University of San Francisco (USF) School of Education, International and 
Multicultural Education Department granted permission to conduct case-study research 
and data collection. 
A consent letter was sent by e-mail to participants, informing them of the scope of 
the research and their involvement as volunteers, which occurred prior to conducting any 
research. The consent letter notified research-participating TMAHS Community 
members of their roles and responsibilities in participating in the data collection through 
September 2017. The returned written consent forms with affirmative comment to 
participate verified participants’ permission to conduct the research study by allowing 
interviews for the expressed purpose of data collection. TMAHS Community members 
retained the returned e-mail as their copy of the consent on behalf of the researcher. 
All data and research records such as field notes, audio tapes, and transcribed 
interviews were kept in a secured and locked filing cabinet in the researcher’s office, only 
accessible to the researcher and hired research assistant during the data-collection 
74 
 
process, when delivering and retrieving interviews transcribed by a paid and bondable 
transcription service, during data analysis and writing of research results for the research 
dissertation and university. The research assistant and transcriptionist signed a 
confidentiality agreement to protect the rights of human subjects. The Institutional 
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects reviewed the researcher’s 
application and approved the study with human participants for this dissertation. 
Background of Researcher 
The researcher and her daughter lived near TMAHS several years before 
becoming on-campus members of the Thurgood community. The researcher spent the day 
on the TMAHS campus on October 10, 2002, as requested by the researcher’s daughter 
(then a sophomore at the school) to witness the volatility of the school campus, described 
then and again on October 11th (the day of the riot). Thus, the researcher is familiar with 
the history of TMAHS. While at TMAHS, the researcher had been a walk-on girls’ track 
and field coach (2001), a parent liaison (2001), and the Parent–Teacher–Student 
Association President (2002–2003). 
Additionally, the researcher was a citywide elected official on the SFUSD Board 
of Education from 2007 through 2015. Over the years, the researcher has been in 
possession of and had access to an inordinate amount of first-hand knowledge regarding 
the October 11th events at TMAHS, and nearly all significant subsequent events since 
that time, whether publicly documented or kept out of the public view. The researcher 
also had ongoing relationships with a multitude of TMAHS Community members, the 
school district, the CDE, San Francisco’s governing leaders, and leadership in the SFPD 
and commission. The researcher made note of particular positionality (Louis & Barton, 
2002) as an education policymaker and politician. Therefore, due to the richness of the 
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researcher’s experience with the TMAHS Community, the researcher mediated bias by 
memoing impressions before and after each participant interview to document ongoing 
reflections of the researcher’s connection to the TMAHS Community. 
Researcher Biography 
The researcher is a former City and County Commissioner of the SFUSD Board 
of Education, sworn into office in 2007 by then San Francisco District Attorney and now 
U.S. Senator Harris, representing California. The researcher served as the Board’s vice-
president in 2008 and as its president in 2009, through the last major U.S. recession and 
during the most difficult budgetary times for public schools across the country. The 
researcher was reelected in 2010 and sworn in by then San Francisco City and County 
Supervisor Campos, now Deputy Administrator for Santa Clara County. 
The researcher was the initial and then leading Board of Education Commissioner 
to champion all SFUSD graduates to complete the A–G course sequence as a 
requirement, in addition to being the lead author for the district’s Restorative Justice 
Initiative and the leading the SFUSD Infrastructure Implementation of Restorative 
Practices. From these seminal areas of work on the Board of Education, the researcher 
credits time as a parent, paraprofessional, and advocate for other educators and families 
in the TMAHS Community. The researcher also cocreated and chaired the Board’s 
Personnel and Labor Issues Committee to increase oversight and assist the Human 
Resources Department in establishing a forum to discuss labor issues in an expeditious, 
nonconfrontational manner. 
The researcher recently completed a 3-year term with a global 
Communication/Public Relations firm in San Francisco, collaborating with the highest 
level of public-policy executives and political strategists in San Francisco to ensure 
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government and client partnerships ran smoothly. During doctoral studies at the USF 
School of Education, the researcher obtained a Teaching English to Speakers of Other 
Languages Certification from UC Berkeley Extension in December 2016. The researcher 
has also offered services, student-teaching English at night to refugees and recently 
arrived immigrants while at USF and UC Berkeley Extension. The researcher plans to 
attend law school, focused on education, once doctoral studies are completed. 
The researcher is a Certified USA track and field coach who volunteers with local 
youth and the Northern California Chapter of the International Special Olympics 
Association. The researcher has one daughter, who also has one daughter who is 
currently attending a Cantonese Chinese Immersion Elementary School and a Mandarin 
Chinese Immersion Afterschool Program. 
Ethical Considerations 
Due to the nature of the police riot at TMAHS bringing up the details of that day 
and its subsequent events, this study may have caused study participants some emotional 
distress. Participants noted they felt anger toward the SFPD and the SFUSD. The 
participants have not expressed suffering from any known or unknown psychological 
issues, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (Meyerson, Grant, Carter, & Kilmer, 2011) 
that may have not been addressed fully following their time at TMAHS and none arose 
throughout the interview process. 
The researcher was aware that traumatic events can serve as seismic challenges to 
individuals’ trauma schema of themselves, others, their relationships, and the world, by 
shattering their assumptions about the world and forcing a reconfiguration of goals, 
beliefs, and worldview (as suggested by Meyerson et al., 2011, p. 950). Some participants 
indicated they had worked through these issues over time and were continuing to do so. 
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Specifically, participants commented on their own areas of difficulty when the researcher 
had follow-up question(s) after participants recalled an unpleasant occurrence during this 
period of the TMAHS 10/11 riot or afterwards. 
Additionally, as a researcher who conducted research on and with members of the 
TMAHS Community, of which the researcher is also a member, one must acknowledge 
process dilemmas encountered. The researcher relived participants’ TMAHS experiences 
with them through the interviewing and dialogue processes. The researcher experienced 
moments of difficulty as participants’ painful memories and recollections prompted the 
researcher to recall her own position, as well as time and place, in concert with each 
participant in each discussion. To prevent interview bias, the researcher journaled and 
memoed before and after participant dialogues as a debrief of researcher experiences. 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to hear the reflective voices of TMAHS 
Community members, particularly the sophomore class of 2002, about the October 11, 
2002 police riot and the effects of SROs on their school culture before and after the riot. 
This case study focused on the events of October 11, 2002, with comparative influences 
from local historical print media. All participants received and were guided through IRB 
protocols to ensure their clear understanding on what would happen before, during, and 
after their interview sessions. Study participants were interviewed in a semistructured 
manner with open-ended questions that sought the fullest reflection they could provide. 
The local newspaper, covering the events that occurred at the school for nearly 2 years 
after the riot, provided perspectives of the thoughts or perceptions of the larger San 
Francisco community about October 11, 2002. The richness of the researcher’s 
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background with the TMAHS, as noted in the researcher biography, was mediated 
through pre- and postinterview memoing. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This qualitative case-study research focused on the unheard voices of the 
SFUSD’s TMAHS community’s reflections on the school’s climate before, during, and 
after the October 11, 2002 police riot. The intent of this case study was to explicitly 
explore, from the perspective of TMAHS students, teachers, and parents, any unheard 
thoughts or recollections about the school, its ambiance in the education community, and 
what affects the October 11, 2002 event and time spent at the school had on their lives. 
The qualitative research’s narrative/semistructured-interview format permitted the 
researcher and participants to immerse in each individual one-on-one dialogue. The 
sessions allowed for lengthy, free-flowing reflections from participants, with some 
occasional follow-up from the researcher. Toward the beginning of each dialogue, the 
researcher and participant spent time familiarizing themselves with each other. With the 
exception of two participants, the researcher knew all participants from their previous 
association at TMAHS. Of the two exceptions, the researcher and they met through an 
online social-media platform specifically created for the TMAHS alumni community. 
The researcher knew the second participant several years before becoming involved with 
TMAHS. Although the platform indicated it was for school alumni, current and former 
faculty, and family members of current and former students were granted membership in 
the community. The general purpose of the platform was for the TMAHS Community to 
remain in contact with each other, monitored by the TMAHS alum who created it. The 
researcher had been granted membership long before this study took place. 
This chapter has three sections. The first section of the chapter introduces study 
participants. The second section discusses study findings from the themes generated from 
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the participant–researcher dialogues that emerged from individual interview sessions and 
follow-up clarification discussions. The third section summarizes study themes and 
findings from the interviews with all 10 participants. 
Overview 
The study consisted of interviews with 10 participants who met the research 
criteria. The criteria for participants were that they must have been either a student 
enrolled, teacher working at, or parent with a student enrolled at TMAHS between the 
years 2000 and 2007. This timeframe would have allowed the TMAHS Community 
member to experience the school before the October 11, 2002 police riot, as well after the 
riot. A document analysis of The San Francisco Chronicle’s 10/11 riot reporting, ranging 
from October 12, 2002 through September 30, 2004, was used to observe the role of a 
mainstream media source’s influence on the public’s opinion and whether it served as a 
driver for future law-enforcement, political, and legislative activities. 
All study participants’ identities were masked to provide confidentiality. Beyond 
their relationship to TMAHS, participants had only a few attributes in common; 
consequently, they were mainly unique and wide-ranging in background and reasons for 
being at TMAHS (see Table 6). All participants still reside in northern California 
counties. Participants’ ages range from approximately 30 years old to 65 years old. Of the 
10 participants, five were women. All participants have worked directly in education, in 
the education nonprofit sector. or with an education-support organization. Study 
participants comprise of former TMAHS students, parents, and teachers. 
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Table 6 
Participant Demographics 
TMAHS Community 
member category Self-identified gender 
TMAHS Community 
member resides within 9 
bay area counties 
Current occupation 
considered ed-focused or 
directly in education 
Student 1 Female No Yes 
Student 2 Male Yes No 
Student 3 Male Yes Yes 
Educator 1 Female Yes Yes 
Educator 2 Female Yes No 
Educator 3 Female Yes Yes 
Educator 4 Male Yes No 
Educator 5 Male Yes Yes 
Parent 1 Male Yes No 
Parent 2 Female Yes Yes 
Note. All study participants were either a student, educator, or parent of a student at Thurgood Marshall 
Academic High School between 2000 and 2007, stayed for more than 3 years, and were present on campus 
on October 11, 2002. 
Participants’ Narrative Profiles 
During the interview sessions with participants, the preliminary moments of the 
conversation were spent with the researcher and participant reacquainting themselves. 
Participants answered preliminary demographic questions to prepare for their one-on-one 
interviews. Using guided-dialogue inquiry, each participant shared their personal 
background to update the researcher on their lives at the time of the interview. Certain 
components of those experiences are not shared in participants’ narrative profiles to 
protect the confidentiality of the participant. 
Student 1 
The participant attended TMAHS beginning in the 2001 academic school year 
and graduated in 2005. Student 1 was born outside the United States, arriving in San 
Francisco at 3 years old. Student 1 had a Ph.D. in a science, technology, engineering, and 
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mathematics field and had worked in higher education. Student 1’s hobbies and interests 
included spending time with family and friends, gardening, and caring for animals. 
Student 2 
The participant attended TMAHS beginning in the 2001 academic school year 
and graduated in 2005. Student 2 was born in San Francisco. Student 2 had bachelor’s 
degree in Business Communications and a Master of Business Administration and had 
worked in organizations that supported students. Student 2 enjoyed sports, leisure and 
travel, music, entertainment, and movies. 
Student 3 
The participant attended TMAHS beginning in the 1998 academic school year 
and graduated in 2003. Student 3 was born in San Francisco. Student 3 indicated that they 
had bachelor’s degree in social studies and had only worked in education-focused jobs, 
working directly or indirectly with students of color or from underserved communities. 
Student 3 spent free time with family and friends as well as participating in a variety of 
fitness activities. 
Parent 1 
The participant had three children who attended and graduated from TMAHS. 
Parent 1 was born in San Francisco and had some college but did not earn a degree. 
Parent 1 had always worked in education. Parent 1 appreciated spending time with family 
and friends, traveling, music, entertainment, and movies. 
Parent 2 
The participant had three children who attended and one who graduated from 
TMAHS. Parent 2 has a bachelor’s degree. Parent 2 was born in San Francisco and at the 
time of the study worked for a nonprofit organization that supported municipal-
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community members. In the past, Parent 2 had worked for education nonprofit 
organizations as well as for-profit corporations. Parent 2 enjoyed health and fitness 
activities. 
Educator 1 
The participant arrived at TMAHS in late 1990s and was eliminated from the 
school staff before the mid-2000s. Educator 1 had an Ed.D. in education. Hobbies that 
interested Educator 1 were animal care and spending time with friends from around the 
globe. 
Educator 2 
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the early 2000s and left the school staff in 
the mid-2000s. Educator 2 had obtained a bachelor’s degree. Educator 2 was born on the 
east coast of the United States. Reading, studying, and world travel occupied Educator 
2’s leisure time. 
Educator 3 
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the late 1990s and left the school staff in the 
mid-2000s. Educator 3 indicated being born in the United States. Educator 3 had a 
bachelor’s degree and relaxed with family and friends. Educator 3 also enjoyed 
camping/hiking, sports/fitness activities, and traveling. 
Educator 4 
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the late 1990s and left the school staff in the 
mid-2000s. Educator 4 had earned a bachelor’s degree. Educator 4 was born in San 
Francisco and attended public and private schools. Educator 4 had hobby interests in 
food/restaurants and beer. 
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Educator 5 
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the early 2000s and left the school staff in 
the mid- to late-2000s. Educator 5 was born outside of San Francisco but in California. 
Educator 5 indicated earning an advanced higher education degree and had only attended 
public schools. Educator 5 welcomed time spent with family and friends. Educator 5 was 
politically engaged and appreciated music, sports, travel/leisure, camping/hiking, and 
entertainment/ movies. 
Anonymous 
Although the researcher had access to multiple sources of information about 
municipal, law-enforcement, and educational processes, many sources were willing to 
offer contextual insights to the zeitgeist of the City and County of San Francisco, the 
SFUSD, and the primary law-enforcement organizations: the SFPD and Sheriff’s 
Departments, as long as the origin of the insights were kept anonymous. Three 
anonymous sources generously offered contextual insights to the data and themes, 
corroborating what study participants revealed. 
Generative Themes 
Coded generative themes emerged from initial interviews and multiple follow-up 
discussions with participants, after the initial coding of data with the qualitative analysis 
software. Further, the researcher again listened to audio of participant interviews to 
gather any inferences and intents from participants’ comments for thematic-coding 
assurance. With the themes generated, findings for each research question surfaced for 
discussion in this section. 
Research Question 1: How did study participants remember the effect of 
embedded on-campus police on the school climate of TMAHS? To answer this research 
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was known as pre-10/11 or before SROs were known as a police presence on the 
TMAHS campus and the TMAHS Community experience overall peacefulness. For the 
second phase, participants recognized this as the day of 10/11, with a strong policing 
presence and an uncontrollable riot. In the third phase, participants’ comments explicitly 
differentiated from other phases as post-10/11 with a strong police presence, crumbling 
school-community infrastructure, and the sense that TMAHS was intentionally destroyed. 
Each phase has correlating themes, analyzed and united through code matching with 
software, then checked by the researcher to ensure the code matching was true to specific 
themes from transcribed interviews. Participants’ voices led in creating these three 
distinct periods in their recollection of embedded police in TMAHS school-climate 
timelines. 
Figure 1 is a visual-concept map denoting the themed findings for Research 
Question 1, representing the phases TMAHS Pre-10/11. 
Figure 1. A visual concept map denoting the themed findings for Research Question 1, 
representing the phase TMAHS Pre-10/11. 
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The subthemes that emerged under the TMAHS Pre-10/11 phase for the 
participants were (a) The Thurgood Marshall Way, (b) Community/Diversity, (c) A Good 
School/College-Going Culture, and (d) The Principal Cared About the TMAHS 
Community. Multiple subthemes emerged under each theme. Under The Thurgood 
Marshall Way, subthemes were (a) an expected rigor accompanied the higher graduation 
credits requirement; (b) students, parents, and educators felt mentored in a particular 
TMAHS style; and (c) most students and educators were unaware of an SRO on campus. 
The few educators who were aware of the female SRO understood she was well-liked and 
respected by the TMAHS Community. Under the emerged Community/Diversity 
subtheme, all participants’ subthemes spoke to the friendly school climate and that 
friendships were made easily across cultures and race boundaries. Under the Good 
School/College-Going Culture subtheme, students and parents remembered that TMAHS 
was a place where the students were exposed to (a) multiple opportunities that were not 
offered at other public schools and all the participants conveyed a strong sense of 
(b) hope for the students’ futures if they went to TMAHS. Finally, the last subtheme in 
which each participant voiced a clear recollection was that the TMAHS Pre-10/11 
principal, Dr. B., cared about the entire TMAHS Community. TMAHS, while this 
principal headed the school, had subthemes that relayed (a) strong administration–staff 
relationships, (b) strong staff–parent relationships, and (c) strong teacher–student 
relationships. 
The Thurgood Marshall Way 
TMAHS, located in the southeast sector of San Francisco, was seen as a smaller 
high school in the community it was supposed to serve, the Bayview district of San 
Francisco. Each participant reflected on the school’s environment as one of high 
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expectations and each person involved in the school had a commitment to education 
leveling life’s playing field. Student 3 recalled his unconscious introduction to The 
Thurgood Marshall Way during the daily welcome: 
I remember sitting in class and over the intercom with Dr. B., rolling my eyes. I 
think that when you’re in it it’s one of those things where you don’t appreciate it 
until you don’t have it anymore, or you may not be able to recognize what about it 
is a way or something that’s unique for somebody else’s experience. It’s 
definitely engrained in my mind. “Have a good day the Thurgood Marshall way.” 
That’s what he said over the intercom every day. “Have a good day the Thurgood 
Marshall way.” All of those were very structural differences and tangible 
differences to the way that the school organized itself, but I didn’t really realize it 
until later, that was unique to Thurgood. And the Thurgood Marshall way was just 
this very simple, I am—like I-am statements. I forget what they all are, it’s like, I 
am respectful, I am something-something. I don’t remember now. 
In hindsight, Student 3 thought the school took particular pains to make certain 
students felt included in the school overall, noting, 
I thought it was a very intentional way to get students grounded into a new school. 
It’s “Hey, you’re here, you’re a part of this, this is what we value,” all the teachers 
share students, so they can collaborate with each other. 
Students 1 and 2 expressed the similar sentiments in understanding the academic 
expectations at TMAHS. Student 1 remembered, “After school homework clubs were 
offered and there was an emphasis on learning. The teachers were very kind and they 
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really cared about the students.” In contrast, Student 2 thought about specific areas that 
were a struggle and the teachers who helped students understand curriculum: 
The work that I did, with my friends and with my teachers. Then another teacher, 
she was a chemistry teacher, like she was one of the people that was on top of us 
in the sense of making sure that we were doing well, like she would try to 
communicate with us and like with our parents and stuff like that. My history 
teacher, he was like always giving interesting tips and about stories and about 
history. He was really cool about that. The other teacher was always on top of it, 
making sure we were doing well, trying to communicate with our parents. 
The Thurgood Marshall Way was not just a slogan that was repeated every day 
during morning announcements; the TMAHS Community conveyed their understanding 
of it as a calling to reengage and reinvest in each other at a higher level. Educator 1 put it 
succinctly: 
The Thurgood Marshall Way. That’s how I’d sum it up. It was an academic 
culture with a focus on science, math and technology and students had rigorous 
requirements of 280 credits, basically an additional year of work, and they were 
getting into prestigious universities. 
Educators 2 and 4 sharply recalled their career beginnings at TMAHS as intense. 
Educator 2 remarked, 
I was really struck by the intensity of the students, and the ambition, and the 
intelligence. And the intensity, and ambition, and intelligence of my colleagues 
who were not just there to receive a paycheck, by any means. Not one of them. 
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Educator 4’s conferred this memory of initiation to TMAHS: 
And yeah, it was just, I didn’t totally know it at the time, but over time I realized 
it was just this kind of all-star team of teachers who had been compiled together 
around this vision and this mission of 280 credits and giving kids from 
Bayview/Hunter’s Point, Black and Brown kids from Bayview/Hunter’s Point, 
like the best possible education. 
Parent 1, with three children who attended TMAHS, had seen many types of 
parents through the years, but at TMAHS, said, 
But I looked at the parents there as being totally different. It was almost like: This 
is Our school, right? We have a say in this school. The academic standards are 
high, but it’s built for us. And I when I say “us,” I’m talking about those students 
of color, and in particular we still had a significant Black population at the school 
that were really buying in. 
The parent also observed how intently his second child was about attending TMAHS, 
regardless of the notion that other popular high schools around the city were attempting 
to recruiting heavily at the time: 
Thurgood Marshall is up and coming, so I thought Thurgood Marshall might be a 
good place for [my daughter] because you can kind of establish your own identity, 
be up and coming. And that was the thing that made me feel like—Wow, what are 
we getting ourselves into? But [she] fell in love with Thurgood Marshall and said 
that that’s where I want to go. And then the demand that they have more units, she 
was really positive about that, which I thought was kind of “What? You want 
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more?” I think it makes it special. In other words, she bought into the Thurgood 
Marshall Way, which is what they all talked about from Day 1. I mean she was all 
in. 
Educator 3, who believed it important for educators teaching students of color to 
use a race lens, insightfully remembered seeking out mentors: 
And asked a friend there who was a grounded teacher, where is the anti-racist 
work here at Thurgood? I’ll never forget what he said to me. He was like, “Hey 
listen, I did that work here at the school and then I had to pay such a cost for it. 
He told us a story about how his father had a heart attack, so he said you know 
why, the work was too hard. I looked to my friend, that grounded teacher for 
leadership there, for sure. But he was unable to give it to me. So then I just 
worked with a small group of completely serious teachers who knew their craft 
and who were willing to do anything to make sure all kids learned. Chief among 
them was this woman. A physics teacher. That woman … that woman really had 
an anti-racist teaching perspective. Do you know what I mean? Because she 
changed the whole curriculum, changed the whole physics curriculum to make it 
accessible to all students. And then another great teacher grounded, who’s not 
pictured here, came to the school later. There was one other woman who lived in 
the community who was totally doing work, political work, you know she’s 
grounded in the politics. 
The opportunity to collaborate and mentor newer teachers proved to be an 
invaluable in-house teacher-training methodology. Educator 5 averred that the mentoring 
TMAHS style felt like family: 
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There was just a super solid, I mean, so many really solid folks, and then 
structures in place. Like the family structure, and I think especially when we came 
in, we had a prep period. Just thinking about what made Thurgood, “Thurgood.” 
There were so many of these unique things that allowed us to do the work we did. 
I just realized that all the 9th and 10th grade teachers had an extra prep period all 
together a couple times a week to talk about kids and talk about our curriculum, 
and cross curricular projects and things like that, right? 
Educator 2 found the mentoring and collaboration favorable to her teaching 
universe: “I liked the way we worked collaboratively with teachers. I liked the respect 
teachers had for students and mostly vice versa. And I liked my colleagues. And it was an 
exciting.” 
When seeking supportive grant-funding opportunities to continue with TMAHS’s 
extensive programs, Educator 1 recalled, 
At some point, in a staff meeting, we were pitched the idea that we had this grant 
opportunity that would bring a school nurse to the school—which everyone 
wanted for our wellness center, it was a real need our students had… but to get 
the nurse, we had to take an SRO. I can’t remember if we were, if we had the 
chance to discuss and vote as a staff, or if we were just informed it was 
happening, it was a done deal. This idea was introduced late in a staff meeting and 
we had about 85 vocal, political staff and a once-a-week 60-minute staff meeting. 
Everyone, well, lots of staff, always wanted to express their point of view and it 
could kill the meetings. This grant was introduced with about 15 minutes left in 
the meeting. I remember a fellow teacher—an English teacher—was really 
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against it—and stood up and described this as the criminalization of youth—and, 
if I remember, a different teacher stormed out of the meeting. But most people 
didn’t want it. There was a small group of more conservative staff who wanted it, 
saying it would make the school safer. 
With the grant funded, a school nurse was placed in the wellness center and an 
SRO on campus. Educator 1 added, 
The first SRO was pretty cool. She was Samoan, I think, and it was probably good 
for the students to see a woman of color have the gig. She was nice enough and 
the kids seemed friendly with her. I’m sure she was taking care of business behind 
the scenes, so I never saw her having an aggressive interaction with a kid. 
However, most participants did not recall an SRO being on campus in an overt 
way. No parent participants recalled an SRO at TMAHS before October 11, 2002. 
Student 1, said, “Before 2002, I never noticed SROs stationed at TMAHS. Therefore, I 
do not know what type of interactions students had with them.” Educator participants did 
recall an SRO, but without a strong presence. Educator 5, indicated “I remember vaguely 
police presence.” 
While Educators 2 and 4 had some comprehension about an SRO on campus, it 
was Educator 2 who sensed less about the SRO: 
I don’t remember them as a force for good. But I don’t remember them as a force 
for evil either. But I only remember one who I feel like was really good. They 
must have stopped the program because I don’t remember SROs the last couple of 
years. 
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Educator 4 recalled the most of the two: 
I don’t remember her name. But I remember the resource officer. The woman that 
was Filipino? Yeah, I remember, kids loved her. That’s my recollection. I just 
remember her being a warm—I mean I think it probably had everything to do 
with the kind of school that it was that she could kind of—probably a combination 
of who she was and also just the atmosphere. She wasn’t being asked to be a 
police officer in the building in the ways that things, you know, things that were 
wrong. That’s not what she was doing. Yeah, I think the atmosphere of the school 
allowed her to be somebody who was there doing what a resource officer in an 
ideal sense should do and not being a policeman in the building. That’s how I 
remember her, yeah. I don’t think I’ve thought about her for years, but I have 
warm recollections of her, for sure. 
Community/Diversity 
Thurgood began as a Consent Decree School (San Francisco NAACP, 1983, 
p. 22) to support high school-aged children in the San Francisco Bayview–Hunter’s Point 
neighborhoods with a zip code of 94124 (TMAHS-SARC, 1995) and then expanded to 
include students from zip codes 94134 and 94110 (TMAHS-SARC, 1997). It fulfilled its 
mandate by offering an academically focused high school for African American students 
living in the Bayview–Hunter point neighborhoods and by serving underserved Latino 
and Asian students of color living in the surrounding low-income area. Participants 
provided examples of multiple instances of feeling like one diverse community as part of 
the school’s overall popularity. Student 1 said, 
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I truly enjoyed being exposed to such a diverse group of people. At TMAHS, the 
diversity helped me to understand different cultures and perspectives. ... When I 
was a freshman at TMAHS (2001), the school environment was very friendly and 
there was no tension. I felt like everyone got along fairly well and I was never 
scared to attend school. Overall, TMAHS during my freshmen year was filled 
with positivity. 
Student 2 indicated a freer existence when thinking about diversity of students: 
I didn’t belong to any clubs, I’d just hang out with everyone. Like I used to talk to 
everyone and people were cool about it, so I was cool with them. Yeah, that’s 
what I did. I was there, I’d hang out with anyone. I’d talk to someone and I’d talk 
to another person, like whatever. I was talking to everyone. I think the people that 
were really athletic, to people who didn’t really care about anything, it was all 
mixed. Yeah, there was lots of changes. The first year (2001) was pretty cool. 
Student 3 recalled a more intentional approval of the diverse community feel of the 
school: 
I think Thurgood that was a school kind of like—I remember being, I think when 
you’re a freshman my entire emphasis was just trying to get along with people. I 
think I changed at Thurgood. Thurgood served a lot of students from Hunter’s 
Point. I think most of the people from Hunter’s Point and Sunnydale, and 
everything that was happening in the community was an aspect of Thurgood, so 
the types of students, you know, I think at that time too there was just more 
violence in the community than there has been recently. We’ve had a large part of 
the Black population leave the city, as a teenager everyone was trying to get 
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along. I think the interesting thing about Thurgood was it took us on a journey 
where the perceptions of how we saw ourselves started to shift, I think, as a result 
of the types of experiences that we did as a school community. 
Additionally, Student 3 believed in family structure was set up at TMAHS to support the 
notion of students from differing backgrounds coming together: 
One of the big things in the freshman and sophomore year were this focus on 
families. 9th grade and 10th grade family cohorts where all of us, what happened 
was you had this thing, teachers for your core subjects and they all shared the 
same students, Spanish, math and science all had the same cohort of students that 
we all did electively to build school spirit and camaraderie amongst each other. 
There was also this sense of competition too amongst the different families. The 
way families were broken down were in three different sections. For 9th grade 
there was a 9X, 9Y, 9Z. It was like we built this connection. And then within the 
families and amongst the three families, the competition piece was also academic, 
and school spirit. We would get shirts for our families and I think we would have 
attendance or GPA things that we did. 
Educator 5 agreed that family cohorts helped create a sense of community in the 
diverse school environment: 
My first year I was teaching world history and US history and at the time we had 
familias, which was this really unique thing I came to realize that wasn’t 
happening at other schools. Basically, these small cohorts of three teachers, a 
hundred students, so it was kind of like this small school within a large school 
model in the 9th and 10th grade where three or four of us, a math teacher, a 
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science teacher, a history teacher, and English teacher all had the same group of 
students, so we could like focus in on our cohort of students. I was crazy 
overwhelmed, I worked 12–14 hour days—every day, and I was there until like 
7:00pm at least every day. 
Good School/College-Going Culture 
Thurgood had begun to realize the Consent Decree mandate as it graduated it first 
class cohorts that attended as freshmen in the mid-1990s. The results showed in the 
increased numbers of families that did not live in the school’s prescribed enrollment 
preference zip codes of 94124, 94134, and 94110 applying to Thurgood through a district 
lottery. Parent 1 specifically remembered the shift in enrollment: 
It began to be a sought-after school by the Asian community because they could 
not get everybody into Lowell, and so they started looking around. Wait a minute, 
what other school is here? And that’s when I found out about that phenomenon 
called: Graduate from Thurgood Marshall and having more students admitted into 
UC Berkeley than Lowell, you know? And getting admitted in to parts of the UC 
system. And you know, that’s when I started taking notice of it. Wait a minute, 
this is a good school, you know, a really, really good school. 
Educator 4 named this thought as the center piece for shaping the school’s core 
belief system: 
There was certainly a sense that you got that there was a real pride taken in the 
place and feeling like they were in a place where expectations were higher and the 
hopes were great. But what we did have is just a belief in the kids and the 
possibility to build a really great school. I think that’s what stands out for me. 
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Student 3 spent much of the discussion focusing on the different ways that 
TMAHS captivated students and families through a TMAHS college-culture mantra and 
practice that emphasized attending college: 
There was a huge emphasis when we got to campus that students here go to 
college. You’re here, you’re going to college, this is what we do here. That was 
evident by the graduation requirement. The graduation requirement was higher. I 
think that also did something, at least for me, that you sort of felt, I think, a deeper 
sense of self-worth because you had higher requirements. Oh, I’m working harder 
than kids in other schools. Yeah, I remember years later the big emphasis on 
academic, and it was funny too, this is something that still happens, about 
academic being in the name. Because it was called Thurgood Marshall Academic 
High School, and I think because of that graduation requirement we really held 
onto that word Academic it was an important part of the school name. 
 And everyone was—Well every school is academic, I don’t get it. But it 
was the association with the higher requirements that people held to that one word 
because it made it like we were set apart because the bar was higher. We felt like 
we associate this sense within ourselves that we can do more than what was 
required. At least for me. That was part of the intention. We had the families, we 
had the higher grad requirements, we had this emphasis on you’re here, you’re 
going to college, and we all got computers. We talk about even today, the laptop 
or computer give-away program where every freshman that came in that wanted a 
computer to take home, they would get a computer. So that’s what your grounded 
in your first year, your first semester at Thurgood. 
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Then summarized this aspect of the environment that also provided opportunities: 
You know, it’s that the world can get a lot bigger, especially if you are coming 
from a community that lacks resources. A lot of educators come into the school 
having their own network and having had some expanded education for kids like 
me … but it’s like an entire different cross-section of people that I got to see and 
be more up close as a result of my teachers taking me to games or encouraging me 
to do different things. So Thurgood became a place that just really broadened my 
world. 
Educator 5 had similar thoughts about TMAHS opportunities for students and 
queried, “Or you think of the inter-session and post-session, right? Do you remember the 
trips we did where each teacher would organize a camping trip?” The Educator also 
reflected on the school’s enrollment at one point in the dialogue, believing that because 
of the school’s location, it would certainly house a large cohort of students enrolled from 
surrounding neighborhoods as well as many who were college bound. Educator 5 then 
pondered aloud, 
It was unique in that way as well because there were a lot of families, it would be 
interesting percentage-wise, that clearly chose Thurgood intentionally for that 
reason. … So, there was a mix of what I think, families who had that educational 
priority or motivation, and families that were just there because it was the closest 
school. The 7th period day and the 280 credits, all those things that were built into 
the structure, and the idea was that we’re going to get these students who have 
been under-served for so many years, to college, then these are all the things it’s 
going to take. 
99 
 
With the college culture thoroughly embedded into what graduating from 
TMAHS meant, several Educator participants expressed they were hopeful for their 
students’ futures. Educator 1 said that “Every kid counted at TMAHS. … Every student 
was important and mattered.” Educator 2 commented, 
We thought we were making the world a better place. We thought we were 
offering kids better options. Knowing that everybody there had chosen to be there 
and nobody had landed there by accident; we all were on a mission. 
Educator 4 said, 
I think my main initial feelings about Thurgood Marshall and my first few years 
there was like it was kind of a place that was filled with hope and a lot of energy, 
and really a place that we ended up learning a lot of business in education, like 
looking back on some of the things that we did, and that we tried to implement, 
we certainly weren’t doing everything perfectly. 
Educator 3 insisted on not putting TMAHS education on a pedestal. The 
participant made clear that certain embedded practices were problematic at the beginning 
of every school year, potentially initiating and perpetuated a White-savior mentality 
among staff who were not people of color teaching in a school that, since its creation had 
more than 90% of students of color attending (TMAHS SARC, 1994; 2002; 2012): 
There was something I hated about it; the teaching staff was so full of themselves 
and they were so young and inexperienced. And I’ll never forget that week in the 
faculty meeting, in the beginning faculty meeting after summer, starting in the 
fall, kids were introduced by their college credentials. I mean the new teachers. It 
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was so problematic, I was like losing it. They were like, and you know, so-and-so 
just graduated from Yale. And I’m like, Really? I’m like, teaching is not Ivory 
Tower. Teaching is dirty. Feet on the ground. 
The Principal Cared About the TMAHS Community 
Student participants primarily remembered interactions with their teachers when 
they reflected on Thurgood, which would make some sense because theoretically, those 
were the school-site staff with whom students had the most contact. The Parent and 
Educator participants’ culminating subtheme about TMAHS Pre-10/11 was that the 
principal of the school cared about everyone in the TMAHS Community. Parent 2, 
humorously remembered him: 
Dr. B. was strict. He got on people’s nerves, but you knew that he cared about that 
school. You knew that he cared about the kids. You knew he cared about the 
teachers. You knew this. Even though he got on your nerves, you knew that he 
was a principal that cared. He made that school. You know? And you go up there 
now and the first name you say: Dr. B., Dr. B. He was like the father there. 
The Educator participants had varying degrees of interaction with the Pre-10/11 
principal. However, the principal’s influence on the school and in shaping its mission was 
irrefutable, according to the Educator participants’ voices. Educator 5 said, 
And it was like just—I’ve been mostly at small schools and charter schools since, 
but having been in other large comprehensive schools, it’s crazy how that team of 
teachers was brought together, you know? Between the principal and assistant 
principal. Like they really, their whole theory of action was like put together the 
most passionate, strongest group of people, put them in front of young folks and 
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that’s how change is made. It was unique in that way … Dr. B’s vision and his 
leadership, and he was there for 8 years? 9 years? 
Educator 4 thought that teacher support could have been stronger from the school-
site administration but believed in the vision set forth by the principal: 
At Thurgood Marshall, we were trusted almost to a fault. Like Dr. B’s main 
philosophy was: I hired you, I trust you, I believe in you. I’m not going to be the 
principal who walks in and is checking up on what you’re doing. I think that has a 
lot of power but at the same time there’s a way to do both. To have supported 
teachers and to push teachers to actually understand how you can get better at 
your craft. But I don’t think I had that sense while I was there. … It was a great 
working environment. We were trusted to work hard and do a really good job. I 
don’t want to suggest—and I think unstructured is the wrong word—I think in 
retrospect, just having kind of gone to the administrative side, and been a part of 
like trying to figure out how do we better support teachers, as my career went on I 
kind of fell more on—looking back on those years—more on how did I as a 
younger teacher get support to be a better teacher? 
Educator 1 affirmed that the Pre-10/11 principal set the tone of the school: 
The culture was really established and driven by Principal B. He was way ahead 
of his time, was implementing research-based strategies that schools are just 
starting to use, 15 years later. I remember I was chaperoning a dance shortly after 
I started and I walked in and Principal B. was wearing overalls, painting over little 
chips on the wall. He had everything invested in those kids and that school and 
when you have high expectations, students respond. Something I liked was he was 
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willing to hire staff he knew were political or challenging the system and he 
brought them and fostered dialogue to advance student learning and grow staff 
leadership. This is a trait I’ve always admired and he is one of very few leaders 
I’ve seen who was willing to do this. 
With the support and encouragement of the principal, staff tried many ways to 
keep lines of communication open with families and guardians about students’ progress. 
The TMAHS Community, sanctioned by the school leadership, worked not just in 
conjunction with peer educators, but pulled in other community members, collaboratively 
in small teams, testing ideas and strategies to see if they would benefit the community 
cohort. If staff deemed they would benefit the community, then the idea or strategy was 
expanded further to accommodate the entire school community at grade-level 
appropriateness. If not, the team might strategize to see if the idea could be reworked and 
salvageable in another iteration. Parent 2, reverenced, 
And the staff there was beautiful. I liked the staff there. And my son was in 
Special Ed, so when I moved out of San Francisco, so I had to get an inter-district. 
The teachers told me, we’re going to fight you on this because we want [my son] 
to stay here [at Thurgood] because we know [my son]. They knew his needs. You 
know? And they told me that. I think we’re living in in the Eastbay. And they 
said—No, we’re going to fight you on that. They were so serious. So, I got the 
inter-district to stay here and my son graduated from Thurgood. 
Student 1, echoed the same feeling: “Many of the teachers even invested their 
time to learn about the students and to create a positive learning environment.” Educator 
1 characterized the teacher–student bond as “It was definitely a ‘warm demander’ 
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atmosphere, with lots of emphasis on academics, and teachers willing to put in extra time 
on projects or after school tutoring.” Student 3 underscored that sentiment by retelling 
some experiences: 
And there were people that didn’t have the best reputation as teachers, you know, 
they were hard, they weren’t nice or something like that. And we really built 
really great relationships. They were very supportive of me. This teacher, he’s 
right there, he was my 12th-grade pre-calculus teacher. I had his wife for AP 
History and also went to do an independent study class where I read a bunch of 
books by this fiction writer that was from New England. I read seven books on 
this guy and I wrote this long report about all of his books. She was my adviser 
for the class. I was trying to do … I wanted to do something challenging. I wanted 
to dig deep into this one writer that I really liked and she supported that and 
helped me set it up and we went back and forth about it. 
 
I went through this religious phase in high school and I used to write these articles 
in the school paper. The article author was Brother C. There was another student 
writer whose name was Doctor D. He focused on issues and current events at 
school. His point of view was funny and risqué. They would kind of get at each 
other, but they were really respectful. I found all these ways to express myself and 
really come into my own academically and present my ideas and have ideas 
encourage. … I’m thinking about all these people now. I had all these academic 
pursuits and I think with my teachers, I found ways to express that, to dive deeper 
into those things. Everything though was outside of it. I guess with the Newspaper 
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advisor and the History paper advisor, I feel like that’s the good thing about 
teachers; teachers that are really committed to the school community. 
Three theme phases and their subthemes encapsulate responses to Research 
Question 1. The first themed phase denoted the TMAHS Community and environment, in 
Pre-10/11, referring to the date of the police riot. Notably, participants fondly 
characterized and explained The Thurgood Marshall Way: how well the school’s diverse 
community got along with each other and growing the college-going culture among 
students and their families while having the lead support of the principal. 
The TMAHS October 11, 2002 riot, was the result of local law-enforcement 
agencies sending a total of 126 (OCC, 2004) armed police in riot and tactical gear with 
helicopter and fire-department support. The themes that emerged under the second phase, 
TMAHS 10/11 day of the police riot had some participants admitting their struggle to 
recall: (a) Chaotic School Environment, (b) SRO/Police Presence, and (c) Three Powerful 
African Americans (see Figure 2). 
Under the second-phase theme, A Chaotic School Environment, leading up to the 
day of 10/11, subthemes emerged from all participants about the TMAHS Community: 
(a) the new principal and administrative staff, (b) the staff feeling intimidated by the 
district offices, (c) the false gang threat and (d) the impression a campaign existed to 
destroy TMAHS. Educators, parents, and students express the subthemes of SRO/Police 
presence as (a) all possessed a painful permanent memory of 10/11/2002, (b) it was 
remembered as an uncontrollable riot, (c) the police presence caused more problems, 
(d) many participants witnessed police brutality, (e) participants feared for students’ and 
staff’s safety, (f) educators observed targeting Black and Brown students, and (g) parents 
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of Three Powerful African Americans in positions of authority over the city, school 
district, and police department are the subthemes (a) Mayor Willie Brown, 
(b) Superintendent Arlene Ackerman, and (c) San Francisco Police Chief Earl Sanders. 
Figure 2. A visual concept map denoting the themed findings for Research Question 1, 
representing the phase TMAHS 10/11. 
Chaotic School Environment 
As the 2002 academic school year began in August, TMAHS staff, students, and 
families were met by an entirely new administrative staff, except for one counselor who 
was selected to remain to help acquaint the new team to the site staff, students, and 
families. Parent 1 saw the difference immediately in how the school was run and voiced 
concerns with other parents: 
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After Dr. B. left? The school went down. I’m going to tell you; the school went 
downhill. It was disorganized, nothing was the same. It wasn’t right once he left 
there. And like I said, maybe he got on parents’ nerves, but when the parents 
found out he was leaving the parents was fighting for him to stay because Dr. B. 
made that school. 
Student 2 spotted the difference in the overall school atmosphere as well with the 
school leadership: “The changed principal. It changed the school a lot. And then like, for 
example, when we graduated we were kind of happy to leave because we were done with 
like the mess that was going on.” 
Educators also watched the decline of school-leadership attributes with the new 
administration. Educator 3 recognized a continuous issue of the interim principal: 
The interim principal, who was scared of the kids. And she made numerous small 
little maneuvers and comments that made that clear. I even had conversations 
with her where I said something to her about it. And it was known among a small 
group of us that she was afraid of the Black kids. She overreacted to everything 
Black kids did. 
Educator 5 corroborated this perspective about the interim principal’s issues with 
students: 
The interim principal coming in and being like what is she, like how is she the 
principal of the school, you know? She had no presence. She was just really off-
putting and negative and who knows what she was told about Thurgood, if she 
was supposed to come in and be the enforcer, but man, I remember just feeling so 
off-put by her, and just seeing her interactions with kids and being like I don’t 
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understand how she is the principal of a school. There was some fear there and 
some discomfort. 
Educator 1 recalled: 
When the woman came in as the interim principal, things just started to crumble. 
Students started acting up, there were incidents of violence between students and 
between students and teachers. The new assistant principal was intolerable. He 
had hidden under his desk during the riot and after, he would harass newer 
teachers, but not someone like me who would stand up to him. He touched me 
once (on the arm) and I told him to not put his hands on me, and he did it again 
later and it just creeped me out. 
Regardless of the steps taken by staff to support students throughout transition of 
new administration, Educator 4 said the lack of leadership undercurrent was felt by the 
whole TMAHS Community: 
We didn’t know it was coming in that way, but the school, from the very 
beginning of that year, and that’s kind of what I was saying at the beginning, like 
from the get-go of that school year it was just falling apart. From the outset, there 
was no leadership and the school clearly needed leadership. That was clear 
instantly, and people recognized from the get-go, the kids recognized it, the adults 
recognized it, that there was no leadership. 
Educator 1 confirmed the sense that the Community could not mend what had 
been broken: 
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Teachers were under continuous pressure and we had a letter from HR saying if 
anyone called in sick without a note it would be considered a wildcat strike. We 
had that on us from October to March. It was ridiculous. 
Subsequently, Educator 1 remembered overhearing a foretelling gang-related 
discussion: 
I remember there was a lot of talk when McAteer closed—which was end of 
spring 2002. McAteer had a gang problem. There were no doubt kids at Marshall 
that were in gangs, but it wasn’t obvious and it wasn’t a big threat or school issue. 
… When McAteer closed, kids were transferred all over the city—and then every 
school had a gang problem. I know this had been a concern for people. 
Educator 5 matched the end of the previous school year’s issues with the 
beginning of the 2002 school year issues: 
And then the year of the—like the battle over the credits and the removing of Dr. 
B, like that energy was shifted in a way toward the political fight, right? To 
basically keep Thurgood what it was. I don’t know how many folks left, but a ton 
of folks left after that year. I remember there were still a lot of us left, but not a lot 
from the original cohort of the first few years. Hiring was super hard, and the 
folks that were hired were not, you know, clearly one of the key mechanisms was 
like with previous administration and who was being hired, right? 
Educator 3 struggled with the school infrastructure coming apart under the 
administration: “And the feeling of the school while she was the interim principal was 
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that the school was in disarray. With her it just felt like it was in the midst of a 
dismantling. It just felt awful.” 
Educator 4 also asserted he had not realized the toll that the previous year’s battle 
for graduation credits had taken on the TMAHS Community: 
I think I at the time kind of underestimated the impact of the 280 credits and what 
that did. I was kind of oblique when that all went down. I don’t see why we can’t 
be a great school even if we don’t have that, and I think we shouldn’t get hung up, 
but I think ultimately it did matter. It didn’t matter enough to have what happened 
happen, but yeah, I think that’s my main memory of it. 
SRO/Police Presence 
The new administration’s perplexing circumstances of not knowing TMAHS 
staff, students, or families, combined with the influx 300 McAteer High School students, 
created a chaotic environment. The new administration insisted on an increase in the 
TMAHS on-campus police presence. New SROs were assigned to the TMAHS campus. 
Several SFPD officers walked the hallways daily in shifts. Educator 4, said, 
A group of teachers went to—it might have been in the middle of like an English 
department meeting—I think that’s what it was. I think the English teachers were 
in a meeting and we were feeling like how tense things were in the hallways 
because all of these police were suddenly in our building. It wasn’t just a resource 
officer, there were like a handful police that were patrolling the building.” 
Educator 1 took the same concerns to the new administration: 
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At one point I remember three cops taking pictures of graffiti with a polaroid 
camera and I remember thinking—it takes three cops to take a picture? And who 
uses a polaroid these days? I asked the assistant principal about what they were 
doing, and he said they collect graffiti to follow it through the city and try and 
make arrests, so one of my feelings was they integrate—and infiltrate—into the 
system to try and identify kids as criminals—it wasn’t about school safety. 
The increased police presence spoke to an understanding between organizations 
that had not fully conveyed the information to the TMAHS Community. District and 
TMAHS school-site leadership were preparing for events that the TMAHS Community 
had not experienced in any of its previous years’ history. The bubbling of tensions and 
eerie feeling of dread came over teachers and students. What happened over the next few 
days was foretold to the school leadership; however, no one in the TMAHS Community 
would have predicted the magnitude and ramifications of future events. Educator 4, 
forewarned, 
We went to the interim principal and sat in her office and said “Something is 
going to happen. It is bad, they shouldn’t be here. They don’t belong in the 
school, we’ve got to figure out some other way because something bad is going to 
hap. This does not feel good, you can feel it in the air.” It was that blunt, like we 
said that, and it was said out loud. And then yeah, a week or 2 later, yeah, it all 
went down. 
Educator 4 added, “Teachers started to organize. … We started taking action 
because we saw the school falling apart. That was Wednesday, October 9—and the riot 
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happened October 11.” Educator 3, also believed, “the school that year was so different 
that we had this interim principal, the woman.” 
Each participant had a permanent memory of 10/11/2002 and realized it was a 
painful memory to recall. Student participants’ voices reflected less detail about the days’ 
events than the Parent and Educator participants’ reflections of the day. This may be due 
to their location in the school at time; their access to certain details of the riot; their 
teachers serving as protectors, shielding them during the riot; and their ages (between 14 
and 17) on October 11, 2002. Student 1, recalled 
There was an incident where a big fight broke out between a few people. From 
what I recall, there was an Asian student who got into an altercation with an 
African American student and both sides had a lot of family members who joined 
in the fight. 
Student 2 said, “The second year, with all the things that were going on with like 
riot.” The detail from Student 3 included that of a school-district official sharing 
understanding of the riot: 
A School Board Commissioner was telling me it was like the largest police 
presence at the school since Columbine. You know, that’s how many police were 
on campus there. It was such a gross exaggeration of the incident … the incident 
also as a way to really oppose the leadership change and they refused to build 
back the teaching. 
The Educators remembered riot specifics as well as their efforts to protect their 
students from the riot milieu. Educator 2 mentioned how the 10/11 riot recurs in 
conversation with education colleagues and the visceral pain it causes through reliving it: 
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I was a little afraid to get my head back in that time when you asked about it 
because it was really so traumatic. And I can go months without thinking about it 
and then it will come up and/or maybe a year or 2 and it will come up in 
conversation every couple of years and I have to go through and explain this. And 
people can’t believe it. When I talk about it people just can’t believe it. 
 Somebody was out on the yard, on the quad crying and calling up to the 
kids. And the kids in my room were talking to her through the window, which 
normally I would not allow, and for some reason I did allowed it. I have no idea 
now in retrospect why. They said the police are beating up on so-and-so, and so-
and-so in the office and blah blah blah, and she was crying and crying. And at that 
point, I wasn’t going to be able to keep the kids in anymore. I went with them to 
go downstairs and out onto the quad. And from the quad but I kept them with me. 
And I called my partner on my cellphone. The first time I’d ever made a call to 
him during the day, and I said “Something terrible is happening here. Police are 
beating on our students and a faculty member.” 
Educator 5 had a classroom on the top floor of the school that faced the football 
field and quad area; however, with all the commotion, Educator 5’s entry into the melee 
was delayed: 
My classroom was facing the football field, yeah. I was really late. Like when I 
got down there it was chaos. I remember I saw the teacher coming down with his 
video camera, I remember seeing the police coming after him. 
Educator 3, informed the researcher of a permanent memory as well as the 
intensity of being in the midst of the ordeal: 
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I remember everything in great detail. It was a life-changing event. At the time 
that this happened, that this event happened, where the police came in and 
attacked the children. … When the shit came down I was right in the middle of it 
on the first floor, and the interim principal and a few other administrators and 
secretaries locked themselves in the main office. Locked the doors. And were in 
the main office as the police filled the halls during passing period and made one 
of those circles back to the inside of the circle to the outside and blocked the 
hallway, and then started getting into it with students. She locked herself in the 
office. … It was for real shit. 
Educator 4’s visual recollection brought forward forgotten personal pain: 
The thing that was hardest for me personally, other than just like the day itself, 
that just brings back such horrible memories of seeing the kids out in the streets 
with the hundred police or whatever ended up happening, and just trying to keep 
kids safe, and just the rage in kids’ eyes. 
Educator 1, added later, 
That riot happened the day our students were scheduled to take their SAT tests—
how do you think that affected their scores? The rookie SRO calling the wrong 
code, a racist issue between the Filipino and African American youth, a million 
explanations.” 
The Parent participants bore in mind the law-enforcement response level of the 
school and still expressed disbelief. Parent 2 recalled witnessing events while locating 
their last child to attend TMAHS: 
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I’ll never forget this. I just got off work because I was doing security for the 
school district. And my son called me. He said, “Mama, come get me.” I said, 
“What’s wrong?” He said there’s a riot up there. Lucky, it wasn’t that far, so 
when I went up there it was unbelievable. It was truly unbelievable. I said it’s a 
shame where there’s no control over this situation. It was really, really bad. I had 
never seen anything like that at school. Never. I have never seen anything like 
that. And I had three kids in school. And I’ve never seen anything like that. The 
police were coming in, and I told my son, “Get in the car now.” He was trying to 
protect his friends, and I said, “No, you get in the car, we’re leaving here.” I said 
this is ridiculous. And my son has a shunt in his head and I didn’t want the police 
hitting him in his head. I didn’t want no students hitting him in the head. Let’s go. 
Let’s go. And the next thing we know we see it on TV. It was horrible, it was just 
horrible. Anyone could have got hurt, seriously hurt because kids were just acting 
crazy, the police were acting crazy, and one policeman told me, “You get out of 
here”. I said, “You don’t tell me what to do. No, I’m coming to get my child.” 
And I had to tell one police officer, “You don’t be shoving. Don’t you shove my 
child.” 
Parent 1’s permanent memory of the day envisioned what the students and 
teachers experienced on campus during the riot: 
So it’s like, you know, those that got arrested because of standing up for justice, 
gets the San Francisco Police Department and Sheriff’s Department, and those 90-
plus officers between the two departments, that invaded that school on that day, 
will never, ever leave my mind. When I think about that many police officers at a 
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high school with all those students, and that bell going off and those students not 
being on lock-down, and being released into a gauntlet, basically, of police 
officers coming in from every single doorway in that school at the same time as 
the students are coming out of class into that environment. 
Comprehension that the TMAHS Community was in the midst of a full-blown 
and expanding riot become apparent when various participants illustrated some of their 
summaries. Educator 3 said, “I remember that a lot of us felt like we had to protect the 
Black kids.” Parent 2 commented: 
It seemed to me that once the police got there it just really got out of hand. They 
were trying to break it up, but they just caused more problems. Yeah, so I don’t—
I wouldn’t know how to handle something like that. That was a large crowd to be 
handled … a teacher got hurt. I just thought my child was going to get hurt. I 
really did. I thought I was going to get hurt. That’s how bad it was. There were 
parents up there that was truly, truly upset. You know? The police were shoving 
the kids, like Thurgood Marshall kids did it. 
Three Powerful African Americans 
Immediately after the riot, TMAHS was closed for a week as parents demanded 
answers from city, school, and law-enforcement leaders about the police brutality 
inflicted on their children and community. San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown, SFUSD 
Superintendent of Schools Arlene Ackerman, and SFPD Chief of Police Earl Sanders 
were heads of their respective bureaucracies in San Francisco and accountable to their 
individual constituencies: the citizens of San Francisco. Teachers refused to return to the 
school, backing parents’ concerns. Student 3, remembered the voices of teachers: 
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They were like we’re not going back. This is October, you know, like the school 
year starts—we’re in October now, the school year starts in August, we’re 8 
weeks into school and teachers are refusing to go back to class. Like that’s how it 
was. Whatever type of—thinking about it now as an adult too, trying to build a 
working relationship with somebody over the course of 2 months. In something, 
okay I’m going to give this a shot, let’s give it 6 months. Teachers are like, No. 
This person is toxic to the school, I refuse to teach. They had like look at what 
happened under this person’s leadership, you know? Kids are being beaten up by 
cops. Teachers are being arrested. It was like, it was like insane. 
Parent 1 summarized the three city- and state-level authorities that had oversight 
on the TMAHS 10/11 police riot: 
It was almost like a Black triumvirate of leadership in the city and county of San 
Francisco. Willie Brown, and we talked about this excessively, as mayor. You had 
Ackerman as superintendent of schools, the public schools, and then you had San 
Francisco Unified School District, then you had Earl Sanders. Yeah that’s it, 
Prentice Earl Sanders, and then he was chief of police. 
Once the Parent 1 deduced the highest-ranking member of the three, he reached 
out to the Mayor and had a telephone conversation with him about the TMAHS 10/11 
riot: 
“I know you’re really busy, but we have a crisis here and I just felt like I had to 
speak with you directly just to make sure that you had multiple perspectives on 
the event, circumstances, and have it from the vantage point of a parent with a 
child here at the school and what we have seen and experienced.” 
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He says “Okay.” He said it real early on, “So what are you expecting me from 
me?” 
But it was like, you called me so what do you expect me to do, right? What are 
you expecting me to do? 
And I said “Well, I thought it would be…if you could talk to the students and talk 
to the parents.” 
He said, “Nooooo! I don’t think you really want me to do that.” 
And I’m curious, “Why would I not want you to?” You know, what’s he know 
that I don’t know, right? 
He says “I’m going to tell you. These kids were out of control. They didn’t follow 
instructions. Blah-blah-blah … under the police officers’ command!” He said that 
they were out of control almost like they were hoodlums or hooligans. 
I said something almost like, “Wait a minute. Who’s telling you? Who’s giving 
you this?” 
He said, “Don’t worry. As Mayor, I have all the … I have more than enough 
information. And I don’t think it would be a good thing for me to be there.” 
Now he could have been saying that for more than just the reason that I’m 
thinking. He might have been saying it because maybe he felt like the community 
wasn’t going to receive him well. 
Educator 1, remembered, 
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African American—made some of the kids who were beaten—all African 
American—sign off that they wouldn’t sue—that the city wouldn’t press charges. 
… All of this political wrangling when kids’ lives were at stake just stank. And 
then these adults want to CYA and take advantage of kids. 
The second theme phase emerging in response to Research Question 1 was 
TMAHS 10/11, focused on the TMAHS Community and environment on Friday, October 
11, 2002. Speaking to the new-school-year chaotic environment with the dismissals over 
the summer of the founding principal and new administrators, the TMAHS Community 
and environment was overwhelmed by the strong police presence and minimal response 
from the three powerful African Americans in charge of the city, school district, and 
police department (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. A visual concept map denoting the themed findings for Research Question 1, 
representing the phase TMAHS Post-10/11. 
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The third phase in the TMAHS Post-10/11 theme findings that arose in response 
to Research Question 1: How did study participants remember the effect of embedded on-
campus police on the school climate of TMAHS?, as (a) blaming the TMAHS 
Community for 10/11, (b) nonexistent race wars now exist, (c) destroy TMAHS, and 
(d) superintendent/central office reactions to 10/11. Participants’ visceral subthemes 
came to light under the theme, Blaming the TMAHS Community for 10/11: (a) police 
blame TMAHS, (b) central office blames TMAHS, and (c) mainstream print media blame 
TMAHS. 
As participants recalled the mainstream media’s role in the TMAHS riot, The San 
Francisco Chronicle’s coverage of the riots added another voice to the incident, although 
it was outside the TMAHS Community. The Chronicle perspective of TMAHS coverage 
is valuable as it spoke to the sociopolitical tone across the paper’s readership, considered 
San Francisco’s primary newsprint source. Under the subtheme nonexistent race wars 
now exist at TMAHS are two subthemes brought forward primarily by the educators, 
indicating a strong awareness of intentional (a) targeting of Black and Brown students 
and (b) a race divide that took hold in the student community. Participants’ subthemes in 
observing the superintendent/central office’s reactions to 10/11 from their own TMAHS 
perspective echoed one another’s as (a) the ongoing exodus of teachers, regardless of 
method, blaming teachers for 10/11 continued, (b) the overall poor school culture assured 
that TMAHS could not return to the school cared for so much, and its ultimate 
destruction, and (c) blaming teachers for 10/11. 
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Blaming the TMAHS Community for 10/11 
As the TMAHS Community tried to address the devastation of the 10/11 riot, 
multiple strands of information and processes operated. From the TMAHS-community 
perspective, the police, the school district, and the city tried to blame them for not 
educating children well enough, not parenting children well enough, not conforming to 
protocols that oppress students of color, and not submitting to labeling practices that do 
not allow diverse communities to thrive. A new cohort of administrative leaders was 
placed at Thurgood after the riot. After several months, a replacement administration 
replaced the previous leadership. This occurred several times over the next year. As with 
traumatic occurrences, assigning blame may assist in dismantling a once tightly woven 
community, such as TMAHS. 
Student 1, recalled the ever-growing conflicts between students and teachers that 
coincided with the turnover in school-site leadership: 
There arose more conflicts between students and teachers, and I think the reason 
for this was due to teachers completely blaming the student for lack of progress. 
Towards the end of my high school career, I did not feel like there were more than 
two to three teachers who thought of me as a person. 
Student 2, became disinterested in school: 
Not every day, like it was, like so my sophomore year was really tough. Like 
since the incident happened with the rioting, that was like really tough. I barely 
went to class, like I just hanged out and did whatever I wanted. The teachers 
didn’t care at that point. That’s how I felt. Like I just remember the security 
guards, that they were hanging around every day. I mean I think I saw a police 
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officer once, but I never did again. Like the discipline was mostly by the security 
guard and like once in a while it would be a counselor. 
Student 3 saw the effort to continue the school’s original philosophy repeatedly thwarted: 
It was not the same. When Dr. B. left, there were teachers there that still wanted 
to try and stay and continue, and the principal they put in effectively killed the 
spirit of all those really incredible educators. And it was always arguments and 
tension. 
Educator 1 recollected the blaming of the McAteer students due to a lack of 
understanding of previous information: 
When the riot happened, top brass tried to blame it on kids who transferred from 
McAteer. I had several of those kids in my classes. I didn’t have any issue with 
those kids. It really felt like bullshit. We were getting bullshit from all over. 
Parent 1, observed information about the riot as it unfolded over time and the 
riot’s trauma that deeply affected students: 
I mean these kids are going on record, they arrested them unjustly in my opinion, 
and I think in the opinion of many. They were set up, it was—we later found out 
it was a police exercise gone haywire. It victimized, it traumatized our children. 
To this day. It altered lives, careers, you know, educational paths, and everything 
else when the kids went through it. Some actually rebounded and became stronger 
having gone through it. But there were others that were dramatically changed 
from what they possibly could have been because of going through this trial. 
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Educator 2, bitterly summarized the TMAHS students’ 10/11 reactive behavior as 
a response to what adults in positions of power had modeled for them: 
Afterwards, [it’s as if] we started the year telling the kids, you know, you’re not 
good enough for 280 units. We started the year telling the kids you’re not good 
enough. You can’t do that. Maybe the kids at Lowell can do that. You can’t do 
that. And then beat them up. Then called the kids names, the cops came in to beat 
them up, and I think about that year, that was my student’s senior year? 
Parent 2, after experiencing what was happening at the school, reading the 
newspaper accounts, and viewing the aftermath of the TMAHS 10/11 riot on television, 
issued a stern warning to the son that remained at the school: 
And that’s what I told my son that day, at this incident. If this happens again, you 
go in the bathroom, you go in the classroom, you protect yourself first. Don’t get 
involved, don’t look at nobody, don’t say anything to anybody. Because you don’t 
know what these people have on them and they can seriously hurt you. 
Nonexistent Race War Now Exists 
As the TMAHS Community strove to pull itself together after the riot, educators 
began to notice an increasing racial divide among students. Educator 1 made it a habit to 
walk the campus to photograph students interacting with one another. The photos would 
show up on classroom screens during the mornings announcements, unless students did 
not wish it. Considering what had occurred, Educator 1 thought it particularly pertinent to 
continue the practice. However, the participant noticed a behavior change on campus: 
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In the old days, we never had segregation issues, but now, all the Asian students 
were in the cafeteria, the Latinos on the stairwells and the African Americans on 
the blacktop. This was terrible. We had never had these racial divisions before. 
Student 1 concurred, noting the ongoing SRO presence: “Ever since that incident, SROs 
were stationed at TMAHS in an attempt to prevent further ‘race-wars’ from occurring.” 
Student 2, who regularly spent time with all students, perceived the following years as, 
“It was a roller coaster ride for 4 years. It started really well and then it went really bad 
and then it had some twists and turns.” 
Educator 5, had a discussion years later with a TMAHS graduate: 
It was no longer … there was a pride at being at Thurgood and doing this thing 
we were trying to do with Black and Brown youth from the southeast side. And 
making up for the way that so many students had been undereducated and 
marginalized. And I remember a student when he came back from college and he 
started working and mentoring at Thurgood, him saying it’s just different. I 
imagine you have numbers around the student population, but I know when I was 
there it was 1,200, 1,100 students, and then it got down to like 500 students. I 
think when they got down so low they were fighting off charter schools. 
Educator 4, sadly expressed how the school had changed: 
I would get to my room as quickly as possible in the morning and I would try to 
stay there all day because if I had to walk through the hallways it was just too 
depressing to be out and see what was going on, and just how kids were thinking 
of themselves. It just became the kind of stereotypical caricature of an urban 
school. 
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Student 1 was the only student participant who speculated on the guiding 
dialogue, “What would have happened at TMAHS if it didn’t have SROs?”: 
If TMAHS did not have SROs, I think issues with students would have been 
handled how they were previously handled. Whenever a conflict broke out, 
students were sent to go talk to the advisor and/or principal. Both sides of the 
stories would be heard, and the advisor/principal would serve as a mediator. 
When the SROs came, they were more prone to using physical interventions 
instead of mediation, and I think that causes more misunderstandings and conflict 
than a resolution. A mediator is able to effectively communicate with both sides 
to resolve the issue. 
Superintendent/Central Office Reactions to 10/11 
As the TMAHS’ culture plummeted and test scores sank, students’ options to 
attend high-ranking colleges dwindled. Enrollment figures for the upcoming school year 
were not promising. Educator 1 noted a comment from an SFPD SRO Supervisor, “I was 
walking back in and the Officer was there—with maybe three other cops. She said to me, 
‘I can’t get anyone to come to this school!”’ Further, Educator 1 reflected that years later, 
Years after the riot, I was in Safeway and one of my students worked there. He 
came up to me and said, “Teacher, were you at Thurgood when the riot 
happened?” I said yes. He said, “That one kid sold that other kid bad weed.” I will 
say, our old dean, Principal B. and the Assistant Principal, while there were times 
they may have needed to contact the cops, they could deal with these type of 
issues … and they maintained a culture that kept this kind of activity out of the 
schools. 
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Student participants complained about the level of rigor in their education 
standards declining. Student 1 thought this was due to as different administration, focused 
on raising TMAHS’ adequate yearly progress through testing: 
From 2002 to the time I graduated (2005), I felt like caring teachers were being 
replaced with those who did not care so much about the students. I became 
displeased with the school culture as the years progressed. TMAHS focused more 
on getting high scores on the standardized tests than focusing on the needs of the 
students. They become absorbed in boosting scores rather than trying to determine 
how they can help students to perform better. 
Student 1, grasped that the future for students at TMAHS would be difficult: 
But there were sometimes that like it just seemed like it was chaos. I wish we all 
had a better learning experience. I personally kind of did but not in a sense of 
where I was like woohoo! And happy. No, I was like whatever then eventually it 
just finally, we were done. 
Parent 2, attended an SFUSD superintendent meeting for TMAHS parents and 
believed there was still no resolution to addressing the riot and school disintegrating 
culture: 
What really upset me was when Ackerman was the superintendent. We had a 
meeting in the library to discuss this the next day or the day after, I mean 2 days 
later. And she came in—to me, I saw a woman coming there with attitude. First of 
all, she was late. That was the first thing that irritated. This is serious, lady, and 
you’re late. Okay, and then you come in with an attitude, and this one parent, she 
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just stood up and she just went off. She just totally went off on us. Then 
Ackerman was gone. She left and left her assistants to talk to us. That irritated me. 
You are the Superintendent of the San Francisco Unified School District and you 
didn’t even say—Okay, let me see how I’m going to handle this, like be all 
concerned. You just walked off. And there I lost respect for her then. Because this 
was serious, you know? Now I was wondering if your child—not yours, but 
hers—would have been in this, would she have reacted in the same way? 
Educator 1 continued to support students and staff under the newer and disturbing 
TMAHS identity as a bad school with poor school culture; this view was partially media 
driven and partially actualized dysconscious racism that had infected the school: 
After the riot, a central office administrator was our principal and I was on the 
school leadership team that met weekly. I can’t remember who brought it up, but 
some girls had gotten a key to a room in the basement—the bomb shelter—near 
the band room—and they had started a prostitution ring and were giving boys 
head for 20 bucks. And a teacher told the central office guy, “allegedly!” I said, 
“These are kids—we shouldn’t be talking about them ALLEGEDLY starting a 
prostitution ring! This is what girls do when they have no other choices!” Where 
was the SRO then? 
Educator 5, also remember the central-office administrator serving as interim 
principal and that the new regime made it clear how the school was going to work or the 
staff could leave: 
A lot of them were pushed out, for sure. Yeah, for sure. And I mean, whether it 
was direct push-out, like by conversation with the central office guy placed at our 
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school, or the push-out of changing what it was that brought folks there. Yeah. 
But yeah, it was an incredibly quick shift from one year to the next. … [I was 
told] basically, you need to stop speaking up and you have a job to do. And where 
is your department at and your job is to run your department. Telling me, sort of 
sideways, I’ve got to shut the fuck up and get with the program or my job is in 
trouble. 
After months of the central-office administration serving as the interim principal, 
the district authorized the TMAHS teaching staff to be part of a hiring committee for a 
next new principal. Educator 2 recalled the experience as one that was not supportive of 
the Thurgood Marshall Way: 
And you know, we thought that, well maybe we’ll get a new principal and they’ll 
be decent. I was on the principal selection committee, and they were all awful. 
They were all truly awful. One of them said racist things. You know, and there 
were better options than the assistant principal too. And second interim was the 
best of a terrible bunch. And look how terrible he was. I don’t know anybody who 
was on that committee who felt good voting for him, but the others were so much 
worse. Kind of like a choice between Bush and Trump. You know, if somebody 
held a gun to your head and said you’ve got to vote, I would vote for Bush over 
Trump, but … because somebody’s holding a gun to your head and says you 
don’t get to choose who’s holding the gun to your head or something. And I mean 
Bush the younger, not Bush the elder. The worse one. 
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Educator 4 knew that the TMAHS staff and central office had differences of 
opinions; however, none of what transpired supported repairing the harm and damage 
inflicted on the TMAHS Community: 
In retrospect, things happened between administrators, district administrators and 
principals, there was clearly a disagreement about things, but the district didn’t do 
anything to take any steps to make our school successful, and they should have 
recognized that. All I can conclude is they didn’t care about it continuing to be 
successful, and then just once it happened I think it was just wholly, completely 
depressing. To everybody. What had happened and that nobody on the district 
level had any interest in really accounting for it and wanting to kind of get to the 
bottom of what had happened and really wanting to look into it. It felt like from 
that moment forward we just became like kind of a throw-away school. 
Educator 5, vigilant in indoctrinating new teachers hired into the original 
Thurgood Marshall Way, retraced the good history of the school: 
The same lens for hiring wasn’t in place. There were still a cohort of folks, that 
teacher was still there, another teacher was still there. I remember this new 
teacher arrived, he was there. He came a few years after I came, but it was like a 
lot of people had left so it wasn’t—you know, it sort of was lost. There were still 
pockets of that energy and really inspired teachers, but there wasn’t that collective 
thing we were working towards, right? It wasn’t … I think the people who had 
been invested, weren’t invested in the same way, but just that vision was lost. 
Individuals were still doing that, but their collective vision around that was lost. 
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As the reality emerged of TMAHS as an emotionally broken school, participants 
expressed their reluctant decisions to leave. Parent 1, understanding that the TMAHS his 
other children attend didn’t exist any longer, said: 
After that incident, I was focused on [the other daughter], the youngest who was 
there. And she wanted to leave. We gave her a choice. We said, “Hey, you can 
stay, or if you want to leave we’re going to support you, right? If you want to 
transfer.” She decided she wanted to go. 
Educator 3 was particularly disturbed by another educator leaving in the middle 
on the 2002 school year: 
After it, the whole thing, like one teacher quit before the year even ended. One 
young teacher … and she was like, I’m quitting. I was like, “How could you leave 
these students?” If you quit, I’ll never talk to you again as long as you live. And I 
haven’t. And now people are picking up her name like she’s somebody special, 
and I’m like, “Are you kidding me?” She left those kids after they were attacked 
by the police. 
Educator 5 struggled to make sense of the stark differences between TMAHS a 
year before and a year after the riot: 
Definitely from 1 year to 2 years later. I mean it’s crazy and I think the year I left 
there were a handful of folks that were still there 2 or 3 years ago. The year I left 
there were probably less than 10 teachers left from the year I started, which was 
only 4 or 5 years previous. 
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Educator 2 reflected on unrest about leaving a school where the participant felt so 
invested: 
And I stuck it out. A lot of people left in 2002, a lot more left in 2003, and I stuck 
it out for one more year, and I just saw no way things could get better. And I don’t 
think they did for a few years. And I think when I lost that, that’s when I had to 
leave. It was just so painful to stay at Thurgood when that wasn’t there anymore. 
Educator 4 contemplated, through lengthy inner turmoil, before making the 
decision to depart TMAHS: 
You point to that year, and that day, and I just think it was a total just loss of faith 
in the system that you couldn’t rebuild because there was no way to rebuild it. 
There was no leadership to rebuild. I mean maybe it could have been rebuilt if 
they had been really thoughtful about who’s going to do it, but that didn’t happen. 
I left there in 2004 or 2005; I think I left in 2004, and I just couldn’t be there 
anymore. I had kind of done that thing and I couldn’t do it anymore. It didn’t feel 
good to be there anymore. I had kind of hung in there the last few years because I 
never wanted to be that teacher that left the kids. Because it felt like that’s what I 
was there to do but then I got to the point where I just couldn’t do it anymore. It 
was just too depressing to be there. But yeah, that day was kind of the culmination 
and we didn’t have the means to recover from it. It seems like it never really has 
recovered. … missed Thurgood Marshall a lot and missed the kids a lot and you 
know, I still communicate with a lot of them. I’ve got a very fond place in my 
heart for Thurgood Marshall. It’s too bad that that happened there, for sure. 
Horrible. 
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The third theme phase responses to Research Question 1, were TMAHS post-
10/11 and the TMAHS Community (students, educators, and parents) managing their 
feelings of being blamed for the 10/11 riot by law-enforcement agencies, the district’s 
central office, and mainstream media accounts. The environment bred distrust among the 
school’s community members. Participants also recognized new race issues at the school 
that did not exist before 10/11, as well as trying to work with the school district’s central 
office reactions and responses to riot. Although many left the school, their reckoning with 
blame and the riot rested on bureaucratic powers and law-enforcement agencies. This 
understanding did not assuage their concerns for one another or the students’ futures. 
Research Question 2: To what extent did the TMAHS, October 11, 2002 police 
riot impact or affect students, teachers, and parents? In responding to this question, 
participants included their reflections of how TMAHS, itself, impacted their lives. All 
themes developing from this research question show each participant’s distinct and 
significant life decisions made in reaction to what they experienced at TMAHS, as well 
as what they experienced on October 11, 2002. Figure 4 is a visual-concept map denoting 
the themed findings for Research Question 2. 
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Impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Riot on TMAHS Community 
Figure 4. A visual concept map of the themed findings for Research Question 2, realized 
impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Police Riot on TMAHS Community. 
Participants’ life-impact themes begin with the realization they could recreate The 
Thurgood Marshall Way elsewhere. Additional themes evolving from participants’ 
responses predicted a future life of mentoring, TMAHS style when “room can be made for 
great things to happen, anywhere,” even in the most challenging circumstances imagined 
(Educator 5). When participants considered the events that occurred at TMAHS before, 
during, and after 10/11, an Impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Police Riot on the TMAHS 
Community theme developed. Assembled under the impact of TMAHS theme were 
disparate subtheme perspectives from (a) students, (b) parents, and (c) educators. The 
researcher attributes the subtheme category divergence to the ages and life roles of 
participants when considering their next steps after TMAHS. The subthemes for former 
TMAHS students raised the following: (a) diversity/community helped in their 
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development, (b) TMAHS alum support underserved student communities and feelings, 
(c) self-empowered and motivated to take on a variety of life challenges, and (d) although 
each student participant had a deeply rooted indoctrinated TMAHS hope, they also feared 
that a 10/11 riot could happen again. The subthemes from former TMAHS parents 
surfaced as a person should (a) watch out and protect themselves, foremost, and as 
parents (b) will not be bought, bribed, or silenced. Last, subthemes for former TMAHS 
educators were that (a) educators gained administrative credentials, empowering 
themselves to recreate TMAHS equity models; (b) educators left TMAHS, (c) educators 
developed an awareness of the fragility of success for students of color, and (d) educators 
also became acutely aware of dismantling components. 
Students 
All student participants were leaving TMAHS and heading to college. All have 
bachelor’s degrees, one has attained a master’s degree, and one a Ph.D. Their voices 
reflect the traditional transition time period in their lives. 
Student 1 noted that the diversity encountered at TMAHS impacted education 
goals and selected pathways in achieving them: 
Also, many people like myself who attended TMAHS, were from underserved 
communities. I felt like there was not enough outreach programs or people who 
encouraged us to pursue a higher education. During my graduate career, I have 
volunteered to teach STEM courses to children in hopes of encouraging them to 
believe in themselves and understand that they have the capability to achieve any 
degree they choose. … That is why I am trying to increase the diversity in my 
program. 
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Student 2 mentioned that toward the end of his time at TMAHS, he acknowledged 
that the current structure at the school was not going provide the supports required for 
college admission. 
There was like a lot of work and me wanting to go to college eventually. I was 
like okay, the only way I’m going anywhere is if I get it together. I had to do it 
because like I’m looking at how things are going and like I can’t be here the 
whole time. I first started at SF State college, and then I went to University of 
Phoenix and I got my Bachelors in business communication, and then I came back 
and got a Master’s in business administration. 
Student 3 departed from TMAHS closest to the 10/11/2002 riot, graduating in 
2003. Student 3 also experienced more of The Thurgood Marshall Way and it’s 
mentoring style than any other student participant. The outlook on educators reflects that 
perspective: 
It really puts our trust in … we have some standout educators that come to our 
city and that’s not the case for everybody that works in schools. I think at 
Thurgood, the people that taught there have become leaders in a lot of different 
fields so it’s important to be very thoughtful about the decisions we’re making on 
behalf of schools. On the other, there’s so much excitement for me about what’s 
possible for kids and for our educators. … I don’t know. I guess what I’m trying 
to say is that gives me as much hope as it does fear that experience there. 
Parents 
The parent participants each had three children who attended TMAHS. Parent 1 
had only one child graduate from the school, whereas all three of Parent 2’s children 
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graduated from TMAHS. Their reflections focus on their TMAHS experiences while 
their children attended TMAHS, before and after the 10/11/2002 riot. 
Parent 2 revealed a manifested fear of what could be the worst possible outcome 
when confronted with dangerous circumstances: 
I look at it like this, that could happen anywhere, so what I try to do is think if I 
see something that’s happening I try to stay clear of it, so I don’t want to get 
involved, you know what I mean? Like for example, I have seen where there have 
been pickpockets on the bus, and I can see it’s happening and I want to help, but 
my thing is, I don’t know what these people have, who’s going to get hurt besides 
myself. You either help or you don’t. Just for your safety, you know what I mean? 
And this is what happened on Friday, the same thing, and this woman intervened, 
and I’m like—It’s good that you want to help, but then you’ve got to think of 
yourself. My thing is, to answer your question, I just go the other way. Just for my 
own personal safety. 
Parent 1 recounted a memory based on an extended interaction with the 
superintendent of schools and district leadership. Parent 1 recalled, 
All the leadership were there, everybody was there. It had to be at least 15 people 
in the room. And so whatever she was doing, I guess she wanted to mitigate 
against not having the information, not being able to work on it, you know? 
Whatever it was. Because I can’t figure out why she had so many leaders in that 
room and it was just me and partner presenting, who had been discussing this with 
the Superintendent. There wasn’t nobody else before us, we were the agenda. 
Make a long story short, I get a call late at night one night, when I say late, I don’t 
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know, 8:30–9:00 at night, and it wasn’t the Superintendent, it was it was her 
attorney, the school district. So, she calls me and she says, you know, the 
Superintendent wanted me to let you know that they looked over the proposal. It 
was very detailed, very well written, very well structured, however, due to the fact 
that we have a lot of pending things that we have to deal with the budget, there’s 
not enough time to get the approvals, the money, and so for that reason she 
wanted to let you know that they would not be able to move forward with the 
proposal as written, and wanted to thank you for the value and the consideration 
that you put forth in presenting it to the school district. It is so greatly appreciated. 
However, she did ask me to ask you if—and I’m paraphrasing this—because they 
don’t have it in the budget, but bottom line is that what they said is there’s $5,000 
to extend to you, but they can’t go forward with the program. And I listened to 
that, and you know what I told her? I said, I’m going to tell you right now what I 
would tell the Superintendent. We appreciate the opportunity to present, but this is 
an insult for you to tell me what you just told me. I said that is an insult. 
“I don’t want your money, I feel that this is an insult. You insulted me, you 
insulted my partner, you insulted our integrity. I can’t be bought.” I said, “You 
tell that to the Superintendent!” and I hung up the phone. 
Unbossed and unbought: that’s what I want to be. I want to go to my grave and I 
want it to be known that he was just like Shirley Chisolm: he was unbossed and 
unbought. I don’t give a damn if I leave with a nickel. I don’t care. 
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And they felt like, Oh, we don’t need to do [this plan], we already know. How the 
hell are you going to tell me you already know when you let this 10/11 crap 
happen? 
Educators 
The educator participants’ lives were irrevocably changed because of (a) the work 
they did at TMAHS and (b) the 10/11 TMAHS police riot. Little doubt exists of the 
incident’s toxicity that spread through the TMAHS Community, exposed in an air of 
bitterness and cynicism during the dialogues. However, during the dialogues, that 
cynicism was overshadowed by the multitude of positive experiences embodied by these 
educators through their TMAHS Community building and mentoring. They began the 
next life chapters fueled by their practices, yet it was The Thurgood Marshall Way that 
sustained them. 
Educator 1 transitioned to administration when recalling the impact and influence 
of TMAHS: 
A few things. First, I decided to activate my administrative credential and become 
an administrator and I have done a few major projects that contribute to equity in 
our district. Second, I also decided I wanted to pursue additional education, so I 
earned my Ed.D. studying equity and teacher renewal. 
Maybe the most important change is it has become an anchor in my life in 
defining my beliefs and actions regarding equity. When needing to make a choice 
regarding equity, I recall our students being beaten by police, being threatened in 
the streets by the sheriffs, being lied to by our political leaders—I have used it to 
focus my actions providing high quality education to all students. The opportunity 
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to work with Principal B. was really a touchstone for me. Especially after seeing 
the same site with poor leadership. I hope, one day, I can be as strong and rooted a 
leader as he has been. 
Educator 2 wondered if the TMAHS model of educating students was to too naïve 
and described other ways TMAHS was an influence: 
I wonder in retrospect, maybe we were just a little bit too idealistic about the 
amount of freedom the kids could handle. 
How did it impact my life, well I quit the school. I moved schools. When I came 
to Thurgood I made a real commitment to the kids, who made a commitment to 
work harder. And I made a real commitment to the Thurgood Marshall way. I 
remember the embracing, that embracing mural that greets you as you walk into 
the school. I remember embracing everybody from all cultural and class 
background, and to the activism that was in the system, to making things better 
within the system. To see that destroyed, not so much by the incident, but by the 
280-fight beforehand, which I see as the Superintendent trying to make herself 
look good, I guess. I don’t know. After the incident, I was part of a meeting with 
the Superintendent with half a dozen Thurgood community members. I have no 
idea how I got invited to that meeting. Nor I don’t even remember what was said. 
But I remember being sort of afraid that she knew my name. … And some years 
later, you know how Facebook occasionally suggests you Friend people? Her 
name popped up! Like at the top of the list one day. 
Educator 3, who remains in the classroom with students today, did not only reflect 
on the future of self but on the teacher who was arrested for videotaping (charges were 
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dropped): “What happened to the teacher videotaping was, jeez, he left education 
altogether. I don’t know. I took a sabbatical at the end of the year and then went to 
another school the following year.” 
Educator 4, indicated a desire to replicate The Thurgood Marshall Way with less 
constraints, as well as move into school administration: 
In the classroom, what I drew on from Thurgood Marshall was just a solid 
foundation around what I knew students were capable of learning. I knew that 
even in a dysfunctional school environment, you could still have a strong 
classroom environment. Those things were possible to do because I lived it. I 
[later again became] stuck in a dysfunctional school system … was all set to leave 
and then somebody that I worked with a little bit got hired as the principal there. 
She asked me to help her reshape the school. We started that summer working on 
it and trying to put things back together. In 12 years later, we built an incredible 
school and it continues to be an incredible school. 
The second thing I took was how fragile it all is, you know? That leadership in 
these schools is incredibly important, that if you don’t have strong leadership it 
will be gone quick. And like a constant push to always be better. It’s right when 
you start saying you’re fine and that everything is okay and that we’re doing fine. 
That’s right when things can slip. It just has to be a relentless pursuit of being 
better and better because like the rest of the infrastructure doesn’t expect a whole 
lot out of you. If you can’t sustain it yourself, or if the district is trying to tear you 
down, then it can happen quick. So you better watch out, better keep your eyes on 
things, better pay attention to the details because the little details are what matters. 
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Educator 5, who still does some classroom teaching and also contributes to his 
school as an administrator, credits starting at TMAHS: 
I really feel like it’s one of the reasons why I’ve been in education for so long, for 
almost 20 years now, because I had that foundational experience, that mentorship, 
and it really gave me a sense of what was possible with some really inspired, 
passionate people. 
It feels most important to me that piece around having Thurgood being in this 
place with this very clearly shared vision or mission that folks made it what it 
was, and its why people came to the table. It was held by the leadership and 
afterwards it was a very purposeful dismantling of that and very effective. 
As the final themes and subthemes in findings in response to Research Question 
2, participants identified the impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 riot on their lives. These 
themes are separated by participant category to offer a more clustered perspective of 
students, parents, and educators and are extremely revealing of the steps individuals have 
taken for themselves and their education or work paths. Their ages, combined with their 
roles at TMAHS between 2000 and 2007, may have been contributing factors in the 
differences in subthemes that came to light, but retained a connectivity to their core being 
from TMAHS. 
The San Francisco Chronicle Reporting 
The Chronicle’s initial coverage of the riot during the month of October 2002, 
when comparing the language in the articles, reflect a running point–counterpoint 
narrative that is fixed on assigning blame. The press coverage, based on the available 
information, sought to uncover who among the multitude of actors in the TMAHS 10/11 
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riot were the provocateurs or riot instigators/escalators: TMAHS Community members 
(students and staff) or law enforcement (SFPD and San Francisco Sheriffs). For the 
month of October, Chronicle reporters wrote three articles that contained 23 direct or 
indirect inferences that the TMAHS staff and students were the provocateurs, escalating 
the incident, compared to 17 direct or indirect inferences that San Francisco law-
enforcement officers were the provocateurs, escalating the TMAHS 10/11 riot. 
Examples of Direct Inferences That Students Were the Escalators in the Reporting 
“Police officers were brought in to break up clashes among students in the 
hallway.” 
“There was a riot going on in that school. If we do nothing, we are derelict in our 
duty, and someone might get killed in there.” 
“The kids were confrontational.” 
“Officers were facing an angry crowd of 150 to 200 youths inside the school, and 
that one had snatched a baton.” 
“I saw some extremely angry children.” 
Examples of Indirect Inferences That Students Were the Escalators in the Reporting 
“Simmering tensions at Thurgood Marshall High School in San Francisco’s 
Bayview district erupted into disturbances Friday.” 
“The unrest forced the midday shutdown of the 1,100-student school.” 
“An undercurrent of tension has run through Marshall High since last spring.” 
“Police said they had no choice but to come to the school and react as they did.” 
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Examples of Direct Inferences That Law Enforcement Were the Escalators in the 
Reporting 
“Several teachers and students said police had used their batons, grabbed the hair 
of students involved in the melee and handcuffed innocent youths.” 
“I was jumped, then I was put under arrest for being jumped and then the police 
started jumping me.” 
“As I was getting ready to walk away from the crowd, one of the police officers 
struck me in the face and they pulled a gun out on my friend.” 
Examples of Indirect Inferences That Law Enforcement Were the Escalators in the 
Reporting 
“Students watching this cannot believe it. …  They were being treated like 
common criminals.”” 
“Police added a second officer at the campus in response, and the district posted 
five security guards.” 
“Teachers and students felt the new principal and the district have created a 
police-state atmosphere, unnecessarily bringing in officers to deal with minor 
clashes.” 
In November 2002, The Chronicle reporters wrote two articles that contained 10 
direct or indirect inferences that the TMAHS staff and students were the provocateurs 
compared to six direct or indirect inferences that San Francisco law-enforcement officers 
were the provocateurs/escalators of the TMAHS 10/11 riot. 
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The next two articles about the riot did not appear in The Chronicle until late 
February and mid-March 2003 containing nine direct or indirect inferences that the 
TMAHS staff and students were the instigators, compared to four direct or indirect 
inferences that San Francisco law-enforcement officers were the instigators/escalators. 
These were the only 2003 articles published by The Chronicle (see Table 7). 
Table 7 
San Francisco Chronicle’s Coverage, Themes Emerged That the Thurgood Students/Staff 
Were Reported More Times as the Instigators or Provocateurs of the TMAHS 10/11 Than 
Riot Law Enforcement 
SF Chronicle’s article dates “direct or indirect” inference 
(12 articles reviewed) 
Police were the 
provocateurs on 10/11 
Students/Staff were the 
provocateurs on 10/11 
10/12/02 12 17 
10/16/02 3 4 
10/17/02 2 2 
11/16/02 5 6 
11/29/02 1 4 
2/27/03 4 9 
3/14/03 0 0 
6/18/04 3 1 
7/15/04 2 7 
9/3/04 1 1 
9/23/04 8 5 
9/30/04 7 0 
Totals 48 56 
 
On June 18, 2004, a Chronicle article was published with one direct or indirect 
inference that the TMAHS staff and students were the instigators of the riot compared to 
three direct or indirect inferences that San Francisco law-enforcement officers were the 
instigators of the TMAHS 10/11 riot. The article highlighted news that the San Francisco 
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OCC would reveal multiple SFPD policy violations that occurred at TMAHS on October 
11, 2002. 
The executive director of the San Francisco OCC, would present a full report and 
findings to the San Francisco Police Commission, the official SFPD oversight body 
(Gordon, 2004), essentially absolving the police of wrongdoing at the school or the 
TMAHS Community beyond their policy violations. After the July coverage that had the 
TMAHS as instigators in seven instances compared to the police with two, the balance of 
The Chronicle’s 2004 coverage inverted their coverage perspective. Chronicle reporters 
attended police commission meetings, heard OCC findings, and published articles 
through September 30, 2002 that showed law-enforcement officers with a total of 16 
instigator/provocateur instances versus TMAHS students and staff with six instances. 
One connecting feature of The Chronicle’s press coverage of the TMAHS 10/11 
riot, which has not been acknowledged is that over time, the coverage, combined with 
subsequent events in San Francisco’s history such as the Fajita-gate police-misconduct 
cover-up, the replacement of Police Chiefs Earl Sanders and Alex Fagan, and the passage 
of local Proposition H in 2003: The Police Reform Measure, the issue remained 
somewhat in the public’s purview. This purview helped the newly seated police 
commission call for a meeting on the TMAHS 10/11 riot and the investigative report 
from the OCC. 
Summary 
In this chapter on research findings, the researcher described the semistructured 
interviews with TMAHS Community members to obtain their unheard voices that reflect 
the TMAHS climate before, during, and after the October 11, 2002 police riot. The 10 
participants met the research criteria through their direct affiliation with TMAHS 
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between 2000 and 2007. Participants were students who attended TMAHS, parents of 
students who attended TMAHS, and educators who taught at TMAHS. All participants in 
this study continue to reside in northern California and were accessible for initial 
dialogues as well as subsequent follow-up clarifications, with few scheduling constraints. 
The dialogues took place either in-person (five) or through video conferencing (five), 
followed by video, e-mail, and telephone communications. 
Participants either introduced themselves or updated the researcher about their life 
paths taken since graduating or leaving TMAHS. All student participants have graduated 
from 4-year colleges or universities and two have gone on to obtain advanced degrees. 
Students have also worked directly with underserved communities and with K–12 
students of color. Parent participants also worked directly with underserved K–12 
students during their professional lives. Educator participants remained in education after 
leaving TMAHS, with none immediately leaving the field due to the 10/11 riot, although 
participants indicated that the riot definitely influenced their practice going forward. 
The generative themes that emerged, based on the two research questions, were 
partitioned into three themed phases (with subthemes following each). The themes and 
subthemes spoke strongly about how much the school and community in the school 
meant to study participants. The participants accessed compartments of their memories to 
candidly share their triumphs and challenges experienced while at TMAHS. The 
memories retrieved from participants unearthed a multitude of themes and subthemes 
during the dialogues, primarily due to the nature of the semistructured discussions. These 
discussions took participants’ time, thoughts, and energy before, during, and after their 
scheduled interview concluded, through follow-up and clarifying inquiry. The topics 
broached were often sensitive and at times visibly distressing for some participants. 
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Many took a few moments during the discussion to gather their thoughts and themselves, 
while enduring the dialogue fully present and in an unguarded state with the researcher. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings, summarizes the dissertation study. The 
researcher’s reflections also appear in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides recommendations 
for further research.
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Chapter 5 contains the discussion of research findings from the reflections of 
TMAHS study participants. Following this introductory section is a summary of the 
dissertation that consists of an overview of Chapters 1, 2, and 3, as well as a brief review 
of Chapter 4. The next section in this chapter discusses, in depth, the research findings 
before leading to the Chapter 6 conclusions and recommendations. 
Summary of the Study 
This dissertation and study began with an introduction to the October 11, 2002 
TMAHS police riot from various published official and unofficial perspectives. These 
perspectives are from service providers, reporters, youth advocates, human-rights 
investigators, and the researcher who were present at Thurgood after the 10/11 riot to 
document and investigate the occurrence with students, educators, and family members 
over a sustained period of time. On October 11, 2002 at TMAHS, the embedded SRO at 
the school placed a call to the local police department for increased support in managing 
a nonweapon school fight on the southeast side of San Francisco, which housed the city’s 
most diverse student population of African American, Latino American, and Asian 
American youth. In the United States, SRO programs that place embedded law-
enforcement officers in schools has increased exponentially over that last 2 decades with 
little input from those impacted most by law-enforcement officers. The voices of 
students, teachers, and families about police permanently placed on their school 
campuses has had limited representation in the scholarship regarding the need for SROs. 
In 2002 San Francisco, three African Americans led the city’s top bureaucracies. 
Mayor Willie Brown, Superintendent of Schools Arlene Ackerman, and Police Chief Earl 
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Sanders held positions of power and were able to play a substantial role in determining 
the ultimate consequences of the 10/11 TMAHS riot. Following September 11, 2001, 
Columbine active-shooter tactical training for law enforcement began in 2001 and that 
militarized style was used to respond to a school fight at TMAHS. Executive powers 
including municipal oversight bodies influenced every strategy and the media to 
minimize the riot, suppress the facts, and mislead the public by blaming the students and 
staff at the school. 
The purpose of this qualitative research was to let the TMAHS Community’s 
narrative voices reflect on their experiences at Thurgood Marshall, the police or SROs 
embedded on their campus, and the 10/11 riot. The participant criteria indicated that the 
TMAHS Community member had to have been a part of Thurgood Marshall between 
2000 and 2007. This would allow time for the participant to have been indoctrinated in 
The Thurgood Marshall Way as well as experience the 10/11 police riot and any changes 
to the TMAHS culture after the riot. 
Through a narrative inquiry, participants answered questions in a semistructured 
dialogue that allowed them to fully reflect, at their own pace, on the impact of TMAHS 
and the 10/11 police riot on their school’s culture and on their lives. The two research 
questions for this qualitative case study were, (a) How did embedded on-campus police 
presence affect school climate at TMAHS? and (b) To what extent did the TMAHS 
October 11, 2002 police riot impact students, teachers, and parents? 
The study sought to answer the research questions by applying a theoretical 
framework and by paying particular attention to the voices of student participants, 
notably those in the sophomore class of 2002. The sophomore class of 2002 would have 
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experienced the school’s coveted Thurgood Marshall Way indoctrination, the 10/11 riot, 
and if they remained at the school, the effects of the riot on the school culture. 
Using the theory of deterrence as a theoretical framework that calls out racism 
and the practices of dominant culture and White privilege, this study connected the 
following two theories to the study: dysconscious racism and CRT. Entrenched in the 
TMAHS philosophy were educators using CRT, recognizing that dysconscious racism is 
a type of internalized racism that plagues youth of color through media depictions and 
dominant-culture norms, labeling them as less than even when trying to break from the 
inferiority complex cycle. Deterrence theories were regularly present with practiced zero-
tolerance policies inflicted on youth of color in school settings and their communities, 
making ordinary life consistently inequitable. High-level school personnel were unable to 
differentiate the detriment that these policies and practices wreaked on the TMAHS 
school community of students, educators, and families in 2002. 
The literature review for this dissertation used claims of fact to build an argument. 
Claims of fact accrued in the following areas: (a) the superpredator phenomenon 
contributes to the SRO program that has exponentially, over time, placed permanent law-
enforcement officers in schools, (b) the program contributes to the profiling and 
marginalization of youth of color in schools where they should feel safe, (c) students of 
color have experienced structural racism and have been pushed into the school-to-prison 
pipeline, and (d) this overall societal culture of mass incarceration thoroughly traumatizes 
youth of color. These facts, when partnered with joint reasoning, satisfy the argument’s 
conclusion that embedded school-based law-enforcement officers marginalize and 
traumatize youth of color in schools. The major findings from qualitative case-study 
research were partitioned in multiple themes and subthemes that emerged for each 
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research question from individual participant discussions. The framework for the findings 
in the conclusion and discussions of the study are formatted similar to the literature 
review. 
Discussion 
This section builds from discerning the themed reflections of participants into 
subtheme findings, such as Community/Diversity, Good School/College-Going Culture, 
or Chaotic School Environment that were either directly supported or closely supported 
by the literature. 
Findings generated for Research Question 1: How did study participants 
remember the effect of embedded on-campus police on the school climate of TMAHS?, 
were separated into three theme phases or time periods, as voices of participants 
emerged, regardless of their role at TMAHS in the research criterion timeframe.  
The first themes within the TMAHS Pre-10/11 phase that participants revealed 
were a) The Thurgood Marshall Way, b) Community/Diversity, c) a Good 
School/College going culture, and d) the Principal Cared about TMAHS Community. 
The Thurgood Marshall Way 
By the 2000s, a consent decree created TMAHS high school on the southeast side 
of San Francisco to support underserved students in the community with a rigorous 
education that had been missing for African American students. SFUSD met its mandated 
mission. Thurgood was educating a diverse mixture of African American, Latino, and 
Asian students from nearby surrounding neighborhoods so well that it was sending more 
of its students prepared for college success than the nationally ranked Lowell High 
School in San Francisco. 
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Study participants reflections revealed much admiration for the school’s 
philosophy, The Thurgood Marshall Way, and subsequent academic accolades, that the 
researcher does not believe has ever been documented thoroughly. Although the 
participants could not recall the specific tenets of TMAHS beliefs, the impression of the 
values has been recalled repeatedly in differing ways that held deep meaning for 
educators, students, and parents. Student and parent participants acknowledged a level of 
excitement and expectation with the higher 280 graduation-credit requirement, instead of 
the district’s 230. Student participants also felt a level of mentoring from educators that 
went well beyond normal teaching and tutoring. 
Educators mentored families in academic structures such as the A–G course 
sequence and block scheduling (UC Office of the President, 2017), and students and 
families developed reciprocal relationships with TMAHS educators by mentoring them. 
Freire’s “conscientization, the process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social 
reality through reflection and action. Action is fundamental because it is the process of 
changing the reality” (Freire Institute, 2017, para 5) epitomizes The Thurgood Marshall 
Way and the mentoring TMAHS style. 
Student participants believed TMAHS educators gave of themselves for the 
betterment of TMAHS students’ lives. Additionally, only a few participants could recall 
the SRO assigned to TMAHS before 2002. Educators who did recall the SRO presence 
on campus noted that the relationship between the SRO and student population was 
supportive and noncombative in nature. Educator 4 commenting that the SRO was 
“beloved” by the students and felt that was permissible due to the nature of TMAHS 
philosophy. 
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Community/Diversity 
Again, although Thurgood’s mandate demanded diversity, participants indicated 
that once involved with TMAHS, one believed they were a part of the Thurgood Marshall 
Community, which intentionally brought new students and their families into the fold of 
members already enrolled at Thurgood. Educator participants expressed similar thoughts 
as they entered the workforce at TMAHS, even remembering the embracing mural of 
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall that is outside the school, depicting him 
encouraging those of every culture, every type of student, and their family to enter. This 
critical-race ideology of respecting voices of people of color as they enter a community 
with one another with the social capital that is inherent in the family’s cultural 
background (Yosso, 2005) was seen as an asset by participants. Student 3 remembered 
vividly coming to Thurgood where there was an expressed expectation that students and 
families would get along with one another, regardless of race, class background, or past 
social histories. Students did find easy friendships across racial and cultural boundaries, 
once indoctrinated in The Thurgood Marshall Way. 
Good School/College-Going Culture 
Educator participants’ reflections indicated they were not aware at the time that 
many TMAHS practices, which they so valued, were written in the structure of the 
school, such as additional preparation periods for teachers to collaborate. The TMAHS 
families structure for incoming ninth- and 10th-grade students allowed teachers to 
support cohorts of students simultaneously with the assistance of other teachers working 
with the same students (D. E. Collins, 1998). Educator 5 mused about a time when 
clusters of students in families gained support from teachers not just academically but in 
extracurricular activities as well. These activities, through thoughtful consideration, 
153 
 
pleased the staff as well as the students. Parent 1 expressed a deep appreciation for the 
rigor as well as the school’s specific recruitment from one of the last neighborhoods in 
San Francisco that had large Black populations. This memory corresponded with Ladson-
Billings (1998) CRT, legitimizing generational wisdom from communities of color 
introduced into the school community, which are equally essential with other social 
attributes revered in U.S. schools and society. 
Educator 1 and Student 3 both underscored a warm demander sentiment (aligned 
with Ross, Bondy, Bondy, & Hambacher, 2008) when reflecting on TMAHS school 
climate and experiences. This outcome was not part of the research inquiry; however, it 
emerged as an entire phase of reflections voiced by participants. A warm demander is an 
education professional who has strong, caring, respectful relationships with each student; 
supports caring, respectful relationships among peers; creates a culture in which everyone 
feels safe enough to take risks; observes a task-focused, calm environment that enables 
everyone to concentrate and learn; and provides high and clear expectations for academic 
performance (Ross et al., 2008). Students 1 and 2 also recalled teachers supporting them 
academically and bringing their families into the development of multifaceted academic 
relationships. 
The Principal Cared About the TMAHS Community 
Efforts of the Pre-TMAHS 10/11 administrators’ and educators’ in providing 
reparations to a community of students who had been historically underserved for most of 
their academic lives meant the work product had ramifications. Strategies must work to 
provide needed outcomes for students to rise to the next levels in academic excellence. 
Collaboration and creation, assessment and more collaboration had TMAHS and families 
laboring together, corresponding with Freire’s conscientization concept through “action-
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reflection-action,” as a process inherent in their regular practical pedagogy (C. Collins, 
2001). 
Freire saw it as an educational process, that is grounded in the experiences and 
daily lives of the participants, but which requires clearly identified 
teachers/coordinators to initiate the process. Teachers have to be concerned with 
social and political responsibility, and with the development of the learners to 
critically understand both society and their capacity to change it. Teachers and 
students then act as coinvestigators, engaged through dialogue in the process of 
understanding their lives in relationship to the world. Only then can an action plan 
be developed to address the problems. (C. Collins, 2001, p. 90) 
Parent participants agreed their relationship with TMAHS educators and 
administrators seemed to be driven consistently toward seeking improvement. Educator 
participants found multiple instances in which family collaboration and passion to make a 
difference for youth of color was as enriching for them as it was meant to be for students. 
This format models the adapted behavior rooted in Freire’s praxis in changing 
dysconscious racism and transitive consciousness toward critical consciousness. 
A central concept of Freire’s model of conscientization is praxis, a cycle of 
action-reflection-action. It is from this process, he postulates, that people come to 
understand the systems of oppression within which they live and ways in which 
they can challenge and change those systems both individually and collectively. 
The move from semi-transitive consciousness to transitive consciousness to 
critically transitive consciousness does not occur automatically, however. (C. 
Collins, 2001, p. 90) 
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The second set of themes foreshadowed the upcoming riot, as themes of the 
TMAHS 10/11 phase were (a) Chaotic School Environment, (b) SRO/Police Presence, 
and (c) Three Powerful African Americans. 
Chaotic School Environment 
All participants opened this phase of theme remembrances that reflected a 
collective dismay at the new administration’s heavy-handed tactics in managing the 
student community and behaviors that often did not exist. Participants, while observing 
the implementation of several theory of deterrence (Skiba & Peterson, 1999) practices, 
resisted implied meanings of the practices aimed at students of color, focusing regularly 
on African American and Latino students. 
Student participants knew and felt the difference in the way the school was being 
run and how their peers were being treated. Without the supportive culture to fight 
systems of oppression from the previous year, students lacked the tools needed to prevail 
against the onset of dysconscious racism and self-doubt (as suggested by King, 1991). 
Student 2 remembered one reason: “the changed principal. It changed the school a lot.” 
Adding to the declining school climate were the growing rumors of student gang 
members descending on TMAHS due the closure of McAteer High school and their 
student body’s disbursement across the city into schools of rival gang members. Educator 
participants witnessed issues between the new administration and the African American 
students escalating on campus. African American and Latino students, in conjunction 
with a racial gang-style affiliation, were labeled troublemakers and the source of the 
school’s problems (Bernburg et al., 2006; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008). 
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Issues with the TMAHS’ student population were exacerbated by the previous 
year’s Columbine school shooting in Littleton, Colorado, for which superpredator fear-
mongering still lingered heavily in the air for all school districts and sites working with 
high school-aged youth. Although the Columbine school shooting involved White 
perpetrators, urban school administrators with large student-of-color populations across 
the country were urged to add more SROs for security purposes (Kennedy, 2001). The 
new school administration took full advantage and doubled the SRO presence by two, as 
well as adding four more security guards to manage the students-of-color community. 
Large groups of officers patrolled hallways throughout the week, adding to the numbers 
of newly assigned law enforcement to the Thurgood campus (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009). 
The superpredator phenomenon contributed to the SRO program on the Thurgood 
campus. 
SRO/Police Presence 
The administration patrolled TMAHS hallways daily with newly assigned SROs 
and security, integrating and acclimating them to the school site and student body 
(Canady et al., 2012; Goralczyk, 2004). The TMAHS Community had no evidence for 
the amount of police present on campus. Signs emerged of a situation brewing, when 
Educator 1 noted the police photographing graffiti; however, those concerns seemed out 
of alignment with what the TMAHS had experienced (Heitzeg, 2009). Educator and 
student participants commented on the crushing police presence on campus and began to 
organize themselves because, as Educator 5 put it, “we were feeling like how tense things 
were in the hallways because all of these police were suddenly in our building. It wasn’t 
just a resource officer, there were like a handful police that were patrolling the building.” 
Regardless, the SRO program at Thurgood was supported as part of a schools’ 
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disciplinary team by school-site administrators and outside community members (Fleury-
Steiner et al., 2009). TMAHS teaching staff met with the principal to share concerns, 
clearly voiced by Educator 4 recalling, “Something is going to happen. It is bad, they 
shouldn’t be here. They don’t belong in the school, we’ve got to figure out some other 
way because something bad is going to happen.” Educator participants portrayed an 
understand of the potential consequences for such intense SRO presence on campus, with 
the harshest treatment for Thurgood Black and Brown students (Skiba & Peterson, 1999; 
Witt, 2007). 
For TMAHS students experiencing the exponential SRO campus patrols, their 
environment aligns with research results from Fine et al. (2003) where 83% of the 
students (aged 16–21) with police or security guards in their schools feel profiled and 
labeled as criminals by school authorities. Student participants remembered that the SRO 
caused more problems for TMAHS during the riot and the school’s culture afterwards; 
however, they did not describe their own location or position during the height of the 
riot’s activities. Student 2 depicted the school after the police riot as being like a 
“rollercoaster … then it went really bad and then it had twists and turns.” Student 3 was 
troubled at the number of police on the Thurgood campus during the police riot: “You 
know, that’s how many police were on campus there.” Educator and student findings 
supported that the SRO Program contributes to the profiling and marginalization of youth 
of color. 
Three Powerful African Americans 
With the citizens of San Francisco and the country watching, arguably the most 
influential people to address the 10/11 police riot were then Mayor Willie Brown, then 
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Superintendent of Schools Arlene Ackerman, and then Police Chief Earl Sanders. Even if 
San Francisco had had other people in those positions of power, the ultimate oversight for 
the entities and organizations that were involved in the Thurgood 10/11 riot rested in the 
hands of the mayor, the superintendent of schools, and the police chief. Ancillary San 
Francisco authorities involved would have been the district attorney, the public defender, 
and the youth commission. The district attorney holds jurisdiction in charging and 
prosecuting crimes, whereas the public defender is the attorney’s office that holds 
jurisdiction in defending people who cannot afford legal counsel. The youth commission 
in San Francisco advises the mayor and board of supervisors on strategic policies, laws, 
and recommendations for unmet needs pertaining to young people (City and County of 
San Francisco, 2017). 
In the aftermath of the 10/11 police riot, several TMAHS Community members 
were arrested (Delgado et al., 2002). The incarcerated students were suspended from 
TMAHS and reenrolled in other schools in the district. TMAHS students who were 
arrested and the remaining students of the Thurgood Community experienced varying 
shades of structural racism. Although news reports indicated that two students were 
arrested, a total of 16 students were detained and arrested during and after the riot (OCC, 
2004). These additional students were simply attending school and were swept up in the 
police melee during class passing time. 
Students and their families grappled with the riot, striving to understand the facts 
of the 10/11 riot and subsequent changes in school locations, either for safety reasons or 
an unspecified cause deemed necessary by the district. Additionally, a growing anxiety 
hovered over pending TMAHS cases, unresolved by the district attorney’s and public 
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defender’s offices regarding the arrested students. TMAHS students went before city 
commissions asking for assistance in resolving issues. 
Parent 1 recalled what occurred for those students who chose to speak truth to 
power after the riot, “So it’s like, you know, those that got arrested because of standing 
up for justice, against the San Francisco Police Department and Sheriff’s Department,” 
making an indelible impression on him. Parent 1’s remembrance of Mayor Brown’s 
telephone comments resonate disappointment that the person who could have advocated 
for the TMAHS Community members refused. 
Zero-tolerance policies and practices, initiated at the beginning of the 2002 school 
year for TMAHS, included placing more SROs on campus, seeking gang- and race-
clashing activities at TMAHS, had immediate ramifications for the school’s community. 
Students were part of a riot that research participants declared was started by the heavy 
police presence on campus, supported by the new school administration at the beginning 
of the school year. Students arrested at TMAHS on 10/11/2002, who may never have 
interacted with the juvenile-justice system before, were introduced to it on that day. 
Students witnessing the arrest of their classmates were also introduced to the criminal-
justice system. Researchers clarified that zero-tolerance policies that target students of 
color lead directly into juvenile-justice systems (Petteruti, 2011; Thurau et al., 2013). 
Student 2 indicated that the riot changed his mind set about school: 
Since the riot happened with the rioting, that was like really tough. I barely went 
to class, like I just hanged out and did whatever I wanted. The teachers didn’t care 
at that point. That’s how I felt. Like I just remember the security guards, that they 
were hanging around every day. 
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Students disinterested in school tend to choose the world outside of school and 
may become truant. Truant students of color, Black and Latino, have more than double 
the chance of being arrested than their White peers. When students of color are 
suspended or expelled, they are also doubly at risk for being arrested than their White 
peers whom also may be suspended or expelled (Monahan et al., 2014). With the original 
TMAHS structures were being dismantled as Educator 5 indicated, the normative 
structural racist systems activated as school bureaucracies took over the school’s 
management, running it like other high schools throughout the district. Instead of the 
school running more efficiently, its culture and climate continued to disintegrate as the 
dominant culture’s systematic privilege and institutional practices ineffectually overtook 
the school’s identity, providing a false sense of caring. Findings from participant 
experiences aligned and concurred with research showing that students of color who 
experience structural racism are pushed into the school-to-prison pipeline. 
The third set of themes in response to Research Question 1, hailing from the 
TMAHS Post-10/11 phase, were (a) Blaming TMAHS Community for 10/11, 
(b) Nonexistent Race Wars Now Exist, (c) Destroy TMAHS, and 
(d) Superintendent/Central Office Reactions to 10/11. 
Blaming TMAHS Community for 10/11 
During the multiple investigations regarding the Thurgood 10/11 riot, the San 
Francisco police and Sheriff’s departments largely refused to accept any responsibility 
for their actions at Thurgood Marshall on October 11, 2002. The OCC’s Report and 
Recommendations for Police Response to a Non-Weapon Fight Including Crowd Control 
Techniques in a High School Setting points to department failings for recommendations 
but “concluded that SFPD’s use of crowd control tactics was within department 
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guidelines” (OCC, 2004, p. 3). This report points blame back to the TMAHS Community 
as the cause of the 10/11 riot. 
The Report on Police Misconduct at TMAHS by Coleman Advocates for Children 
and Youth and their Families (N’T. Lee, 2004) contains findings from the SFUSD Task 
Force convened by the district and Coleman Advocates’ Youth Making a Change 
investigating the events at Thurgood on 10/11/2002 for nearly a full school semester. The 
report’s findings are below: 
• October 11 began with an ordinary student conflict. 
• Aggressive police action created a second conflict between African American 
students and the police. 
• The police response to Thurgood Marshall High School was excessive—
perhaps the largest police response to a school conflict in U.S. history. 
• The incident was not a student riot. 
• Police used excessive force against unarmed students and adult bystanders. 
• At least 90% of youth who experienced verbal or physical abuse by the police 
were African American. 
• An African American teacher was wrongly harassed and arrested. 
The Coleman report, along with the SFUSD TMAHS Task Force, added 
legitimacy to the TMAHS Community’s assertion that the new school site 
administration’s zero-tolerance policies enabled law enforcement to use aggressive 
crowd-control tactics on unarmed students, overwhelmingly targeting African American 
students for abuse (N’T. Lee, 2004, pp. 2–6). Unfortunately, the Coleman Report was not 
as readily available for public reading as The San Francisco Chronicle’s initial coverage 
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of the riot, and the reporting left an impression that the Thurgood Marshall Community 
was not only at fault but somehow deserved the treatment the police gave them on 
10/11//2002 (Alexander, 2010; Cann, 2015). 
Nonexistent Race Wars Now Exist 
The Chronicle’s coverage also repeatedly fueled racial clashes that were present 
at the school, citing unresolved issues with McAteer High School’s closure. The issues in 
question concerned African American students already present at Thurgood and the 
incoming McAteer student of Latino descent. It was not until after the riot that students 
and teachers on campus noticed students eating and clustering in their homogenous ethnic 
groups. The prophesied racial issues had come to fruition. As Educator 1, noted, “This 
was terrible. We had never had these racial divisions before.” 
The presence of SRO and security guards on the Thurgood campus was constant 
and the police department received a stipend for handling the gang/racial tensions that 
escalated into a student riot, according to their depiction of events at TMAHS on 10/11. 
Student 1 recalled a different perspective: “The SROs interpreted the fight as an 
altercation due to race; however, that was not the case.” 
Weitzer (2000) studied the differences African American youth perceived in how 
police treated Whites and Blacks. Youth questioned why they were presumed guilty of a 
crime when doing the same ordinary things that a White person would do, like walking 
down the street with hands in their pockets because of the cold, not because of something 
suspicious. Alexander (2010), in The New Jim Crow,” noted that it not an accident that 
youth of color are incarcerated at higher rates than White youth; rather it is the contention 
that youth must understand what rules are and will not be coddled. 
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Superintendent/Central Office Reactions to 10/11 
Parent 2’s assessment of the parent meeting with the superintendent strikes a 
chord of disappointment that the district’s educational leader could not be present for the 
TMAHS parents who wanted answers. This meeting set the tone for how for many other 
contentious meetings would thwart healing efforts between the superintendent and 
different faction of the Thurgood Community. The district did assemble a task force to 
work with the TMAHS Community to fully understand the 10/011 riot. The task force 
comprised 29 people under local organization headers like community-based 
organizations (nine), local churches (six), SFUSD administrators, two of whom were 
attorneys (11), educators (one), and city officials (two). Due to the high number of 
district-related members, Task Forces’ efforts were considered questionable and their 
recommendations were included in the Coleman Advocate Report published in 2004. The 
Thurgood Community had little faith in the Task Forces’ effort to help heal the wounds 
caused by changing the site administration in conjunction with the police riot that 
occurred on campus. No TMAHS or other youth were allowed to sit as a Task Force 
member. 
Youth of color believed police did not listen to them and assumed that they were 
guilty from first impressions. This was clear when student involved in the original 
conflict at Thurgood on 10/11 said, “I was jumped, then I was put under arrest for being 
jumped and then the police started jumping me” (Delgado et al., 2002). Limited research 
indicates that when police interact with students on public school campuses, negative 
effects are long lasting (Thurau et al., 2013). The TMAHS riot illustrates another 
example of students of color feeling unwanted in their schools, neighborhoods, and 
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communities (Fine et al., 2003). TMAHS’ school climate and unique culture, as voiced 
by Educator 4, never recovered. 
Educator 2 reflected that after the riot, a meeting took place with six other 
TMAHS Community members. Educator 2 only remembered from the meeting that the 
superintendent was fearful because a teacher was in the room. This occurrence connotes 
the intimidation exerted over TMAHS teachers and reasons for their exodus over a brief 
period of time. By the mid-2000s, Educator 5 believed only a handful of teachers left 
from who had been at the school in 2002, stating “probably less than 10 teachers left 
from the year I started, which was only 4 or 5 years previous.” 
Marginalization and Traumatization of Youth of Color 
When the finding subthemes are place sequentially, youth of color were targeted 
by embedded law-enforcement personnel and SRO programs placed on their school 
campuses. The school was traditionally a place for learning and growth when youth are at 
vulnerable stages in life but had become a place that lacked empathy and labeled students 
of color as criminals. Youth of color then equated school as a place to which they were 
not connected and developed a fear of recurring threats from law-enforcement officers 
(Theriot, 2016). Youth of color with SROs and embedded police in their schools 
addressed ongoing marginalization and traumatization. 
Findings were generated to answer Research Question 2: To what extent did the 
TMAHS, October 11, 2002 police riot impact students, teachers, and parents? When 
participants considered the events that occurred at TMAHS before, during, and after 
10/11, a theme developed explaining the impact on their TMAHS Community’s lives. 
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Impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Police Riot on TMAHS Students, Teachers, and Parents 
Subthemes emerged on student participants, who noted that their diverse and deep 
community association helped in their worldview develop (D. E. Collins, 1998). Their 
career choices regularly included working closely with underserved students of color, 
providing mentoring, TMAHS style, to facilitate overcoming challenges and navigate 
dominant culture and bureaucratic norms (Yosso, 2005). All student participants also 
have kept in contact with some members of the TMAHS Community, forming long and 
meaningful relationships with other TMAHS alum. Each participant expressed an 
enthusiasm for a future they felt empowered to help shape, as well as a deep-seated fear 
that a 10/11 riot could happen at any time, destroying all foundations on which they built 
their work and efforts. 
Parent participant subthemes arose in two arenas. One was the lessons around 
preparing oneself for a dangerous encounter, no matter in a large crowd or in a one-on-
one confrontation. One parent participant averred that one must take care of one’s person, 
do whatever is necessary to survive by avoiding conflict, and absolutely not get involved. 
The other parent participant experienced several encounters with district staff. An 
agreement existed to assist the district at the highest level with creation of a school-site 
safety plan, as Thurgood had none in place at the time of the riot. However, through a 
series of occurrences, the plan was reviewed over time and rejected. After further 
discussion with district counsel, Parent 1’s response to the conversation was that 
community members would not be bought, bribed, or silenced. 
Educator participants’ subthemes ranged from recognizing that as educators, the 
only space where teachers hold dominion is their classrooms. Three of the five educator 
participants took steps to gain administrative credentials and recreate equity models, 
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similar to those with which they trained at TMAHS, which they knew students of color in 
underserved communities would benefit from understanding. All educator participants 
left TMAHS, citing how painful it was to stay once the vision was destroyed by the 
administration and 10/11 riot experience. 
Historically, the efforts of dominant-culture privilege will not acquiesce, as it is 
intrinsic in every academic setting. Educator participants spoke to combating directly the 
internalized racism infiltrating the minds of students of color from their earliest academic 
interactions (aligned with D. E. Collins, 2000; King, 1991). Participants also expressed a 
sense that they had acquired an air of vigilance for the delicate and vulnerable state that 
success can be for students of color. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Chapter 6, the first section presents the research findings and provides 
conclusions from the findings, as well as discusses any surprises that occurred. Following 
is a presentation of the recommendations for future research. Finally, the chapter includes 
reflections from the researcher and closing remarks. 
Conclusions 
A key query and primary concern of this research study has been to understand 
how a nonweapon school fight devolved into the SRO-led law-enforcement melee that 
enveloped the Thurgood Marshall Community on October 11, 2002, as stated in Chapter 
1. One way to understand is to recognize the sizable burden placed on students of color in 
public school. Public schools across the country are filled predominantly with ethnic 
youth. Youth have an ongoing fight against stereotypes that have mislabeled them as 
unfeeling, remorseless superpredators (Bennett et al., 1996) whose time is spent either 
with gang members or dealing or consuming drugs, and whose only rewards are found in 
intensifying their thrills by causing mayhem and death (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009). 
Although, schools in rural, suburban, and urban environments experience similar 
behavioral issues with youth, it has been the urban youth of color and their schools that 
receive an exponential amount of exaggerated media attention. This type of attention has 
a systematized way of regularly spreading false images on the nightly news and in 
mainstream movies. These media formats show more youth of color than White youth as 
disruptive forces in the community (Goldsmith, 2016). Over time, the depictions remove 
the humanity of Latino and Black urban youth, further fueling the long debunked 
superpredator phenomenon. These depictions also work to dismiss urban youth of color’s 
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cultural contributions and their community’s assets in society because the contributions 
and assets neither fit quantifiably into dominant White mainstream culture categories nor 
match dominant cultures’ ideal youth activities (Yosso, 2005). Hence, urban youth of 
color find themselves labeled the other or the outsider (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009). 
However, the culprits who have not been held accountable for their egregious 
actions are the social scientists and higher education scholars who, in the 1990s, 
promoted the superpredator phenomenon. These scholars authored literature counter to 
actual declining data on juvenile crime and watched as the phenomenon took hold in 
urban settings without refuting its devastating effects to communities of color. Public 
accolades were heaped on these social scientists for providing unfounded and 
unsubstantiated scholarly support that contributed to the ongoing use of systems (like 
GREAT, DAWN, and National Institute on Drug Abuse) still targeting urban youth that 
grew from their inception in 1980s (Langston, 2003). These enhanced systems trained 
federal, state, and local law-enforcement officers in lobbying lawmakers, elected 
legislators, and criminal-court systems with their embellished statistics to create 
initiatives meant to enhance ways to contain urban youth. The outcome stifles the natural 
growth and hinders progress of students of color when they are in in schools. The 
Juvenile Crime Control Act takes this strategy a few steps further, incentivizing state 
courts to criminally try younger children and convict youth as adults. Block-grant funds 
are distributed across the country, increasing penalties for Black and Latino youth (Gray, 
1997). The culture that supports the overrepresentation of youth of color in the criminal 
courts is the same culture that helps feed those youth into the culture of the prison–
industrial complex (Davis, 1998), and the school-to-prison pipeline. 
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The correlation with the school-to-prison pipeline emanates from the increased 
placement of law-enforcement officers in schools through SRO programs that quote 
tracking-system statistics as justification, along with school shooting tragedies like those 
at Columbine and Sandyhook (Elikann, 1999; Kennedy, 2001). Only a few presidential 
elections yielded administrations that were tough on crime, evolving from the Gun Free 
Schools Zone Act of 1990 to the Gun Free Schools Zone Act of 1994, to initiating the 
Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act of 1997, which triggered the COPS Safe Schools 
Initiative Program funded annually by the federal government (Petteruti, 2011). These 
laws created and enhanced zero-tolerance policies that offered the structure that supports 
the mass incarceration of students of color and lays waste to communities of color 
(Alexander, 2010). The aforementioned national-level mandates affect urban youth of 
color in their communities and in their schools, causing them to fight for survival while 
fighting for an education. 
At the local level, California and San Francisco’s youth, and particularly students 
of color, experience these same issues in their schools and communities. Cal STAC and 
the STAS’s monitoring systems and training for law-enforcement officers have been 
implemented in urban schools, specifically preparing for in-school attacks that resemble 
Columbine or Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Vossekuil et al., 2002). When one couples 
the tracking and monitoring systems that contain schools and youth with an SRO that is 
acculturated to an enabled policing community, documented instances emerge of police 
brutality against youth of color in San Francisco-Bay Area communities and in schools. 
The plethora of themes and phases that 10 TMAHS study participants produced 
from their own reflections merely begins to identify the need to include and promote the 
voices of impacted school-community members (students, educators, and families) when 
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considering embedding police on a school site. These decisions, made by educational 
leaders who are far removed from the school site, speak to the silencing experienced by 
TMAHS students, educators, and parents regarding the significant changes in their 
school’s climate, partnered with zero-tolerance-policy enforcement and an increase in the 
embedded SROs regularly patrolling the school’s campus. 
Surprises Occurred During Research 
Although interrater reliability (Roberts, 2010), explained below, vetted well the 
research process, a few surprises occurred while conducting research for this dissertation 
that often confounded the researcher. The two sample participants, acquaintances of the 
researcher, were unaffiliated with the TMAHS riot or school community but understood 
some of the circumstances about the event. They were sent information as though they 
were study participants and asked to reply as such. After the explanation of the study, one 
sample participant who was about the same age as a TMAHS senior in 2002, now an 
adult (age 32) chose not to participant and did not respond further to inquiries. The other 
sample participant who was about the same age as a teacher working at TMAHS in 2002 
(age 45) returned all messages, agreed to participate, and answered dialogue questions. 
The sample participant did not understand some questions, which may have been due to 
not being completely familiar with the school’s history or the SRO-related riot. However, 
by asking follow-up questions after the initial question guiding the dialogue, responses 
reflected inquiry. 
Regardless, one of the first experiences of the researcher was the lack of response 
of potential research participants, once the research was underway in earnest. Many 
potential participants (students, educators, and parents) as well as law-enforcement 
personnel and people who were on the TMAHS campus the day of the riot had expressed 
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interest in participating in the research; however, as time for the study drew near, these 
potential participants failed to come forward or communicate further with the researcher, 
despite multiple and varying outreach attempts. The research began with an initial 12 
participants who indicated they desired to participate; however, two declined 
participation by not responding after the details of the study were revealed to them and 
the researcher made several follow-up attempts. 
Another surprise revealed during the study were study participants’ comments 
that created the three-themed phases of TMAHS. It was not surprising that participants 
began their reflections when they began working at TMAHS, attended TMAHS, or had a 
child attending TMAHS, but what was surprising is that participants continued after the 
first guiding dialogue question onto the next phase and then the next phase with little or 
no prompting, with the riot buffered between the pre- and post-TMAHS. It seemed as 
though participants already had a timeline mapped out internally, waiting for the inquiry 
to release long-buried memories. 
The final surprise was that participants articulated (in one way or another) an 
overshadowing theme. One participant shared having figured out a forewarning for other 
successful organizations to recognize subtle or unsubtle elements that could compound to 
build and lead to the dismantling of communities created for students of color to succeed 
and thrive. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
While conducting research for this dissertation, three recommendations for future 
research came to light. One suggestion came from a participant in dialogue with the 
researcher and the other recommendations are from the researcher. 
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Educator 4, posited that many families intentionally selected Thurgood through 
the school-lottery process with preference offered to those living in the 94124, 94134, 
and 94110 zip codes: the neighborhoods nearest to TMAHS. A future study could discern 
if students and their families who did not intentionally choose TMAHS but had defaulted 
into the school because they did not complete the selection process, also adopted The 
Thurgood Marshall Way. Were those students able to thrive in the environment, 
developing a conscientiousness of their own, carried out into the world after their time at 
Thurgood? 
The research for this inquiry could be a mixed-methods study, combining 
quantitative and qualitative research that considered data from SFUSD enrollments by zip 
code. The qualifier for the SFUSD data mining, would be to find school district 
applications where TMAHS was at the top of the list of schools selected by families 
during the enrollment cycle. Enrollment-cycle data includes all schools open to 
enrollment, as understood by applicants and their families, rather than when applying 
after the first round of school selection, when applicants may not have received their 
primary choice of school. Once the specific criteria were met, research would entail 
locating those families or students to inquire with them the reasons for their selection of 
TMAHS as a high school of choice. A qualitative study, including conversations with a 
cohort of families or students, could provide rich detail about why they chose TMAHS 
and their expected outcomes for having attended the school, paired with quantitative data 
for research question results. 
Further study about The Thurgood Marshall Way would discern how that 
philosophy and practice compared to some more famous academic-intervention models, 
such as the Harlem Zone and Lorraine Monroe’s original Dream Schools on the east 
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coast. Appropriate research would engage the original administration team and their 
selection to lead TMAHS, as well as how they worked together to recruit and build a 
cohesive team of educators and site support staff. This qualitative case study would aid in 
understanding the opportunities advantaged, challenges met, and disasters thwarted in 
ideologies coming to fruition. Culminating the study should be the query of how this 
model may be made sustainable in the face of adversarial efforts to make this educational 
environment inaccessible to the student populations that need it the most. 
Another suggestion for future study revolves around the experiences of TMAHS 
students who graduated in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. While interviewing three students 
for this dissertation, one graduating from TMAHS in 2003 and the other two in 2005, 
participants reflected on their experiences at TMAHS and the influences on their lives as 
a result of the year they graduated from TMAHS. Students 1 and 2 said the initial school 
experience reflected a warm demander environment, but the school culture quickly 
shifted to an experience filled with negative aspects as they strove to attain their high 
school diploma. 
This study would look at their college experiences, understanding whether they 
felt prepared to succeed in the rigorous collegiate environment, what careers they chose, 
whether they experienced periods of unemployment, and if so, for what reasons. The U.S. 
financial crisis leading to the Recession of 2007–2009 also occurred during the time 
when these TMAHS graduates would have been completing their college degrees, if they 
chose to attend or be entrenched in the workforce. Their experiences as working adults 
would be particularly interesting in understanding how much of their TMAHS education 
played a part in their preparation for life issues that occurred during that time period. 
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These are some of the recommendations for further study that can be applied to 
other like school settings, using the same criteria. They center on students of color or 
more generally how youth of color manage events.  Focusing on multiple paths for 
research for how to young people who live in an impoverished life circumstances manage 
to achieve when supported? 
Recommendations for Professional Practice 
To take all possible preventative measures against having an event recur, such as 
the TMAHS October 11, 2002 police riot, the following recommendations are presented 
for those presiding over and working in the K–12 education system as well as other types 
of academic settings.  
The first recommendation is to advise governing bodies prior to deciding that 
armed law enforcement should be placed into a K-12 school setting, there needs to be a 
deep understanding of the consequences of adding such personnel to a school’s campus. 
An assessment of community policing practices as well as what measures are present in 
the surrounding community that already impact students’ lives when they are not in 
school can be attained from local non-profit organizations supporting students and 
families. It is strong recommendation to use cross cultural data-driven research to better 
understand what zero-tolerance policies currently exist near schools, the effects of zero-
tolerance policies on youth of color within a school district, and at the level of school 
sites. Data from the statistics department may be quite revealing and provide insights on 
how many and which students are experiencing suspensions and expulsions as well as 
offenses attached to them outside of school grounds. The goal is to diminish the harsh 
impact on youth of color experienced when broken windows and theories of deterrence 
compound their daily existence and leave them with little hope for bettering themselves 
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within their communities. Researchers can partition the data by gender and ethnicity.  
Many schools and school districts have implementing an empowering restorative-justice-
and-practices and student-peer court models. Entire school communities work together to 
reduce community harm, increase harm-caused accountability, and move toward true 
reconciliation. Such models strengthen a school community and its members through 
trust building. Included in the trust-building process, is to consult student-led advisory 
boards and commissions that have been created to offer the perspectives of youth in 
determining policies, practices, protocols that are enacted and placed in environments 
that they inhabit. The voices of these empowered youth should be sought, documented 
and taken into consideration when considering placement of law enforcement on school 
campuses. 
The second recommendation is that a memorandums of understanding (MOU) be 
established between the governing school body or board and the municipal law-
enforcement agency whenever an assigned SRO or other embedded law-enforcement 
officer has a presence on a school campus. The MOU should denote clear protocols of 
behaviors for the officers, with the government school body delineating what behaviors 
are allowed and prohibited on school grounds (aligned with Kim & Geronimo, 2009). For 
example, the rights of students and staff at the school site should be respected; any 
student interrogation or questioning should only occur when parent or guardian has been 
notified and is present; unless urgent circumstances dictate, the student should be 
provided the opportunity to have an adult ally of their choice present until parent or 
guardian may be present; arrest of a student should not occur in the classroom setting and 
all care should be taken for students’ physical, emotional, and mental well-being; officers 
should not be a part of nor take part in the school’s disciplinary processes. 
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Further, Bracy (2010) and Kupchik (2010) noted that law-enforcement officers 
serving as school-site counselors do not have the training or skills to serve in this 
capacity. Their mere presence in student disciplinary processes tend to escalate 
circumstances by asserting a law-and-order approach into the setting, whereas a minor 
offense would not have warranted contacting law enforcement (Bracy, 2010). Procedures 
should only be managed and handled by trained and certified school-site personnel. In 
circumstances that require escalated police activity on campus, unless the situation is life-
threatening or denotes immediate impending danger, the school staff should remain in 
full charge of the school site while officers handle the issue, preferably in the office or in 
the immediate area of the disturbance. Last, all officers assigned to schools should have 
mandatory youth-development guidance and juvenile deescalation training, with frequent 
continuing-education updates. These tenets should be outlined in an initial draft of the 
MOU and circulated to parent groups, student organizations, teachers’ unions, and 
community-advocacy organizations for feedback. The MOU draft should go through 
many iterations including presentation of best practices examples from other school 
districts and municipalities before the final draft is signed by the district superintendent 
and chief of police at a public meeting (as suggested by Kim & Geronimo, 2009).  
However, since there is a recognized culture of over-policing communities of 
color (Davis, 1998) and the more vulnerable youth of color, it is also recommended that 
there be a comprehensive review of local law enforcement’s general orders, as they 
pertain to juveniles and police interactions with juvenile in the community and on school 
campuses (OCC, 2004b).  These rules and regulations should also have a thorough 
evaluation by youth advocacy and juvenile justice organizations through a collaborative 
partnership with law enforcement. 
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Implications of the Research 
The TMAHS and the 10/11 police riot will remain in the psyche of the students, 
educators, parents, families, and neighboring community for quite some time, still 
remembered vividly in 2017. Their lives and lessons devised from the TMAHS 
experience in its entirety have impacted their decisions, behaviors, and conversations 
regarding zero-tolerance policies, the ramifications of policing in schools, underserved 
Black and Latino student communities, and the school-to-prison pipeline. 
TMAHS study participants impacted directly by embedded police in schools have 
offered a glimpse into their universe and the destructive results when enabled and 
embedded SROs are present (Goldsmith, 2016) and focused on enforcing harsh and 
unwarranted punishments where students are vulnerable, in school trying to obtain an 
education. This study also reflects two types of school-site administrators. One type was 
described as nurturing for educators and empowering for Black and Brown youth. 
Despite consensus that this type of administrator was not perfect, a strong belief emerged 
favoring an environment set on repairing the harm caused by decades of academically 
underserving students of color (D. E. Collins, 2000; Yosso, 2005). The other type of 
administrator was one who adhered to demeaning stereotypes for student of color, 
initiating theory-of-deterrent policies for behaviors that had not taken hold of the school 
in the beginning of the 2002 academic school year. However, when expectations were 
lowered, and systems of oppression were put in place, youth of color quickly succumbed 
to stigmatizing labels (Bernburg et al., 2006) placed upon them. King’s ever-present 
dysconscious racism (1991) manifests in youth following labeling and overly harsh 
treatment (Casella, 2003b). 
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Some law-enforcement agencies seek to change a history of enabled police 
brutality to community peace officers when engaging with youth and students of color in 
their schools and connected neighboring communities (Brotman, 2015). Youth-advocacy 
groups, social-justice coalitions, and civil rights organizations may point to this case 
study as an example of voices that were never heard or respected when speaking to 
persons in positions of power about changing school communities and their structures. 
The participants held onto their recollections and suppressed their voices. However, 
through this study, they had an opportunity to share their voice with a larger community 
of education policymakers and school-district governing bodies that may be considering 
placing SROs or embedded law-enforcement officers in schools. 
Reflections of Researcher and Closing Remarks 
As I conclude my dissertation journey, I feel a huge sense of accomplishment 
after carrying TMAHS Community member’s voices for accountability and closure from 
the 10/11 police riot with me for the last 15 years. Upon my arrival at the University of 
San Francisco, I had in mind another topic that remains meaningful to me to investigate: 
native English-speaker remedial literacy and the application of Teaching English to 
Speakers of Other Languages strategies; and I will someday. However, I knew deeply 
that I wanted my final dissertation research to be about TMAHS and the 10/11 police riot. 
Over time, and with the encouragement of my professor, Dr. Lance T. McCready, I 
stepped back in time with members of the Thurgood Marshall Community to remember 
our history and that fateful day in October 2002, as well as its aftermath, embracing all 
that came with it. I truly believe and trust that there are proven, respectful community-
healing avenues that enable peace and have our students, particularly of color, feel safe in 
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schools without embedding armed law-enforcement officers on their campuses or having 
them handle school-student discipline. 
The study participants continuously expressed their support for me to take on the 
TMAHS 10/11 Riot because its effects still ripple through the southeast sector of San 
Francisco today. Several participants mentioned they had thought to address TMAHS and 
the 10/11 Riot in their post-TMAHS life but had not done so. Their ongoing 
encouragement of the researcher’s work and effort to bring forward their collective and 
reflective involvement in TMAHS, before, during, and after the 10/11 police riot, has 
been heartfelt and truly appreciated. 
As a school board member for the SFUSD, policies that I advocated and created, 
such as restorative justice and restorative practices, a completed A–G course sequence 
requirement for all SFUSD graduates, and more, stemmed from operationalizing the 
ideologies I learned from educators and families while I was a parent at TMAHS. I have 
benefitted from the profound generosity of the shared learning and mentorship 
environment present at TMAHS through The Thurgood Marshall Way and I intentionally 
seek opportunities to advocate by modeling its tenets in life, in academia, and when I 
work mentoring others. 
It has been a long process (far longer than my 3-year doctoral program at USF) 
that brings me to the end of this particular road in my life. Although many other roads 
have opened during this journey traveled, most were a direct result of my involvement 
with TMAHS and the deep love I have for the school’s community and folk doing serious 
community work in the southeast sector of San Francisco. I’ll never tire of saying the full 
name of that school, which was so beloved by its students and their families, its 
educators, and the community it served. I used to think that Thurgood Marshall 
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Academic High School and the 10/11 riot changed the course of my life, but about 10 
years ago, I began to recognize that the school, the community, and the riot were all part 
of the plan for my life. I was supposed to be there at that point in time, just as I’m 
supposed to be here at this point in time, discussing it. 
For all of the experience, I’m humbled. 
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APPENDIX D 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
The following terms have been operationalized for this study: 
A–G Requirements. Widely used and accepted for University of California (UCs) 
and California State Universities (CSUs) as well as private colleges and universities, the 
A-G course requirements, also known as A-G course sequence is a list of subject 
requirements created in the high schoolers course schedule from the freshmen through to 
senior year. Its purpose is to ensure that students have obtain a general body of 
knowledge that will provide breadth and perspective to new, more advanced study. The 
list of courses in the sequence are History/social science (“a”), English (“b”), 
Mathematics (“c”), Laboratory science (“d”), Language other than English (“e”), Visual 
and performing arts (“f”), College-preparatory elective (“g”). “These courses are to be 
academically challenging, involving substantial reading, writing, problems and laboratory 
work (as appropriate), and show serious attention to analytical thinking, factual content 
and developing students’ oral and listening skills (UCOP, 2017, 
http://www.ucop.edu/agguide/a-g-requirements/)“. 
Block schedule. “A system for scheduling the middle- or high-school day, 
typically by replacing a more traditional schedule of six or seven 40–50 minute daily 
periods with longer class periods” (e.g. 90 to 120 minutes) that meet on every other day 
schedule throughout the week. One of the bonuses for block scheduling is that student 
become accustom to this schedule, which mirrors college campus schedules for classes, 
making the transition to a college campus seamless (Glossary of Education Reform, 
2017). 
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Board of education/Governing education body. A body of persons/board 
controlling an educational system or a unit of it; especially, a board of citizens controlling 
especially the elementary and secondary public-school education in a state, county, city, 
or town — compare school board (Meriam-Webster, 2016). 
Broken-windows theory. Social scientists James Wilson and George Kelling 
(1982) generally posited that if a broken window on a building remained unrepaired in a 
neighborhood for an extended period, no matter the socio-economic level of the 
neighborhood’s demographics, then other windows in the building would be broken by 
any number of residents and/or passing strangers because the population had concluded 
that no cared. 
Case study. Creswell defines case study as “a methodology: a type of design in 
qualitative research that may be an object of study, as well as a product of inquiry.” 
Further, case studies have bounded systems, are detailed and use multiple sources of 
information (2002, p. 97). 
Classroom management. Refers to the wide variety of skills and techniques that 
teachers use to keep students organized, orderly, focused, attentive, on task, and 
academically productive during a class (Glossary of Education Reform, 2017). 
Conscientization. The process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social 
reality through reflection and action. Action is fundamental because it is the process of 
changing the reality. Paulo Freire says that we all acquire social myths which have a 
dominant tendency, and so learning is a critical process which depends upon uncovering 
real problems and actual needs (Freire Institute, 2017). 
COPS, Secure our Schools Initiative. COPS Secure Our Schools (SOS) grants 
provide funding to state, local, or tribal governments working in partnership with public 
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schools to improve school safety. Successful programs are based on a comprehensive 
safety assessment that identifies the individual needs of the schools, and law enforcement 
agencies receiving funding will collaborate with school administrators, teachers, students, 
and parents to implement solutions to school safety challenges. (DOJ, 2017). 
Critical consciousness (in education). a level of consciousness characterized by 
depth in the interpretation of problems, through testing one’s own findings with openness 
to revision, attempting to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and preconceived 
notions when analyzing them... affirming the mutual and coequal roles of teachers and 
learners (Heaney, 1995). 
Critical race theory (in education). Are a set of basic insights, methods, 
perspectives, and pedagogy that seeks to analyze, identify, and transform those cultural 
and structural aspects of education that maintain dominant and subordinate racial 
positions inside and outside of the classroom. The theory in education challenges 
biological and cultural deficit stories by using a variety of efforts such as “counterstories, 
historiographies, corridos, oral traditions, films, poetry… (Solórzano & Yosso, 2002)” 
(as cited in McNee, 2015, p.12). 
Discipline. Is the practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behavior, 
using punishment to correct disobedience (Lee, 2004b). 
Enabled police force. A police force unhindered by legal scrutiny and empowered 
by deregulation in a deliberate attempt to preserve the racially disparate criminal justice 
system (Goldsmith, 2016). 
Generative themes. Generative themes are codifications of complex experiences 
which are charged with political significance and are likely to generate considerable 
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discussion and analysis. They are derived from a study of the specific history and 
circumstances of the learners (Heaney, 1995). 
Impact. Measure of the tangible and intangible effects (consequences) of one 
thing’s or entity’s action or influence upon another (OCC, 2004). 
Intransitive consciousness. The state of those whose sphere of perception is 
limited, whose interests center almost totally around matters of survival, and who are 
impermeable to challenges situated outside the demands of biological necessity 
Lock-down in a school setting. An emergency measure or condition, in which 
school-site staff and students are temporarily prevented from entering or leaving a 
restricted area or the whole building during a threat of danger. (OCC, 2004) 
Off-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law enforcement officer). 
An SRO patrols perimeters of a physical school location or site, along with the 
surrounding neighborhoods (Lee, 2004b) 
On-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law enforcement officer). 
An SRO patrols and may have designated space within the physical school location or 
site (OCC, 2004). 
Police/Law-enforcement officer. A person whose job is in keep the peace, handle 
routine calls for service, respond to emergency calls or in progress crimes, enforce 
criminal, traffic, health and safety code violations; assist during major emergencies and 
natural disasters with evacuations and perimeter security; arrest and book prisoners and 
transport, file crime and incident reports, conduct basic investigations, evaluate and 
secure crime scenes, render first aid in appropriate situations, make death notifications; 
locate and interview witnesses, serve arrest, traffic and search warrants, patrol assigned 
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beat or arena in a car, on foot, on a bicycle or horse; a member of the police force (Police 
Test Guide, 2018). 
Prison–industrial complex. Considering the corporate economic and dividend 
structures being attributed to the prison industry, with close reflecting that of the US. 
Military, the profitability of privatized business-government linkages with corrections 
and public punishment, the exponential expansion of penal system can now be 
characterized as a “prison industrial complex” (Davis, 1998). 
Restorative justice. Is a social science process that studies a harm-causing offense 
and uses methods involving the primary stakeholders in determining how best to repair 
the harm done by that offense. The three primary stakeholders in restorative justice are 
victims, offenders and their communities of care, whose needs are, respectively, 
obtaining reparation, taking responsibility, and achieving reconciliation. The degree to 
which all three are involved in meaningful emotional exchange and decision making is 
the degree to which any form of social discipline approaches being fully restorative 
(Wachtel, 2013). 
Restorative practices. Is a practiced social science process that negotiates how to 
build social capital and achieve social discipline through participatory learning and 
decision-making. The use of restorative practices helps to: reduce crime, violence and 
bullying, improve human behavior, and strengthen civil society (Wachtel, 2013). 
School campus. The physical location of the school site within the school district 
jurisdiction (OCC, 2004). 
School community. A school community consists of person associated with the 
school on a regular and/or integral basis. These members consist of, for example: 
students, teachers, onsite administrators (principal, vice/assistant principal), janitors, 
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cafeteria workers, counselors, deans, parents of students attending the school, school 
district officials assigned to oversee the school, and neighboring residents, nearby 
merchants, and non-profit organizations near the school location that provide services to 
the school’s population. 
School Resource Officers/SROs. A school resource officer, by federal definition, 
is a career law enforcement officer with sworn authority, who is deployed by an 
employing police department or agency in a community-oriented policing assignment to 
work in collaboration with one or more schools (McNicholas, 2008; Canady, James & 
Nease, 2012). 
Social justice. Goldfarb and Grinberg define social justice “as the exercise of 
altering these [institutional and organizational] arrangements by actively engaging in 
reclaiming, appropriating, sustaining, and advancing inherent human rights of equity, 
equality, and fairness in social, economic, educational, and personal dimensions” 
Goldfarb & Grinberg definition (2002, p. 162), (as cited in Theoharis, 2007). 
Stop and frisk. A legal practice used by in the United States, predominantly by the 
New York City Police Department (NYPD) that has its origins on London, in which a 
police officer may detain, ask questions, and search a person who appeared to be 
suspicious. Stop and Frisk laws were a direct descendant of zero tolerance practices and 
the broken windows theory. However, after 10 years of the practice, it was discovered 
that majority of the persons that were stopped and frisked by the NYPD were African-
American and Latino males between the ages of 14-24 (Devereaux, 2012). 
Structural racism. A system in which public policies, institutional practices, 
cultural representations, and other norms work in various, often reinforcing ways to 
perpetuate racial group inequity. It identifies dimensions of our history and culture that 
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have allowed privileges associated with “whiteness” and disadvantages associated with 
“color” to endure and adapt over time. Structural racism is not something that a few 
people or institutions choose to practice. Instead it has been a feature of the social, 
economic and political systems in which we all exist (Lawrence, 2004). 
Superpredator. A term used to describe youth deemed as violent and 
unredeemable in the eyes of society. In late 1995, John DiIulio, a criminologist and 
political scientist, wrote a magazine article entitled “The Coming of the Super-Predators” 
(Drum, 2016). DiIulio said “We’re talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for 
human life and no sense of the future. And make no mistake, while the trouble will be 
greatest in black inner-city neighborhoods, other places are also certain to have 
burgeoning youth-crime problems that will spill over into upscale central-city districts, 
inner-ring suburbs, and even the rural heartland.” (Botelho and Ellis, 2015). 
Three Strikes Laws. ““Three strikes and you’re out,” requiring that criminals 
involved in three serious, violent felonies be sentenced to prison for guaranteed terms up 
to life imprisonment” (Meese, 1994). The Three Strikes Laws are also a part of the 
United States tough on crime policies and zero tolerance practices. 
U.S. Department of Education (ED). The Education Department’s mission is to 
promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering 
educational excellence and ensuring equal access (ED, 2016). 
U.S. Department of Justice. The Office of the Attorney General was created by 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, sec. 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93), as a one-person part-time 
position. The Act specified that the Attorney General was to be “learned in the law,” with 
the duty “to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United 
States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when 
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required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of 
the departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments” (DOJ, 2017). 
War on drugs. Is an American term commonly applied to a campaign of 
prohibition of drugs, military aid, and military intervention, with the stated aim being to 
reduce the illegal drug trade. The term was popularized by the media shortly after a press 
conference given on June 18, 1971, by United States President Richard Nixon—the day 
after publication of a special message from President Nixon to the Congress on Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control—during which he declared drug abuse “public enemy 
number one” (Dufton, 2012). 
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History of Student Assignment in SFUSD 
In 1978, the San Francisco NAACP brought a case against SFUSD and the State of 
California.  The NAACP argued that the District and the State engaged in discriminatory 
practices and maintained a segregated school system in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution, federal statues, and the State of California Constitution. 
In 1983, the U.S. District Court approved a type of agreement between the parties 
called a “Consent Decree” which had two primary goals for the San Francisco Unified 
School District:  
1. continued and accelerated efforts to achieve academic excellence for all students 
with a particular focus on African American and Latino students; and  
2. elimination of racial/ethnic segregation or identifiability in any school, program, or 
classroom to the extent practicable. 
In implementing the 1983 Consent Decree, SFUSD created a student assignment plan 
and a transportation system designed to support SFUSD’s efforts to desegregate its 
schools.  The student assignment plan used a combination of schools with both 
contiguous and noncontiguous attendance areas, alternative schools (without 
attendance areas), and optional enrollment requests which allowed students to transfer 
to schools outside of their attendance area school.  In addition, no school could have 
fewer than four racial/ethnic groups, and no racial/ethnic group could constitute more 
than 45% of the students at attendance area schools or 40% at alternative schools.  
In 1994, a group of San Francisco parents sued the District for using race as a 
factor in school assignment, and as part of a 1999 settlement, SFUSD was prohibited 
from using race or ethnicity as a consideration in student assignment.  In attempting to 
comply with that agreement, SFUSD initially proposed an assignment plan that used a 
lottery process in which race/ethnicity was one factor, but the Court rejected that plan.   
In 2001, the Court approved a settlement agreement that included a new student 
assignment method called the Diversity Index, which was implemented for the 2002-03 
school year and has been in use ever since. The Diversity Index is designed to:  
1. give parents choice;  
2. ensure equitable access; and  
3. promote diversity without using race/ethnicity.   
On December 31, 2005, the Consent Decree expired, and for the first time in 22 
years the SFUSD student assignment process was not regulated by the courts.  
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Hearing from the Community 
SFUSD has partnered with different community members and organizations over the 
past five years to gather feedback on the student assignment system.  SFUSD has 
heard from thousands of parents and other community members regarding their 
experience, concerns, and suggestions for student assignment.  Families consistently 
report wanting quality schools and a fair and equitable system that is easy to 
understand.  
While families consistently report wanting quality schools, there are many divergent 
perspectives on what a new student assignment plan should prioritize and support.  For 
example, some parents want a school close to home, while others feel that choosing a 
school with particular programmatic features is more important than having a school 
close to home.   
Here is a high-level summary of key findings from the community reports.  For the 
purposes of the summary, we have pulled out findings that relate only to the student 
assignment system.  However, within these reports there is also rich material regarding 
the kinds of schools parents and other community members want.  
• Some parents, particularly elementary school parents, want a quality school close to 
home or easy to get to.  Other parents feel that choosing the school that is best 
suited for their child is more important than having the school in their neighborhood.  
• Most parents want their school communities to reflect San Francisco’s 
socioeconomic and cultural diversity.  But for parents across the city, diversity is 
often trumped by a school’s location, academic quality, and their own feeling of 
belonging. 
• Even parents who are happy with their children’s schools want more predictability in 
the enrollment process and are uncomfortable with a process that feels excessively 
complicated or random.  
• Parents want the District to provide clear and accessible information that will help 
them choose a school that is a good fit for their child.  
• Parents want to participate fully in the enrollment process, but many encounter 
significant language, time, and information barriers.  
The content of past community reports can be found on our website: www.sfusd.edu.  
(http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfm?page=policy.placement.assignment.commu
nity) 
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SFUSD’s Current Student Assignment System 
The current student assignment plan, in place since 2001, is designed to: 
1. Give parents choice; 
2. Ensure equitable access; and 
3. Promote diversity without using race/ethnicity. 
Under the current system, the biggest determinations of where a student goes to school 
are parent choice and available seats at any given school.  
Students are not automatically assigned a school.  Families can request up to seven 
schools anywhere in the district.   
Younger siblings get priority to attend school with their older sibling.  
While there is some local preference, the district is using the same attendance area 
boundaries created over 15 years ago, and about 1/3 of schools do not have any 
attendance area boundaries.   
Some schools have more applications than seats for students. For those schools a 
diversity lottery assigns students to one of their choices.   
The diversity lottery seeks to achieve economic, linguistic, and academic diversity.  It 
defines and measures diversity using a complex formula that calculates the probability 
that in a given grade randomly chosen students will be different from each other.   
 
The calculation is based on five race-neutral factors:  
1. extreme poverty;  
2. socioeconomic status;  
3. student’s home language;  
4. academic performance index of student’s prior school; and  
5. student’s prior academic achievement. 
For many schools, the applicant pools are not diverse. Since the diversity lottery only 
assigns students from the applicant pools, it has limited opportunity to reduce racial 
isolation and the concentration of underserved students in the same school. 
Students who do not get one of their choices get offered the school closest to where 
they live with a seat available.  
You have to turn your application in on time to choose among all the schools. If you 
don’t turn your application in on time, you can only request schools that still have space. 
There is limited connection between where students live and where they go to school, 
and as a result school assignments are not predictable.  
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Board of Education’s Priorities  
for Student Assignment 
In response to the concerns about the current student assignment system, the Board of 
Education established three priorities for a new student assignment system, and they 
also established measures for evaluating different options.   
 
Board’s Priorities  Measures for Evaluating Different Options 
   
Reverse the trend of racial 
isolation and the 
concentration of 
underserved students in 
the same school. 
 • Minimize the number of schools with more 
than x% of students achieving below basic/far 
below basic. 
• Minimize the number of schools with more 
than x% of a single racial/ethnic group.  
• Minimize the number of schools with more 
than x% below basic/far below basic 
combined with x% of a single racial/ethnic 
group. 
• Minimize the number of schools with more 
than x% of students with a low socio-
economic status. 
• Minimize the number of schools with more 
than x% of English Language Learners. 
   
Provide equitable access 
to the range of 
opportunities offered to 
students. 
 • Make equitable access to high-quality 
opportunities independent of “on-time” 
participation in the student assignment 
system. 
• Increase diversity at racially isolated schools 
that also have high concentrations of 
underserved students. 
• Decrease the number of under-enrolled 
schools. 
   
Provide transparency at 
every stage of the 
assignment process. 
 • Eliminate incentives for parents to try to 
game the student assignment process. 
• Increase the rates of on-time participation in 
the enrollment process. 
 
These measures will be used to analyze various options to see if a particular option is 
more or less likely to meet the Board of Education’s priorities for a new student 
assignment system. 
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CONSENT DECREE (1983) 
SAN FRANCISCO NAACP, ET AL. VS. SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, ET AL. 
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APPENDIX G 
SFUSD, DIVISION FOR INTEGRATION: 
SPECIAL PLAN FOR THE BAYVIEW-HUNTERS POINT SCHOOLS (1993) 
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Melee	closes	S.F.	high	school	-	Melee	closes	high	school	in	San	Francisco	
San	Francisco	Chronicle	(CA)	(Published	as	THE	SAN	FRANCISCO	CHRONICLE)	-	October	12,	
2002	
Author/Byline:	Ray	Delgado,	Jaxon	Van	Derbeken,	Nanette	Asimov,	Chronicle	Staff	
WritersEdition:	FINALSection:	BAY	AREAPage:	A17	
	
Simmering	tensions	at	Thurgood	Marshall	High	School	in	San	Francisco's	Bayview	district	
erupted	into	disturbances	Friday	as	scores	of	baton-wielding	police	officers	were	brought	in	to	
break	up	clashes	among	students	in	the	hallway.	
	
The	unrest	forced	the	midday	shutdown	of	the	1,100-student	school,	located	off	Silver	Avenue	
near	Interstate	280	and	Highway	101.	Then	police	fanned	out	in	the	neighborhood	dispersing	
students	who	were	milling	about,	some	shouting	taunts	at	officers.	
	
Many	teachers	and	students	said	the	60	police	officers	from	throughout	the	city	who	
responded	had	overreacted	to	the	confrontation.	In	the	end,	two	students	were	arrested,	along	
with	an	English	teacher,	29-year-old	Anthony	Peebles,	who	videotaped	some	of	the	unrest	and	
repeatedly	told	students	not	to	disperse,	police	said.	
	
He	allegedly	pushed	an	officer	who	was	trying	to	get	him	to	stop,	police	said.	Peebles	was	cited	
and	released	on	suspicion	of	inciting	a	riot,	battery	on	an	officer	and	interfering	with	an	arrest.	
An	officer	seized	his	video	camera.	
	
Several	teachers	and	students	said	police	had	used	their	batons,	grabbed	the	hair	of	students	
involved	in	the	melee	and	handcuffed	innocent	youths.	
	
"They	were	acting	as	if	this	was	a	riot,	but	it	was	not	at	the	riot	stage,"	said	Kevin	Hartzog,	a	
teacher	at	Marshall	for	five	years.	"The	whole	thing	could	have	been	resolved	calmly,	without	
having	officers	here	in	force."	
	
"This	was	an	overreaction,"	said	an	English	teacher,	Pirette	McKamey.	"The	level	of	this	
response	was	a	total	disconnect	with	what	was	actually	happening.	
	
Our	students	watching	this	cannot	believe	it.	.	.	.	They	were	being	treated	like	common	
criminals."	
	
Police	said	they	had	no	choice	but	to	come	to	the	school	and	react	as	they	did.	
	
They	said	a	series	of	fights	began	just	before	school	started	Friday	morning,	when	one	youth	
was	attacked	by	a	group	of	10	to	15	students	just	outside	the	school.	
	
"That	precipitated	a	big	fight,	and	the	two	officers	in	the	school	were	overwhelmed,"	said	Capt.	
Michael	Puccinelli	of	Southern	Station.	"There	was	a	riot	going	on	in	that	school.	If	we	do	
nothing,	we	are	derelict	in	our	duty,	and	someone	might	get	killed	in	there."	
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The	boy	who	was	attacked,	16-year-old	sophomore	Jason	Morgan,	said	the	police	response	
made	things	worse.	
	
"I	was	jumped,	then	I	was	put	under	arrest	for	being	jumped	and	then	the	police	started	
jumping	me,"	Morgan	said.	
	
Colleagues	said	Peebles,	who	did	not	return	calls	seeking	comment,	was	angry	at	how	the	
police	were	handling	the	situation	and	told	students	not	to	disperse.	
	
Puccinelli	said	school	Principal	Juliet	Montevirgen	reprimanded	Peebles	at	the	scene.	
	
"We	warned	him	three	times	to	stop	inciting	the	violence,"	the	captain	said.	
	
"He	was	saying	the	police	were	wrong.	He	certainly	didn't	act	like	a	responsible	faculty	
member."	
	
Montevirgen	did	not	return	calls	seeking	comment.	
	
About	an	hour	after	police	arrived	in	force	late	in	the	morning,	a	large	crowd	of	angry	students	
stormed	up	and	down	Silver	Avenue,	yelling	at	police	officers	who	stood	in	a	line	to	prevent	
them	from	returning	to	the	school.	
	
The	stalemate	lasted	another	hour.	Students	eventually	left	the	scene	at	the	urging	of	teachers	
and	parents.	
	
Many	students	agreed	that	police	went	overboard.	
	
Channing	Hale,	a	15-year-old	sophomore,	said	she	was	hit	on	the	side	of	her	head	by	a	police	
baton	as	she	tried	to	get	out	of	the	way.	
	
"As	I	was	getting	ready	to	walk	away	from	the	crowd,	one	of	the	police	officers	struck	me	in	the	
face	and	they	pulled	a	gun	out	on	my	friend,"	Hale	said.	
	
Puccinelli	said	police	had	been	forced	to	act.	He	said	officers	were	facing	an	angry	crowd	of	150	
to	200	youths	inside	the	school,	and	that	one	had	snatched	a	baton.	
	
"We	had	to	move	the	kids,"	he	said.	"The	kids	were	confrontational."	
	
An	undercurrent	of	tension	has	run	through	Marshall	High	since	last	spring,	when	district	
Superintendent	Arlene	Ackerman	dismissed	the	school's	popular,	longtime	principal,	Samuel	
Butscher.	The	school	also	had	to	accommodate	about	200	additional	students	at	the	beginning	
of	the	school	year,	some	of	whom	came	from	the	long-troubled	and	now-closed	McAteer	High.	
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Police	added	a	second	officer	at	the	campus	in	response,	and	the	district	posted	five	security	
guards.	
	
Some	teachers	and	students	felt	the	new	principal	and	the	district	have	created	a	police-state	
atmosphere,	unnecessarily	bringing	in	officers	to	deal	with	minor	clashes.	
	
Even	before	Friday's	melee,	teachers	were	describing	how	the	departure	of	Butscher	and	the	
arrival	of	Montevirgen,	a	veteran	school	district	administrator,	had	led	to	a	breakdown	in	
discipline.	
	
School	board	member	Dan	Kelly	said	he	did	not	think	the	change	in	leadership	had	caused	the	
fight.	He	said	those	still	longing	for	the	old	administration	"are	a	few	dissidents.	But	it's	a	
mistake	to	pin	this	incident	on	that."	
	
District	officials	said	some	of	the	youths	involved	in	the	fights	Friday	did	not	attend	Marshall.	
	
Ackerman's	second-in-command,	chief	academic	officer	Elois	Brooks,	said	an	assistant	principal	
had	brought	the	Marshall	students	into	the	office	and	the	other	participants	had	fled.	The	
students	were	suspended,	Brooks	said.	
	
The	incident	drew	a	handful	of	district	administrators	and	school	board	members	to	the	school	
to	develop	a	response	plan,	which	will	include	notices	to	parents	and	a	handout	to	teachers	to	
discuss	conflict	resolution	in	class.	
	
There	will	also	be	a	meeting	for	parents	at	the	school	Tuesday	night	and	one	or	more	meetings	
between	faculty	and	staff,	Brooks	said.	
	
"We	are	certainly	sorry	and	not	satisfied	when	we	have	students	behaving	in	this	manner,"	
Brooks	said,	pledging	to	investigate	not	only	what	happened	with	students,	but	whether	the	
police	used	unnecessary	force	in	their	response.	
	
"I	saw	some	extremely	angry	children,"	she	said.	"But	I	can	assure	you	that	we	will	also	sit	down	
with	the	police	chief	and	talk	about	the	lessons	learned.	"	
Caption:	PHOTO	(2)(1)	Jamie	Wilcher	(center)	was	hit	by	a	police	baton.	Her	parents,	Loretta	
Wilcher	(left)	and	Akili	Hammond	(right),	came	to	take	her	home.,	(2)	A	student	is	led	out	of	
Thurgood	Marshall	High	School	in	handcuffs	after	others	were	sent	home.	Photos	by	Christina	
Koci	Hernandez/The	Chronicle	
Memo:	E-mail	the	writers	at	rdelgado@sfchronicle.com,	jvanderbeken@sfchronicle.com	and	
nasimov@sfchronicle.com.	
Index	terms:	Thurgood	Marshall	High	School;	BRAWLS	&	RIOTS;	POLICE	CONDUCT;	SCHOOLS;	
SFDateline:	San	FranciscoRecord:	3262835	
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S.F.	high	school	reopens	after	melee	-	Marshall	parents	confront	officials		
Hide	Details	
San	Francisco	Chronicle	(CA)	(Published	as	THE	SAN	FRANCISCO	CHRONICLE)	-	October	16,	
2002Browse	Issues	
	
Author/Byline:	Ray	Delgado,	Chronicle	Staff	WriterEdition:	FINALSection:	BAY	AREAPage:	A23	
	
Students	returned	to	San	Francisco's	troubled	Thurgood	Marshall	High	School	on	Tuesday	
morning	for	the	first	time	since	a	confrontation	between	police	and	students	shut	down	the	
school	last	week.	Many	of	them	were	accompanied	by	parents	who	angrily	demanded	answers	
from	school	district	officials.	
	
Juniors	and	seniors	filed	into	the	school	for	impromptu	sessions	with	crisis	counselors	to	learn	
about	conflict	resolution	and	dealing	with	anger	as	part	of	the	school	district's	plan	to	quell	
tensions	at	the	school	after	Friday's	disturbance.	Sophomores	and	freshmen	will	return	for	a	
similar	program	today,	and	regular	classes	will	resume	Thursday.	
	
Many	of	the	students	witnessed	the	late-morning	fight	between	three	teenagers	that	turned	
into	a	tense	and	lengthy	standoff	between	students	and	police	after	officers	were	called	to	the	
school.	Students,	and	some	teachers,	say	police	used	unnecessary	force	to	disperse	the	crowd,	
handcuffing	innocent	bystanders	and	hitting	several	students	with	their	clubs.	
	
In	the	end,	the	two	students	involved	in	the	original	fight	were	arrested	along	with	a	29-year-
old	teacher	who	was	videotaping	the	confrontation	and	was	accused	of	assaulting	a	police	
officer.	
	
It	was	the	worst	disturbance	ever	to	hit	the	1,100-student	school,	which	was	founded	eight	
years	ago	to	be	an	antidote	to	the	low	academic	standards	that	had	been	associated	with	the	
Bayview-Hunters	Point	area.	
	
Senior	Tramael	Burch,	17,	said	she	wasn't	really	interested	in	the	various	conflict-resolution	
plans	the	district	pulled	together.	She	said	she	was	too	upset	about	what	happened	to	many	of	
her	friends.	
	
"I	had	a	headache	all	weekend,"	Burch	said.	"I	feel	like	something's	inside	holding	me	back.	I	
was	scared	about	coming	back."	
	
Senior	Chris	Ang,	17,	said	although	he	wasn't	afraid	for	his	own	safety,	he	thinks	that	the	
fighting	last	week	between	black	and	Asian	students	will	result	in	racial	tension	at	the	school.	
	
"It's	kind	of	a	good	idea	to	come	back	to	get	everybody	together,	but	in	a	way,	it	could	start	
racial	tensions."	
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At	the	same	time	that	students	were	in	class	Tuesday,	many	of	their	parents	met	with	school	
district	Superintendent	Arlene	Ackerman	and	Principal	Juliet	Montevirgen.	Many	unleashed	
days	of	pent-up	anger	about	how	the	incident	was	handled	by	administrators	and	police.	
	
"I	expect	the	school	to	handle	things	internally,	not	get	panicked	and	call	the	police	like	that,"	
said	Andre	Williams,	whose	17-year-old	daughter	Andrea	is	a	senior	at	the	school.	"I	expect	for	
that	never	to	happen	again."	
	
Parents	demanded	to	know	when	they	would	see	the	school's	emergency	response	plan,	how	
outside	students	who	were	involved	in	the	scuffles	got	into	the	school,	why	the	police	were	
called	and	responded	in	riot	gear	and	who	pulled	an	emergency	fire	alarm	that	added	to	the	
chaos	and	funneled	many	students	into	the	hallway	melee.	
	
Ackerman	was	repeatedly	on	the	defensive	during	the	two-hour	meeting	and	promised	to	
provide	parents	with	a	condensed	response	plan	by	the	end	of	the	day	and	to	call	a	special	
community	meeting	with	the	Board	of	Education	and	Police	Chief	Earl	Sanders	to	answer	some	
of	the	other	concerns.	
	
"I	am	trying	to	get	information	about	what	happened,"	said	Ackerman,	who	was	out	of	town	on	
Friday	when	the	incident	occurred.	"There	were	a	number	of	different	perspectives	and	people	
that	were	here.	You	have	to	give	me	time	to	answer	those	questions."	
	
Ackerman	said	police	were	called	to	the	school	by	a	police	officer	stationed	at	the	school	and	
were	told	that	there	was	a	fight	that	was	out	of	control	and	apparently	responded	in	force	
because	of	that	characterization.	
	
"I'm	not	saying	the	(school	resource	officer)	should	have	called	police,	that's	just	what	
happened,"	Ackerman	said.	
	
There	are	two	officers	and	four	security	guards	stationed	at	the	school.	Ackerman	said	students	
would	be	issued	identification	cards	to	help	prevent	outsiders	from	getting	on	campus.	
	
Embattled	Montevirgen	also	addressed	the	group	and	apologized	to	parents	for	the	heavy	
police	presence	Friday.	
	
"After	listening	to	a	group	of	African	American	parents	(Monday)	afternoon,	I	reflected	on	my	
way	of	looking	at	the	situation,"	she	said.	"I	was	brought	up	in	a	community	and	a	culture	
where	a	(police)	uniform	is	the	only	thing	that	can	save	you.	I	was	wrong	to	bring	that	
assumption	here."	
	
Montevirgen	said	after	the	meeting	that	the	fight	in	the	hallway	outside	her	office	was	so	
chaotic	that	it	was	hard	to	know	how	to	control	it.	
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"This	was	not	just	a	simple	fight,"	Montevirgen	said.	"The	first	floor	was	so	crowded	and	all	of	a	
sudden	there	was	all	this	yelling	and	screaming	going	on."	
Memo:	E-mail	Ray	Delgado	at	rdelgado@sfchronicle.com.	
Index	terms:	Thurgood	Marshall	High	School;	BRAWLS	&	RIOTS;	POLICE	CONDUCT;	SCHOOLS;	
SFRecord:	3263434Copyright:	Copyright	2002	The	Chronicle	Publishing	Co.	
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S.F.'s	Marshall	High	principal	quits	-	Decision	follows	dramatic	standoff	between	students	and	
police	
San	Francisco	Chronicle	(CA)	(Published	as	THE	SAN	FRANCISCO	CHRONICLE)	-	October	17,	2002	
Author/Byline:	Ray	Delgado,	Chronicle	Staff	WriterEdition:	FINALSection:	BAY	AREAPage:	A23	
The	embattled	principal	of	San	Francisco's	Thurgood	Marshall	High	School	abruptly	resigned	
Wednesday	in	front	of	angry	parents	meeting	with	district	officials	to	discuss	a	melee	that	shut	
down	the	campus	last	week.	
	
Principal	Juliet	Montevirgen	announced	that	she	would	immediately	step	aside	in	the	best	
interest	of	students	after	her	tumultuous	two-month	term	leading	the	campus	of	1,100	pupils	
culminated	with	a	dramatic	standoff	Friday	morning	between	students	and	baton-wielding	
police	summoned	to	break	up	a	fight.	
	
Montevirgen	endured	widespread	criticism	from	parents,	students	and	teachers	who	
complained	of	a	heavy-handed	response	from	police.	Students	and	teachers	said	that	officers	
used	excessive	force	to	break	up	a	crowd	gathered	to	watch	the	fight	and	that	police	
handcuffed	innocent	bystanders.	
	
Although	Montevirgen	did	not	call	the	police,	she	was	criticized	for	her	lack	of	leadership	after	
the	incident	and	poor	communication	with	parents	about	what	happened.	That	only	added	to	
the	litany	of	complaints	many	had	about	her	tenure	at	Marshall.	
	
Two	students	and	a	teacher	were	arrested	after	the	melee,	and	school	officials	canceled	classes	
for	the	remainder	of	the	day	after	students	continued	taunting	police	trying	to	disperse	them.	
	
School	district	Superintendent	Arlene	Ackerman	said	an	emotional	Montevirgen	called	her	late	
Tuesday	night	and	asked	to	be	reassigned	to	another	post	"for	the	sake	of	the	children."	
	
"She	felt	at	this	point	that	she	did	not	want	to	be	an	obstacle	to	the	school	moving	forward,"	
Ackerman	said.	"At	this	point,	I	think	it's	time	to	move	forward.	People	seem	to	have	accepted	
that."	
	
Dr.	Frank	Tom,	assistant	superintendent	responsible	for	high	schools	and	a	former	principal	at	
Lincoln	High,	will	serve	as	interim	principal.	
	
Marshall's	former	assistant	principal,	Lou	Garrett,	will	return	and	be	joined	by	Jean	Bell,	who	
was	assistant	principal	at	Franklin	Middle	School.	
	
Marshall's	other	administrators	will	remain	in	their	positions,	district	officials	said.	
	
Montevirgen,	a	30-year	district	employee	and	a	former	principal	of	Balboa	High	School,	could	
not	be	reached	for	comment.	
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Her	resignation	capped	a	dramatic	year	of	changes	at	an	8-year-old	school	once	considered	a	
shining	example	of	academic	acheivement	and	higher	standards	in	the	city's	Bayview-Hunters	
Point	neighborood.	
	
Many	parents	and	teachers	criticized	Ackerman's	decision	last	spring	to	replace	veteran	
Principal	Samuel	Butscher,	and	they	blame	his	absence	for	the	school's	recent	academic	slide	
and	mounting	tension	among	students.	
	
Ackerman	never	commented	publicly	on	her	decision	not	to	renew	Butscher's	contract,	and	
many	felt	he	was	replaced	because	he	criticized	the	district's	decision	to	lower	from	280	to	230	
the	number	of	credits	required	to	graduate	from	Marshall.	Many	students,	parents	and	
teachers	took	great	pride	in	the	higher	standards	and	were	dismayed	when	the	district	lowered	
the	bar.	
	
The	school	also	had	to	accommodate	about	200	additional	students	at	the	beginning	of	the	
school	year,	some	of	whom	came	from	the	long-troubled	and	now-	closed	McAteer	High	
School.	
	
Montevirgen's	resignation	was	a	welcome	surprise	to	many	teachers	who	had	threatened	a	
sick-out	today	if	Ackerman	did	not	meet	a	list	of	their	demands.	
	
Environmental	science	teacher	Lance	Powell	said	Thursday	night	that	he	and	his	colleagues	
would	report	for	work	today	with	high	hopes	for	the	new	administration.	
	
"My	hope	is	for	the	(new)	administration	to	get	out	in	the	hallways	and	get	to	know	these	kids,"	
he	said.	"We	have	to	build	a	new	culture	from	within.	We're	hopeful	that	we're	moving	in	the	
right	direction."	
Memo:	E-mail	Ray	Delgado	at	rdelgado@sfchronicle.com.	
Index	terms:	Juliet	Montevirgen;	Thurgood	Marshall	High	School;	BRAWLS	&	RIOTS;	OFFICIALS;	
POLICE	CONDUCT;	RESIGNATION;	SCHOOLS;	SFDateline:	San	FranciscoRecord:	3263611	
356 
 
 
 
Dust hasn't settled over Thurgood Marshall fracas 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - November 
29, 2002 
• Author/Byline: Ray Delgado 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: SAN FRANCISCO FRIDAY 
• Page: 2 
• Column: SCHOOL NOTES 
It's been more than a month since the ruckus at Thurgood 
Marshall High School in the Bayview District but passions are still 
running high for those who were involved in the hallway fight 
between students and the ensuing police activity. 
 
Marshall students, parents and community members have been 
waiting for a public hearing where they can hear explanations and 
speak their mind about the Oct. 11 melee that shut down the 
school for the day and brought in a throng of police officers. 
 
It just so happened that the city and school district committee, a 
relatively new collaboration between school board members and 
city supervisors, 
 
had a meeting planned last week and placed the Marshall matter 
on the agenda. Although the committee is not involved in the 
school district's official task force investigation, it was the first 
chance for many of the committee members to delve into the 
Marshall matter. 
 
They got few explanations from school district officials, who often 
cited the on-going investigation while still acknowledging a vast 
breakdown in communication that led to a heavy-handed police 
response. 
 
Although members of the Marshall community weren't specifically 
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invited to attend the meeting, many heard about it at the last 
minute and scrambled to get there. 
 
Many chastised Board of Supervisors President Tom Ammiano 
and Jill Wynns, school board president, for not making sure the 
community knew about the meeting. 
 
The district played a controversial videotape taken moments after 
police arrived at the high school, a tape that had been confiscated 
by police. 
 
Most of the footage was shot by English teacher Anthony 
Peebles, 29, who was arrested after refusing police orders during 
the incident. The district said the tape is available for anyone who 
wishes to see it. 
 
The district attorney declined to press charges against Peebles, 
who still faces disciplinary action from the district. 
	
358 
 
 
 
No charges for teacher in melee - S.F. prosecutor leaving it up to school district 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - November 
16, 2002 
• Author/Byline: Wyatt Buchanan, Chronicle Staff Writer 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: BAY AREA 
• Page: A17 
A San Francisco high school English teacher will face no charges 
stemming from an Oct. 11 student melee at Thurgood Marshall 
High School in the Bayview neighborhood. 
 
Anthony Peebles, 29, was arrested on suspicion of inciting a riot, 
battery on an officer and interfering with an arrest after baton-
wielding police responded to a fight among numerous students at 
the school. 
 
The school principal, Juliet Montevirgen, later resigned over the 
incident. 
 
Prosecutors said they thought they lacked sufficient evidence to 
convince a jury to convict Peebles, who has taught at the school 
since September 2001. 
 
"The best course is to let the school district handle the matter, 
which they wanted to do anyway," said Mark MacNamara, a 
spokesman for the district attorney's office. 
 
MacNamara said authorities believe Peebles handled himself 
inappropriately as a teacher, but such a determination and any 
subsequent action must come from school officials. 
 
Peebles has been on paid administrative leave pending the 
conclusion of a school district investigation into the incident. 
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"This case has been a travesty of justice from the very beginning. 
All he did was document what he saw," said Peebles' attorney, 
Jeff Adachi, referring to his client's videotaping of the event. 
 
Peebles began filming when he saw police hitting students with 
batons, Adachi said. He was teaching when the fight began. 
 
The camera was confiscated by police. 
 
"His only intention was to record what was happening, and he's 
been put out there like he's some activist teacher. He's not. He's a 
peace-loving man who wants to teach," said Adachi, who is chief 
public defender-elect. 
 
Police said Peebles repeatedly told students not to disperse and 
pushed an officer who tried to make him stop. 
 
Four juveniles arrested after the incident face Juvenile Court 
hearings next week, MacNamara said. 
• Memo: E-mail Wyatt Buchanan at wbuchanan@sfchronicle.com. 
• Index terms: Anthony Peebles; Thurgood Marshall High School; 
BRAWLS & RIOTS; SF; TEACHERS 
• Dateline: San Francisco 
• Record: 3268293 
• Copyright: Copyright 2002 The Chronicle Publishing Co. 
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D.A. drops charges in teen brawl - Other solution sought to fight at S.F. school 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - February 
27, 2003 
• Author/Byline: Ray Delgado, Chronicle Staff Writer 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: BAY AREA 
• Page: A17 
Criminal charges have been dropped against four students 
arrested when a hallway brawl spiraled out of control at San 
Francisco's Thurgood Marshall High School last year. 
 
Community pressure and lack of police support helped persuade 
the district attorney's office to drop the charges -- most of them 
misdemeanors -- against the four teens in Juvenile Court 
Wednesday. 
 
The fight broke outside the Bayview district school's 
administration office Oct. 11, attracting a crowd of students and 
prompting a police officer at the campus to call for backup. More 
than 60 police officers, some of clad in riot gear, responded to the 
disturbance. 
 
Community activists and some politicians decried the police 
response to the incident, and there are still two continuing 
investigations into that response. 
 
Assistant District Attorney Walter Aldridge said he was ready to 
prosecute the case but asked for a meeting with top police 
officials to discuss their concerns prior to Wednesday's hearing. 
Aldridge met with Deputy Chief David Robinson and others for 
about half an hour prior to the hearing and said he was told that 
Police Chief Earl Sanders wanted to see the charges dismissed to 
promote community healing. 
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"After discussing the thing with them for about half an hour, I 
made a decision that I could live with (dropping the charges)," 
Aldridge said. "There was no pressure. The ultimate decision is 
on me." 
 
Sanders announced the district attorney's decision at Wednesday 
night's meeting of the city Police Commission, saying the youths 
would have mentors in the department, including Robinson. He 
called it "a unique experiment," adding, 
 
"We're praying this one works." 
 
Commissioner Sidney Chan questioned the deal, saying other 
people could seek arrangements in similar situations under the 
guise of community healing. "The floodgate can be opened wide," 
he said. 
 
But the commissioners appeared satisfied after the chief's 
explanation that the effort should be given a chance to work. 
 
A prominent African American community leader who met with the 
Police Department numerous times on behalf of the youths and 
their families said Wednesday that department brass and school 
district officials wanted to see the charges dismissed against the 
youths from the very beginning. 
 
"There were mistakes made that everyone recognized," said Jim 
Queen, a member of the African American Police Community 
Relations Board, an advisory panel formed more than two years 
ago to improve community relations with the Police Department. 
"The kids should not be prosecuted because the grown-ups did 
not have their act together." 
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School District Superintendent Arlene Ackerman said in a 
statement that she was pleased with the charges being dropped, 
saying, "It was my goal following the Thurgood Marshall incident 
that the students . . . should be given a clean slate to move on 
with their futures." 
 
School district staff also presented Wednesday a summary of 
findings about the incident pulled together by a special community 
task force for a joint committee of school board commissioners 
and members of the Board of Supervisors. 
 
The Thurgood Marshall Academic High School Community Task 
Force found an array of problems in how the school's staff 
handled the initial fight and criticized the police response to the 
incident. 
 
The task force report condemned school and school district staff 
for communication failures and lack of a coordinated response 
plan that also led to communication failures with the responding 
police officers. 
 
The task force members recommended that the school develop a 
school safety plan, which has been done, and advised the district 
to create a committee to evaluate the role of police officers 
assigned to schools and a protocol for police responses to 
incidents at schools. Supervisor Tom Ammiano, chair of the joint 
committee, has asked for a hearing about the relationship 
between the district and the Police Department. 
 
The task force report will be discussed in detail at a special school 
board meeting to be held Tuesday night at Thurgood Marshall. 
• Memo: Staff writer Jaxon Vanderbeken contributed to this report. 
/ E-mail Ray Delgado at rdelgado@sfchronicle.com. 
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Marshall parents ready to move on after brawl 
Hide Details 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - March 14, 
2003Browse Issues 
• Author/Byline: Ray Delgado 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: SAN FRANCISCO FRIDAY 
• Page: 2 
• Column: SCHOOL NOTES 
•  
The auditorium at Thurgood Marshall Academic High 
School was filled to the gills with people who came out for a 
special Board of Education meeting last week, but the vast 
majority of them weren't there to discuss last year's melee at the 
school. 
 
Instead, most of the parents, students and teachers who attended 
the meeting pleaded with the board to spare school music 
programs and teachers in the face of pending budget cuts. 
 
The district has yet to learn the precise amount of funds it will lose 
from the state, but that didn't stop the well-organized coalition of 
music education supporters from arguing the need for the popular 
school music programs. 
 
The board listened to impassioned pleas for more than an hour 
before cutting short public comments so that it could move on to 
the item that had them meeting at Thurgood Marshall in the first 
place -- the Oct. 11 brawl that brought more than 70 police 
officers to the school. 
 
Once the board moved on, however, the auditorium emptied 
considerably, to the point where school district staff and board 
members outnumbered the handful of people who had come to 
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hear the findings of a district-led task force on the incident. 
 
Kim Maufus, the president of the school's Parent Teacher Student 
Association, blamed the poor attendance on the school's failure to 
send out automated phone messages reminding parents of the 
meeting. 
 
Principal Frank Tom apologized for the snafu but told board 
members that the school mailed out reminder letters to parents 
the week before and sent flyers home with the students. 
 
The PTSA vice president Gloria Edwards disagreed with Maufus' 
explanation for the poor attendance, however, telling the board 
that parents were ready to move on. 
 
"At some point parents want a healing," Edwards said. "When 
(parents) got the letter, their response was 'we don't want to be 
here.' " 
 
MAGIC AT LAKESHORE: Lakeshore Elementary School is 
hoping a little magic will help fill its coffers tonight. 
 
The school's PTA will hold a special fund-raiser featuring 
magician Mike Stroud at the school tonight. The family-friendly 
show will feature juggling, acrobatics, comedy and bilingual jokes 
in addition to Stroud's regular magic tricks. 
 
Tickets are $10 and the show will begin tonight at 7:30 in the 
school's Sharon Guillestegui Community Room. The school is 
located at 220 Middlefield Drive at Eucalyptus Street. 
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SAN FRANCISCO - Policy violation found in '02 police response 
Hide Details 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) - June 18, 2004Browse Issues 
• Author/Byline: Rachel Gordon 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: BAY AREA 
• Page: B4 
• Column: BAY AREA DIGEST 
• Correction: A story Friday concerning an Office of Citizen 
Complaints' investigation into a melee 
at San Francisco's Thurgood Marshall High School did not 
accurately describe the nature of the findings. The Office of 
Citizen Complaints, the city's police watchdog agency, found 
"several policy failures" in the way police responded to the 
incident, but it found no violations. The agency's director, Kevin 
Allen, said he will recommend new policies for the Police 
Department to prevent similar problems from occurring. (06/19/04, 
P. A2) 
The city's police watchdog agency has found that the Police 
Department failed to adhere to its own policies in responding to a 
melee at Thurgood Marshall High School in 2002. 
 
The agency, the Office of Citizen Complaints, wrapped up its 
investigation in March but did not announce its findings until 
Wednesday's Police Commission meeting. 
 
"We did find several policy failures," Office of Citizen Complaints 
Director Kevin Allen told commissioners. He would not reveal the 
nature of the problems, but more details are expected to emerge 
during a Police Commission hearing on the incident scheduled for 
July 14. 
 
Police showed up in force to the Bayview District campus on Oct. 
11, 2002, 
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responding to a backup call from school-based officers who felt a 
string of small hallway fights was getting out of hand. About 60 
officers from the Police Department and the Sheriff's Department 
responded, some in riot gear. 
 
Many students and teachers called the police response heavy-
handed. Police officials say the response was appropriate, given 
the volatility of the situation. 
 
Police arrested four students and a teacher, who was accused of 
inciting a riot. Charges against all five were later dropped. 
• Memo: -- -- -- Charlie Goodyear 
• Index terms: Office of Citizen Complaints; Thurgood 
Marshall High School; BRAWLS & RIOTS; POLICE 
DEPARTMENTS; SCHOOLS; SF 
• Record: 3352709 
• Copyright: Copyright 2004 The Chronicle Publishing Co. 
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SAN FRANCISCO - Police crowd-control tactics questioned - Watchdogs issue 
report on 2002 melee at Marshall 
Hide Details 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) - July 15, 2004Browse Issues 
• Author/Byline: Henry K. Lee, Chronicle Staff Writer 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: BAY AREA 
• Page: B4 
San Francisco's civilian police review board questioned 
Wednesday night whether the Police Department has adequate 
crowd-control policies to deal with melees like the one that 
erupted at Thurgood Marshall High School in 2002. 
 
About 60 officers and deputies -- many clad in riot gear from a 
training exercise -- showed up in force on the Bayview district 
campus on Oct. 11, 2002, responding to a backup call from 
school-based officers who thought a string of small hallway fights 
was getting out of hand. 
 
Students and teachers say the police presence escalated the 
tension and call their response heavy-handed. Police officials say 
the response was appropriate, given the volatility of the situation. 
Police arrested four students and a teacher, who was accused of 
inciting a riot. Charges against all five were later dropped. 
 
In a report issued Wednesday by the Office of Citizen Complaints, 
police officers were generally lauded for their "knowledge and 
skill" in the use of tactics to control the crowd. 
 
"However, the incident raises questions about the propriety of 
using current crowd-control policies and tactics in a high school 
setting, particularly in response to a call of a fight with no 
weapons," said office investigator Donna Medley. 
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Deputy Police Chief Greg Suhr defended the department, saying 
while it was unfortunate that some students felt they had had an 
unpleasant experience with the police, "I still think these officers 
did a good job." 
 
One officer that day nearly two years ago brandished a gun at a 
student after the youth removed the officer's baton, Suhr said. "As 
bad as it sounds to the people on scene, that is within policy," 
Suhr said. 
 
Suhr said he would research whether the department has 
specifically crafted policies dealing with crowds of students on 
campuses. 
 
Medley said investigators with her agency had looked into 
allegations that officers beat predominantly African American 
students. "In investigating these incidents that gave rise to the 
perception of racial bias, the OCC was presented with other facts, 
perceptions and rationale that disputed the allegation," Medley 
said. 
 
In one instance, students saw police take away a youth and 
thought they were arresting him when, in fact, they were trying to 
get him to paramedics to treat a bleeding forehead. 
 
There was "insufficient evidence to prove or disprove" a number 
of other allegations made by students, including claims that 
officers used profanity, failed to provide their names and badge 
numbers, failed to provide medical assistance and detained 
students without justification. 
 
The report noted, however, that "the general level of supervision 
of the officers and command staff communications were in 
370 
 
 
 
conformance with department policy and training." 
 
Malaika Parker, director of Bay Area PoliceWatch, said she was 
not surprised that the department was absolving itself of blame. 
 
"It's not appropriate for police in riot gear to storm onto campus," 
Parker said. "The 'act now, who cares what people think as long 
as we can make it look pretty' is not acceptable." 
 
Another PoliceWatch member, Vanessa Moses, agreed, saying of 
the Office of Citizen Complaints' report, "It sounded like a list of 
justifications to me. " 
 
Police Commissioner Theresa Sparks questioned why it took 21 
months to produce the report. Office director Kevin Allen said that 
there were many people to interview and that some students 
refused to speak with his investigators or referred them to 
statements they had previously made. 
 
Last year, the Thurgood Marshall Academic High 
School Community Task Force found an array of problems in 
how the school's staff handled the initial fight and criticized the 
police response to the incident. 
• Memo: E-mail Henry K. Lee at hlee@sfchronicle.com. 
• Index terms: Thurgood Marshall Academic High 
School Community Task F 
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Police panel to hold hearing on Marshall 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) - September 3, 2004 
• Author/Byline: Rachel Gordon 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: SAN FRANCISCO FRIDAY 
• Page: F1 
• Column: CITY HALL BEAT 
Nearly two years have passed since police responded to a series 
of small hallway fights at Thurgood Marshall Academic High 
School in the Bayview. And to this day a debate rages over 
whether officers acted appropriately. 
 
Some students and teachers say the police were heavy-handed; 
officers say they did what was needed to quell what turned into a 
near riot. 
 
There may never be agreement on how the Oct. 11, 2002, 
situation was handled. But now focus is turning to the future and 
whether the Police Department should rethink its crowd-control 
tactics in school settings. 
 
The Police Commission will hold a hearing on the Thurgood 
Marshall incident at 5:30 p.m. Sept. 22 at City Hall. 
 
--- --- --- 
 
He's back: Mayor Gavin Newsom's appointment of Dick Sklar to 
the Public Utilities Commission's oversight panel brings back one 
of the most flamboyant, smart and feisty figures in city 
government. 
 
Sklar, once tapped by Bill Clinton to serve as envoy to the 
Balkans to oversee the rebuilding of Bosnia, and by Gray Davis to 
help the state through the energy crisis, first made his mark in 
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San Francisco as head of the city's Public Utilities Commission -- 
and boss of the Municipal Railway -- when Dianne Feinstein was 
mayor. 
 
His relationship with Feinstein deteriorated, however. She called 
him arrogant, and he suggested the mayor, who went on to 
become a U.S. senator, was a political lightweight. 
 
--- --- --- 
 
Title wave: Sean Elsbernd learned quickly that having the title 
"Supervisor" before his name makes his life different. "Now when 
I make calls there's a lot quicker action," said the new supe, who 
has found the bureaucrats pay more attention when he's on the 
other end of the line. 
 
It was less than a month ago that Elsbernd served as a behind-
the-scenes legislative liaison for the mayor, and before that toiled 
as an aide to former Supervisor Tony Hall. When Hall resigned, 
Newsom made Elsbernd the District 7 supervisor. 
 
Another perk of being supervisor: Elsbernd now has his own 
parking space in front of City Hall. And, he said, he can call his 
new colleagues by their first names. "I no longer have to call them 
'supervisor.' " 
 
Plenty of people are gunning to strip Elsbernd of his new title. 
He's facing 12 challengers in the District 7 race. 
 
--- --- --- 
 
Back to school: Last weekend, 1,000 kids from Bayview-Hunters 
Point got free backpacks and school supplies as part of an 
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outreach program by the public defender's office. More than three 
dozen other city agencies and community-based organizations 
participated. 
 
"There was a real need for a collaborative effort that was 
neighborhood based, and we wanted to do something positive for 
the youth," said Public Defender Jeff Adachi. 
• Memo: E-mail Rachel Gordon at rgordon@sfchronicle.com. 
• Index terms: POLITICS; SF 
• Record: 3363768 
• Copyright: Copyright 2004 The Chronicle Publishing Co. 
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SAN FRANCISCO - Students, activists seek apology for '02 near-riot at Marshall 
high 
Hide Details 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) - September 23, 2004Browse Issues 
• Author/Byline: Rachel Gordon, Chronicle Staff Writer 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: BAY AREA 
• Page: B4 
Students, teachers, parents and community activists are 
demanding that authorities apologize for an incident at Thurgood 
Marshall Academic High School two years ago in which a small 
hallway fight erupted into a near-riot after scores of officers 
arrived. 
 
A crowd packed the San Francisco Police Commission meeting 
Wednesday night to ask for an apology from police. Critics 
accused police of engaging in heavy-handed tactics, alleging 
officers used unnecessary force, threatened students with guns 
and were verbally abusive. 
 
At least 60 and perhaps 100 or more San Francisco police 
officers and sheriff's deputies responded to the Bayview school 
during the incident on Oct. 11, 2002. 
 
Police officials have insisted that officers acted appropriately. 
 
"I thought that the officers came into a difficult situation ... and the 
situation was abated," Deputy Chief Greg Suhr said in an 
interview Wednesday. "I believe the officers acted properly." 
 
One person was injured, and that happened before officers 
arrived, Suhr said. 
 
Marcela Garcia, who was a senior at the school at the time, tells a 
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different story. 
 
"Images like those that happened on Oct. 11 are hard to erase," 
Garcia told the commission. "In my mind, I thought the police 
were there to help and not harm. That day, they should have 
helped and not harmed." 
 
On that day, police arrested four students and a teacher. Charges 
against all five were later dropped. 
 
The Office of Citizen Complaints, the city's independent police 
watchdog agency, found in investigating the matter that the Police 
Department failed to follow several policies but did not violate 
department rules. The agency has made a series of 
recommendations, which the commission will consider at a later 
date, intended to improve police interaction at the city's schools. 
 
Meanwhile, the Police Department is crafting new protocols that 
will detail how officers should respond to specific incidents on 
campuses. The department also is working with school officials 
and community groups on school safety issues, including violence 
prevention programs. 
 
Commissioners urged police to move swiftly in putting new 
procedures and policies in place. 
 
"It seems like everything that possibly could go wrong that day 
went wrong," Commissioner Gayle Orr-Smith said. 
 
Anthony Peebles, the teacher that police arrested, told the 
commission that to this day, he's still affected by what happened. 
"That day for me personally just blew (my) idealism out of the 
water," he said. 
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Peebles, an English teacher angered over the large presence of 
law enforcement, videotaped the melee and was arrested by 
police for refusing to follow their orders. His tape was shown at 
the commission meeting, and his anger at the large police 
presence was evident. San Francisco Public Defender Jeff 
Adachi, who was in private practice at the time, represented 
Peebles. Adachi said the more he looked into what happened at 
Marshall, the more he became "convinced that not only was this 
incident excessive in terms of police response, but outrageous, 
and that racism was involved." 
 
Peebles, like many of the students who complained about the 
police activities that day, is African American. 
 
"Great harm was done to the school that day, and to the 
community and the kids," said Commissioner Peter Keane, 
adding that he's hopeful the department is moving in the right 
direction by taking a hard look at how things can be done better. 
 
Keane made a motion for the Police Commission to offer a formal 
apology in the case. His proposal will be taken up at another 
meeting. 
• Memo: E-mail Rachel Gordon at rgordon@sfchronicle.com. 
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SAN FRANCISCO - Police officers call for apology by commissioner - Remarks 
hinting racism in school response resented 
Hide Details 
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) - September 30, 2004Browse Issues 
• Author/Byline: Rachel Gordon, Chronicle Staff Writer 
• Edition: FINAL 
• Section: BAY AREA 
• Page: B4 
A San Francisco police commissioner stood before scores of 
angry officers Wednesday night, listening to their demands that 
he apologize and resign for remarks he made the week before 
about police response to a small hallway fight at a public high 
school two years ago that erupted into a near- riot. 
 
Commissioner Peter Keane had suggested that racism was a 
factor in the large police presence at the Thurgood 
Marshall Academic High School incident in the Bayview district 
on Oct. 11, 2002, and that the students there were left with 
psychological scars similar to those felt by the survivors of the 
terrorist massacre at a Russian school last month. 
 
The Police Officers Association jumped on the remarks 
immediately and called for Keane to quit, saying he had maligned 
the city's police officers. They showed up in force, some in 
uniform, some in their street clothes, to the commission's weekly 
meeting, held this week in an elementary school in the Mission 
District. 
 
"All San Francisco police officers have come here tonight 
expecting an apology," said police union president Gary 
Delagnes. "Indeed, we demand it." 
 
Even the city's police chief joined in. In a prepared statement, 
Chief Heather Fong took Keane to task without identifying him by 
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name. 
 
"We welcome constructive criticism from all quarters," Fong said. 
"We do not invite or endorse, however, comments that paint the 
actions of our officers with a broad brush. Those kinds of 
generalities are neither accurate nor are they productive." 
 
In reference to the Russian school incident, Fong said, "Such an 
analogy, whatever the motivation, is offensive and without 
foundation." 
 
Keane addressed the crowd at the start of the meeting, having 
been forewarned that he was at the center of a brewing storm. He 
said people had twisted his words from the week before and 
taken them out of context. 
 
He said he had never compared the Russian school siege to 
the Thurgood Marshall fracas, other than to state how some 
students felt in its aftermath. "These kids feeling secure in their 
school, in their educational environment, that was taken from 
them, so great harm was done to the community and to the 
school and to the kids," he said last week in describing the fallout. 
 
More than 60 San Francisco police officers and deputy sheriffs, 
some in riot gear, converged on the school at the request of an 
officer assigned to the campus after a small hallway fight erupted. 
 
Keane also questioned whether the same thing would have 
happened at a school on the west side of the city that didn't have 
such a large African American student population. Keane said he 
wasn't calling the officers racists. 
 
Instead, he explained Wednesday, that there could have been 
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"subtle," even "unconscious" racism that came into play. 
 
"We have to confront it honestly as a factor," he said. 
 
At the start of the meeting, Keane refused to apologize, but he 
had a change of heart after listening to all the testimony and said 
he regretted bringing up the Russian school massacre. 
• Caption: PHOTOPeter Keane criticized police response to a high 
school incident in the Bayview two years ago. 
• Memo: E-mail Rachel Gordon at rgordon@sfchronicle.com. 
• Index terms: Peter Keane; Thurgood Marshall Academic High 
School; CLJ; BRAWLS & RIOTS; OFFICIALS; POLICE; PREP; 
REACTION; SCHOOLS; SF 
• Record: 3367502 
• Copyright: Copyright 2004 The Chronicle Publishing Co. 
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COLEMAN’S REPORT ON POLICE MISCONDUCT AT THURGOOD MARSHALL 
ACADEMIC HIGH SCHOOL ON OCTOBER 11, 2002 
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A Voice for San Francisco’s Children  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report on Police Misconduct at  
Thurgood Marshall Academic High 
School on October 11th, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 22, 2004 
NTanya Lee, Director of Youth Policy 
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“The police immediately came toward the African Americans and started hitting us 
with billy clubs (batons) and handcuffing innocent people who were not even involved 
in anything, simply trying to go to their classes. They slammed students up against 
lockers, put guns to students heads, and handcuffed innocent people. There were many 
people who got hit with batons. I personally got hit with a baton.” 
J.R., Student 
 
 “It was innocent people that the police hit. I just want to get an education.” – Tiarra,  
Student 
  
I. OVERVIEW 
This report summarizes eyewitness accounts of the interaction between Thurgood Marshall 
students, parents and teachers and the San Francisco Police Department on October 11th, 
2002.   
 
The report makes a number of “Findings” and a series of Recommendations, which have been 
reviewed by many members of the TMAHS community.  
 
It is our hope that this report contributes to efforts to reveal the truth of the events of that 
day, and moves us closer to ensuring “ 10/11 Never Again.”  
 
For information about these findings or recommendations, please contact Ntanya Lee, 
Director of Youth Policy, Coleman Advocates, at (415) 239-0161 x21. 
 
II. FINDINGS 
 
FINDING I: OCTOBER 11th BEGAN WITH AN ORDINARY STUDENT 
CONFLICT.  
A fight between several students took place on campus on the morning of October 11th, 2002. 
The primary cause of the fight was a financial dispute between two of the students, one of 
whom was African American and the other Asian American.  
 
School staff and two School Resource Officers broke up the fight, and the students were taken 
to the main office.  
 
Shortly thereafter, a second fight took place began between a relative (an older cousin) of the 
African American student and friends of the Asian American student, in the hallway on the 
first floor. While this was a second fight, it was about the original conflict between the two 
students.  
 
FINDING II. AGGRESSIVE POLICE ACTION CREATED A SECOND CONFLICT 
– BETWEEN AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS AND THE POLICE 
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At some point during or soon after the first fight, the SRO reportedly called for significant 
police backup. As the second fight was being broken up by school site staff and SROs, at least 
6 SFPD charged in, handcuffed the cousin and used force against the original African 
American student who had left the main office to see what was happening in the hallway. He 
was aggressively ‘taken down’ by police – pushed down to the floor with the officer’s knees 
on his back, and handcuffed. 
 
A crowd of students (primarily African American) became angry that the police were using 
such aggressive tactics against the student. They yelled at the police that “you have the wrong 
student!” The police yelled at the students to disperse, but the students refused. The students 
reported that while the fight had been between Asian and Black youth (and it was the cousin 
who was injured), it was only African Americans who were being manhandled and arrested 
and they were attempting to stop a grave injustice. Trained staff or police could have 
perceived this and de-escalated the situation. Instead, the police arrested several youth, 
handcuffing them in the hallway in front of many other students. Students then became more 
distressed seeing their friends who hadn’t been in the fight taken away by the police. 
 
The aggressive police tactics against the African American students greatly escalated an already 
tense situation, created a new conflict between police and Black students at the school, 
broadening the issue, creating fear, anger and distress among Black students who had nothing 
to do with the original fight. 
 
School administrators and police perceived student antagonism and anger as a sign that a ‘riot’ 
was going to take place, and more police were called to the scene. 
 
FINDING III. THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THURGOOD MARSHALL HIGH 
SCHOOL WAS EXCESSIVE – PERHAPS THE LARGEST POLICE RESPONSE TO A 
SCHOOL CONFLICT IN US HISTORY. 
 
While we do not have documentation from SFPD as to who made the calls, and what was said 
in those calls, it is clear that the response was extremely disproportionate to the situation. 
From published reports and statements at public meetings by the San Francisco Police 
Department and the Sheriff Department, at least 60 SFPD and 30 Sheriff Deputies arrived at 
this small high school on the edges of Bayview Hunters Point, totaling at least 90 law 
enforcement officers. 10 were officers in SWAT or “riot” gear, and there were 5 prisoner 
transport wagons brought to the scene. 
 
There were dozens of police inside the school, immediately outside the school, and in a 
military-style ‘police line’ near Silver Ave, marching in formation towards students. The Riot 
squad had full riot gear, including helmets, shields and clubs. 
 
FINDING IV. THE INCIDENT WAS NOT A ‘STUDENT RIOT’.  
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From the SFUSD Thurgood Marshall High School Taskforce Final Report:  
“It was generally felt that the police presence escalated the situation between a few 
students into what the media termed a ‘melee’. Individuals felt that too many police 
were on the scene. There were reports that an officer brandished a weapon at a 
student, and several students stated that police used physical force (including batons, 
hitting, and pushing), profanity or inappropriate language toward students, and 
disparate treatment of Black and Asian students.” 
 
In many accounts since October 11th, 2002, this incident has been referred to as a student 
‘riot’, implying that students were the primary perpetrators of violence and that they caused 
or instigated other students to commit criminal acts – that the police were then called in to 
control.  
 
The evidence suggests that the event was more akin to a ‘police riot’ than a student riot. Over 
90 police officers arrived in force, used abusive, aggressive and violent tactics against unarmed 
youth who were in their own school and who were not committing any crimes. There was no 
‘unlawful assembly’ of students, (usually a criteria for a riot). In fact, students were in their 
own school, where they are required by law to be. They were not holding a large student 
protest or walkout.  There was no brawl between dozens of students. There were no guns 
found on any student.  
 
The police aggression created fear, panic, distress, and anger. While some students resisted 
being hit and abused by the police, the primary instigators of violence that day were members 
of the San Francisco Police Department. 
 
“To me this was just a simple problem which could have been resolved before it 
escalated like this. Personally, I feel that the police exacerbated the problem by coming 
in doing what they did because they caused students to get angry and even more 
distraught and they didn’t know how to react to the situation at hand. How would 
you feel if you were walking on your way to class and the police came and hit you in 
your face with a billie club?” – J.R., student 
 
The SFUSD Taskforce recommended that charges against the arrested students be dropped, in 
recognition that students were not the primary actors that day: “Based on our investigation, 
the situation escalated due to a failure of procedures that were controlled by the adults at the 
school site. The Community Task Force does not want students punished for the failures of 
the adults.” 
 
FINDING V. POLICE USED EXCESSIVE FORCE AGAINST UNARMED 
STUDENTS & ADULT BYSTANDERS 
 
In first hand accounts to media, SFUSD Taskforce members and other investigators, at least 
30 students reported the following: 
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• At least two students report that police threatened them with guns to their heads.  
 
• Students were hit across the face, chest, back, and other parts of the body by police 
batons 
 
Student, JR: “The police immediately came toward the African Americans and started 
hitting us with billy clubs (batons) and handcuffing innocent people who were not even 
involved in anything, simply trying to go to their classes. They slammed students up 
against lockers, put guns to students’ heads, and handcuffed innocent people. There were 
many people who got hit with batons. I personally got hit with a baton.” 
 
Student: CH, a 15 yr old, said she was hit on the side of her head by a police baton as she 
tried to get out of the way. “As I was getting ready to walk away from the crowd, one of 
the police officers struck me in the face.”  
 
Student: “The police were pushing my friend and I blocked her and they started hitting 
me.” 
 
Parent: “My son was hit in the chest.” She took her son to the hospital three days after the 
incident.  
 
Parent, LW: “My husband found my daughter crying hysterically. She had been hit in the 
arm with a police officer’s billy club while trying to go to her next class during passing 
period. She was in pain from being hit and also emotionally distraught from seeing her 
friends assaulted.” 
 
Parent: “Ronnie Cooper told us his daughter went directly to the hospital from the 
school. He said an officer had smacked her wrist with a baton and forced her to the 
ground.” (SFBG, 10/23) 
 
Student, Alina: “Seeing a lot of people getting abused by the police really scared all the 
students…When the cops were all up on the side walk they attacked a girl...I ran over to 
her to see if she was ok. A lot of other girls were trying to help her. Then the cops came 
and started hitting everyone. One cop was hitting me twice on my arm.”  
 
Student: A friend was hit in the mouth with a billy club, and their mouth bled.  
 
• Students were thrown to the ground by police officers. 
 
Teacher: “I saw a female student thrown out of the door by the police face first.” 
 
One boy was pushed to the floor and kicked while on the floor.  
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• Students were verbally abused, and called derogatory slurs, including “bitch” and 
“nigger.” 
 
Staff: An officer pushed a female student into Mr. Peebles and shouted “Move, bitch!” 
 
Staff: Police officers were standing around [a student] and yelling/cursing at other 
students. At one point an officer shouted to students, “You want to come here? Just try 
it!” 
 
Staff: Three police officers called me a nigger as well as other students in the hallway. 
 
• Several parents/relatives were harassed and hit by police officers when they came to 
find and pick up their children.  
 
Staff: A female student was on the ground…later heard she had suffered an asthma 
attack…Just then, a man came running toward the student. Before he could reach her, 
several police officers knocked him into the bushes. The man was the student’s uncle.” 
 
Parent: Looking for her child…“I was then approached by a line of riot-geared police 
officers marching down the hill. I wondered why they were going toward those children 
in that manner. None of the children I had just passed represented a threat of any kind to 
anyone…I was then stopped in my tracks by a stick being shoved into my abdomen and an 
officer rudely telling me to go back the way I came. I calmly explained that that I am a 
parent who lived in the area and was there to see my child home safely. He told me I 
would not be allowed to do so and had better go back and began shoving harder. At that 
moment, a female officer [intercepted]…Had it not been for her, I probably would have 
been beaten as well. I definitely felt that I was in danger.” 
 
FINDING VI. AT LEAST 90% OF YOUTH WHO EXPERIENCED VERBAL OR 
PHYSICAL ABUSE BY THE POLICE WERE AFRICAN AMERICAN. 
 
Background: Several years ago, the African American community appealed to the San 
Francisco Unified School District to create a college-preparatory school that would 
specifically respond to the needs of African American Students and specifically students from 
Bayview Hunters Point. That school is Thurgood Marshall Academic High School. The 
school has represented the hopes and dreams of many in the African American community 
for greater academic success and achievement for their children. While Thurgood Marshall 
High School is not primarily African American, it has the highest concentration of African 
American high school students in the school district, and is located on the edge of the 
Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood. It is this context that makes the police targeting of 
African American youth on October 11th particularly alarming. 
 
Although the student body of Thurgood Marshall Academic High school is only 30% African 
American, witness on the scene on October 11th almost unanimously report that at least 90% 
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of students who experienced police abuse were African American. A few Latino and Samoan 
students were also hit.  
 
Disproportionate detention and arrest of African American students: Reports indicate that 
between 10 and 30 students were detained during the incidents of that day, handcuffed in 
front of their peers, taken away in police ‘paddy wagons’ and held at the nearby Bayview 
police station.  Their parents were not called, and many had to frantically search for their 
children for several hours. Ultimately most were sent home. However, 4 students were 
arrested and held at juvenile hall. Students report that some were arrested for touching police 
officers. Only after months of community outcry, and a recommendation from the SFUSD 
Community Task Force, were the charges dropped. 
 
Less than a month previous to this incident, a major student fight took place outside of 
Lincoln High School on the West side of town. The fight was between Asian American and 
white students, involving almost 50 students with weapons including bats and knives and 
student injuries. In this case, less than 6 police officers responded to the scene.  
 
Why were so many police sent to Thurgood Marshall? Why were police tactics so aggressive? Why 
were so many African American students criminalized – handcuffed, detained and incarcerated? 
 
Did the SRO on campus perceive that a ‘riot’ was about to take place because of racial 
stereotypes? Did the police who responded to the scene assume that the African American 
students in the hallways were all gang-affiliated youth with plans to commit great acts of 
violence? The facts suggest that there was racial profiling and targeting of African American 
students, a clear violation of their civil and human rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
FINDING VII. AN AFRICAN AMERICAN TEACHER, ANTHONY PEEBLES, WAS 
WRONGLY HARRASSED AND ARRESTED. 
 
Anthony Peebles was a teacher at TMAHS on October 11th. After witnessing abusive police 
behavior, Mr. Peebles began videotaping the events. He reports that he was specifically 
targeted by police, while no white teachers were harassed, prevented from moving around the 
building, detained or arrested. He was arrested, and faced disciplinary actions from SFUSD. 
Due to community concern and lack of evidence, the charges against him were finally 
dropped and he was allowed to return to TMAHS. He now teaches in Oakland.  
 
Statement from Anthony Peebles: 
 
During a passing period at TMAHS, nearly 80 police officers descended on a public 
high school in San Francisco's Bay View Hunters Point district. During this attack, 
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numerous students, teachers and parents were injured by the excessive and aggressive 
tactics perpetrated by the police. I personally witnessed a gun pulled out at a student, 
another female student was thrown out of the office by her hair and her pants by 
police chief Puccinelli. Three police officers called me a nigger as well as other students 
in the hallway. I was hit by two other officers in the arm and the abdomen. I witnessed 
another student being kicked in the stomach in an attempt to restrain him in the main 
office, in front of shocked staff members. 
 
In an attempt to calm students down and make them feel more human, I began 
rubbing the legs of two of the students who were in hand cuffs on the ground in the 
hallway. Immediately an officer grabbed me by the collar of my sweater off of the 
ground. At this point I began running up the stairs to the media lab. I grabbed a 
camera and ran back down stairs into the police melee. 
 
When I arrived back down stairs, the police had pushed all the students out of the 
center of the hallway and into the outside areas at the end of the hall. When I heard 
students screaming in the back I began walking toward them, filming police badge 
numbers and students testimony of what had taken place. I attempted to walk to the 
outside area where students were being held and was forcefully with held from moving 
forward by another officer. Meanwhile white teachers were allowed to walk back and 
forth through the hallway and the outside area. I attempted to move forward and was 
then pushed into the lockers and then grabbed violently out of the way. 
 
I retreated up the stairs and was then arrested by six officers being led by the principal 
of the school. I was taken into a paddy wagon full of students and led to the Bayview 
district. No one was read any rights and held for three hours. Inside the holding cells, 
police officers walked back and forth taunting students with gang terms and jeers of 
"big block" and other gang terms. When released I was told not to speak to any police 
officers or Press. 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. The Police Commission should publicly apologize to the students and parents of 
Thurgood Marshall High School for the needless harm and trauma caused by the SFPD 
on October 11th,  2002 and indicate its commitment to take steps to ensure that this 
never happens again.  
 
2. The Police Commission should create a new policy for Police Conduct in Schools. This 
policy should shape, and govern, the SFPD’s Memorandum of Understanding with the 
SFUSD.  The Police Commission should pass a new policy that includes the following 
components:  
 SFUSD’s June 1999 “Safe Schools Resolution” governing police conduct on school 
grounds shall also be the policy of the SFPD.  
 There shall only be very limited circumstances in which police backup is 
appropriate on school grounds and when police officers have the sole the authority 
to call for such backup. For example, there must be evidence of a clear, immediate, 
lethal threat to public safety. 
 New, limited “use of force” standards and crowd control tactics should be 
developed, appropriate for law enforcement interaction with children, in closed 
school settings.  
 Additional, regular training shall be required for all San Francisco Police 
Department officers on methods of de-escalating student conflicts and working 
with children and youth of color (especially African American, Latino and Pacific 
Islander youth).  
 
3.  The Office of Citizen Complaints should assign a special, permanent investigator as a 
Youth/Schools Investigator. This Investigator should be the primary contact when there are 
complaints about police misconduct involving children, and/or police misconduct on school 
grounds. This Investigator should be charged with ensuring that every school site has 
complaint forms available and that the OCC Complaint process is well known to all members 
of the school community.  
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APPENDIX J 
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF CITIZENS 
COMPLAINTS’ BEST PRACTICES REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
POLICE RESPONSE TO A NON-WEAPON FIGHT 
INCLUDING CROWD CONTROL TECHNIQUES IN A HIGH SCHOOL 
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APPENDIX K 
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF CITIZENS 
COMPLAINTS’ PROPOSAL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE POLICY AND 
CRITIQUE OF SFPD’S 7.01 GENERAL ORDER JUVENILE POLICY DGO 
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APPENDIX L 
RESEARCH SUBJECTS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
Research Subjects Bill of Rights 
 
The rights listed below are the right of every individual asked to participate in a research study. 
Research subjects can expect: 
 
• To be told the extent to which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained and 
of the possibility that specified individuals, internal and external regulatory agencies, or study sponsors 
may inspect information in the medical record specifically related to participation in the clinical trial. 
• To be told of any benefits that may reasonably be expected from the research. 
• To be told of any reasonably foreseeable discomforts or risks. 
• To be told of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment that might be of benefit to the 
subject. 
• To be told of the procedures to be followed during the course of participation, especially those that are 
experimental in nature. 
• To be told that they may refuse to participate (participation is voluntary), and that declining to 
participate will not compromise access to services and will not result in penalty or loss of benefits to 
which the subject is otherwise entitled. 
• To be told about compensation and medical treatment if research related injury occurs and where 
further information may be obtained when participating in research involving more than minimal risk. 
• To be told whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research, about the research 
subjects' rights and whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury to the subject. 
• To be told of anticipated circumstances under which the investigator without regard to the subject's 
consent may terminate the subject's participation. 
• To be told of any additional costs to the subject that may result from participation in the research. 
• To be told of the consequences of a subjects' decision to withdraw from the research and procedures for 
orderly termination of participation by the subject. 
• To be told that significant new findings developed during the course of the research that may relate to 
the subject's willingness to continue participation will be provided to the subject. 
• To be told the approximate number of subjects involved in the study. 
• To be told what the study is trying to find out. 
• To be told what will happen to me and whether any of the procedures, drugs, or devices are different 
from what would be used in standard practice. 
• To be told about the frequent and/or important risks, side effects, or discomforts of the things that will 
happen to me for research purposes. 
• To be told if I can expect any benefit from participating, and, if so, what the benefit might be. 
• To be told of the other choices I have and how they may be better or worse than being in the study.  
• To be allowed to ask any questions concerning the study both before agreeing into be involved and 
during the course of the study. 
• To be told what sort of medical or psychological treatment is available if any complications arise. 
• To refuse to participate at all or to change my mind about participation after the study is started; if I 
were to make such a decision, it will not affect my right to receive the care or privileges I would receive 
if I were not in the study. 
• To receive a copy of the signed and dated consent form. 
• To be free of pressure when considering whether I wish to agree to be in the study.  
If I have other questions, I should ask the researcher or the research assistant. In addition, I may 
contact the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS), which is 
concerned with protection of volunteers in research projects. I may reach the IRBPHS by electronic 
mail at IRBPHS@usfca.edu 
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APPENDIX M 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM, UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 
	
	
	
	
Hi  -  
 
In efforts to make sure that I meet all of the IRB guidelines, I wanted to provide you with the 
informed consent document.   It outlines what my research is about and if you agree to 
participate in the case study, I will then contact you to obtain some demographic information 
before we begin our discussion. 
  
Please see below all of the information. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
Below is a description of the research procedures and an explanation of your rights as a 
research participant. You should read this information carefully. If you agree to participate, you 
will reply “with an affirmation or yes” to this email to indicate that you have read and understand 
the information on this consent form. You are entitled to and will receive a copy of this form. 
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kim-Shree Maufas, 
a graduate student in the Department of International and Multicultural Education within the 
School of Education at the University of San Francisco.  The faculty supervisor for this study is 
Dr. Betty Taylor, a professor in the Department of International and Multicultural Education 
within the School of Education at the University of San Francisco. 
  
WHAT THE STUDY IS ABOUT: 
The purpose of this research study is to explore the experiences of Thurgood Marshall 
Academic High School (TMAHS) Community Members, such as students (sophomores in 
2002), educators, administrators, other on-site staff, and community members who attended, 
worked at, or were a part of the Thurgood Community from just before 2001 and possibly 
through 2007.  Participants will be asked to think about on the school community, the culture, 
the clubs, environment, how people got along together, and overall what it felt like to be at 
Thurgood. Additionally, what were some thoughts about have security guards and further a 
SFPD Resource Officer Program on campus.  More specifically, this study would like the 
TMAHS Community participants to share their reflections about the October 11, 2002 Incident. 
  
WHAT WE WILL ASK YOU TO DO: 
During this study, the following will happen:  You will receive a survey first then the 
researcher will set-up a time for you to answer a series of questions that relate to your experience 
as a Thurgood Marshall Academic High School (TMAHS) Community Member and your time at 
the school. Then specifically, you will be asked some questions relating to the San Francisco 
Police Department’s School Resource Officer (SRO) on-campus program at Thurgood.  The 
time-period that this study focuses on is from Fall 2001 through to Spring 2007 (or until your 
graduation from Thurgood if you were a student).  In order for the researcher to collect the rich 
data from participants, recording devices will be used during the interview.  This will aid in the 
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transcription process.  One year after the conclusion of the study audio recordings will be 
destroyed. 
  
DURATION AND LOCATION OF THE STUDY:  
Your participation in this study will involve one session that lasts one hour and a possible 
follow-up call to clarify responses if needed. The study will take place at the convenience of the 
researcher and participant.  
  
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS:  
We do not anticipate any risks or discomforts to you from participating in this research. If 
you wish, you may choose to withdraw your consent and discontinue your participation at any 
time during the study without penalty. 
  
BENEFITS:  
Sharing your story with others can be cathartic in that it has the possibility of providing 
internal healing for all that were a part of the TMAHS Community.  You will receive no other 
direct benefit from your participation in this study; however, the possible benefits to others 
include solidarity and learning from the techniques employed to advance and maintain in 
challenging environments.  Your voice will be included in the analysis of how to support other 
students and/or school site staff who have similar experiences with law enforcement on their 
school campuses as part of the recommendations to K-12 policy decision makers going forward.  
  
PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY:  
Any data you provide in this study will be kept confidential unless disclosure is required 
by law.  In any report we publish, we will not include information that will make it possible to 
identify you or any individual participant.  Specifically, we will use pseudonyms to differentiate 
participant data.  No one will have access to participant data outside of the researcher. 
 
COMPENSATION/PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION: 
There is no payment or other form of compensation for your participation in this study. 
  
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE STUDY: 
Your participation is voluntary and you may refuse to participate.  Furthermore, you may 
skip any questions or tasks that make you uncomfortable and may discontinue your participation 
at any time.  In addition, the researcher has the right to withdraw you from participation in the 
study at any time. 
  
OFFER TO ANSWER QUESTIONS: 
Please ask any questions you have now or later, you may contact Kim-Shree Maufas.  If 
you have further questions later, you may also contact the principal investigator, Dr. Betty 
Taylor at 415-422-6041 or taylorb@usfca.edu.  If you have questions or concerns about your 
rights as a participant in this study, you may contact the University of San Francisco Institutional 
Review Board at IRBPHS@usfca.edu. 
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2.  PARTICIPANTS   
2(a)  Participant Population and Recruitment 
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2(b)  Participant Risks and Benefits 
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2(c)  Participant Compensation and Costs 
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3. CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA SECURITY  
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4.  CONSENT  
4a.  Informed consent 
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-3/03#*3,#+%<L,0*#/+#"*3,.-/+,#,)*/*',4:#()4#*3,#+%<L,0*#2($#4/+0")*/)%,#&(.*/0/&(*/")#(*#()$#*/2,#-/*3"%*#&,)('*$#
".#'"++#"1#<,),1/*+#*"#-3/03#*3,#+%<L,0*#/+#"*3,.-/+,#,)*/*',4:B!
6b.  Waiver of documentation of written informed consent  (Complete only if answered "no" to 
4a) 
R3,#.,5%'(*/")+#(''"-#/)+*()0,+#/)#-3/03#*3,#8>S#2($#-(/?,#*3,#.,G%/.,2,)*#1".#4"0%2,)*(*/")#"1#/)1".2,4#0")+,)*:#*3(*#
/+:#*3,#0"'',0*/")#"1#(#+/5),4#0")+,)*#1".2=#81#$"%#(.,#.,G%,+*/)5#(#-(/?,.#"1#-./**,)#4"0%2,)*(*/")#F+/5),4Q#"1#/)1".2,4#
0")+,)*:#&',(+,#()+-,.#*3,#1"''"-/)5#G%,+*/")+D#
!
\/''#*3,#")'$#.,0".4#'/)T/)5#*3,#&(.*/0/&()*#()4#*3,#.,+,(.03#<,#*3,#0")+,)*#4"0%2,)*#()4#*3,#&./)0/&('#./+T#*"#*3,#
&(.*/0/&()*#-"%'4#<,#1."2#<.,(03#"1#0")1/4,)*/('/*$6### #B,+##### #7"#
!
!"#$"%#0")+/4,.#*3/+#(#2/)/2('#./+T#+*%4$#*3(*#/)?"'?,+#)"#&."0,4%.,+#1".#-3/03#-./**,)#0")+,)*#/+#)".2(''$#.,G%/.,4#
"%*+/4,#"1#.,+,(.03#F+,,#WS#(<"?,#1".#4,1/)/*/")QV6### #B,+##### #7"#
]C&'(/)#-3$#$"%#(.,#.,G%,+*/)5#-(/?,.#".#2"4/1/0(*/")#"1#4"0%2,)*(*/")#"1#-./**,)#F+/5),4Q#/)1".2,4#0")+,)*#()4#3"-#$"%#
&'()#*"#"<*(/)#0")+,)*=#! ! ! ! ! !
6c.  Waiver or modification of informed consent (Complete only if answered "no" to 4a) 
R3,#.,5%'(*/")+#('+"#&."?/4,#()#"&&".*%)/*$#1".#*3,#8>S#*"#-(/?,#*3,#.,G%/.,2,)*#1".#/)1".2,4#0")+,)*#".#*"#2"4/1$#*3,#
/)1".2,4#0")+,)*#&."0,++:#&."?/4,4#*3,#&."*"0"'#2,,*+#*3,#1"''"-/)5#0./*,./(D#
F@Q##R3,#.,+,(.03#/)?"'?,+#)"#2".,#*3()#2/)/2('#./+T#*"#+%<L,0*+#F+,,#W<#(<"?,#1".#4,1/)/*/")QV#
FWQ##R3,#-(/?,.#"1#('*,.(*/")#-/''#)"*#(4?,.+,'$#(11,0*#*3,#./53*+#()4#-,'1(.,#"1#*3,#+%<L,0*+V#
FXQ##R3,#.,+,(.03#0"%'4#)"*#&.(0*/0(<'$#<,#0(../,4#"%*#-/*3"%*#*3,#-(/?,.#".#('*,.(*/")V#()4#
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   4 
(4) Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information after participation. 
If you are requesting a waiver or modification of informed consent (e.g., incomplete disclosure, deception), explain how 
your project meets the requirements for waiver or modification of informed consent, as outlined above.        
	
	
485
APPENDIX O 
IRBPHA LETTER OF APPROVAL 
12/4/2017 Students & Alumni DonsApps Mail - Expedited Review Approved by Chair - IRB ID: 853
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/?ui=2&ik=0db931889b&jsver=vPUi2w7Prus.en.&view=pt&msg=15e4381442020263&q=irb&qs=true&search=query&siml=15e43… 1/2
KimShree Maufas <kmaufas2@dons.usfca.edu>
Expedited Review Approved by Chair ­ IRB ID: 853 
Terence Patterson <noreply@axiommentor.com> Sat, Sep 2, 2017 at 9:51 AM
Reply­To: Terence Patterson <irbphs@usfca.edu>
To: kmaufas2@usfca.edu
IRBPHS ­ Approval Notification
 
 
To: KimShree Maufas
From: Terence Patterson, IRB Chair
Subject: Protocol #853
Date: 09/02/2017
 
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the
University of San Francisco (USF) has reviewed your request for human subjects approval
regarding your study.
 
Your research (IRB Protocol #853) with the project title A Case Study of Police Presence
in Schools: The Thurgood Marshall Academic High School 10.11.02 Incident has
been approved by the IRB Chair under the rules for expedited review on 09/02/2017.
 
Any modifications, adverse reactions or complications must be reported using a
modification application to the IRBPHS within ten (10) working days.
 
If you have any questions, please contact the IRBPHS via email at IRBPHS@usfca.edu.
Please include the Protocol number assigned to your application in your correspondence.
 
On behalf of the IRBPHS committee, I wish you much success in your research.
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Sincerely,
 
Terence Patterson, EdD, ABPP
Professor & Chair, Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects
University of San Francisco
irbphs@usfca.edu
USF IRBPHS Website
